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          For many years, academics generally viewed uptick rules as short sale constraints 
that contribute to stock overvaluation and hamper stock price efficiency. Recently 
adopted Regulation SHO provides us with a natural experiment to study the impact of the 
suspension of uptick rules on various market quality measures in a controlled 
environment. In the first essay, I investigate the impact of removing short sale price test 
rules on stock returns and find that on the NYSE, removing the tick-test rule mitigates 
stock overvaluation. On the NASDAQ, however, lifting the bid-test rule goes beyond 
correcting such overvaluation. It shows that prices of high-dispersion stocks tend to be 
depressed relative to prices of low-dispersion stocks. I also examine the relationship 
between daily short selling activities and stock returns and find that on average short 
sellers are more likely to be value-driven “contrarians” who short sell following high 
stocks returns. In the second essay, I examine the information content of short selling 
around the release of analyst recommendations. By looking at the magnitude and the 
speed of price response to analyst downgrade recommendations, I provide intra-day 
evidence supporting the documented assertion that suspension of the uptick rule helps 
improve stock price efficiency. For after-hour downgrades, pilot stocks respond quickly, 
with virtually all of the price response incorporated by the following open, while control 
stocks take an extra half hour after opening to fully reflect the new information. For 
downgrades that occur during normal trading hours, downgrade information is partially 
incorporated into pilot stock prices up to two hours before the recommendation is 
released, while control stocks take up to an hour and a half after the recommendation 
release to impound the information into stock price. Finally, short selling activities prior 
to the release of analyst recommendations indicate that short sellers capitalize on their 
private information associated with upcoming downgrades in the control sample, but such 
behavior seems to disappear in the pilot sample. I conjecture that, during the pilot 
program, short sellers were aware of the SEC’s regulatory scrutiny of pilot stocks and 
thus avoided trading on their private information in those stocks. 
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In this Chapter I use Regulation SHO data from 2005 to investigate the impact of the 
suspension of uptick rules on stock returns. Consistent with extant theories, the results 
suggest that on the NYSE, the suspension of the tick-test rule for so called ‘pilot’ stocks 
mitigates overvaluation in high investor opinion dispersion stocks relative to low investor 
opinion dispersion stocks. Such overvaluation reduction effect varies depending on the 
types of stocks; it is mostly driven by small stocks and value stocks. In addition, the 
results also show that the suspension of uptick rules is not effective in reducing stock 
overvaluation in stocks with Exchange Traded Options since overvaluation in those 
stocks has already been mitigated by the introduction of options. On the NASDAQ, 
however, lifting the bid-test rule goes beyond correcting such overvaluation. It shows that 
prices of high-dispersion stocks tend to be depressed relative to prices of low-dispersion 
stocks during the sample period.  If such stock undervaluation is driven by “predatory” 
short sellers’ price manipulation, then the SEC’s recent decision of removing bid-test 
restrictions for NASDAQ listed securities may not be considered as an optimal policy. In 
addition, I investigate the relationship between daily short selling activities and stocks 
returns and find that on average short sellers are more likely to be value-driven 
“contrarians” who short sell following high stocks returns. The impact of such 
“contrarians” short selling is more profound in value stocks and large stocks. Although it 
appears that daily rebalance portfolios consisting of a long position in high-shorting 
stocks and a short position in low-shorting stocks can generate enormous abnormal 
returns, I do not interpret this as a feasible investment strategy because a high level of 
short selling occurs simultaneously with high stock returns. Investing in such a long/short 
portfolio based on past shorting information is unlikely able to generate any significant 




Uptick rules were implemented by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) in 
the 1930s.1 The original purpose of these rules was to stabilize stock markets by 
preventing short sellers from manipulating stock prices downward, especially when the 
markets trend down. For many years, academics and practitioners have argued that such 
short sale restrictions cause overvaluation in stocks with high investors’ opinions 
dispersion, thus hampering market efficiency and lowering market quality.2 To enable the 
SEC and academics to study the effect of uptick rules on market quality and trading 
processes, the SEC implemented a pilot program beginning on May 2, 2005 which 
suspended uptick rule restrictions for a set of pre-chosen “pilot stocks”. The pilot 
program established by the Regulation SHO facilitates comparison between pilot and 
control stocks, thus providing us with a natural experiment to study the effect of 
removing uptick rules on stock returns in a controlled environment. 
Using Regulation SHO data from 2005, I examine the impact of the suspension of 
uptick rules on stocks returns. Comparing pilot and control stocks listed on the NYSE 
during the sample period from May to December 2005, I find that removing the tick-test 
rule for pilot stocks mitigates overvaluation in high opinion dispersion stocks relative to 
low opinion dispersion stocks. In particular, the suspension of uptick rules on the NYSE 
can mitigate stock overvaluation as much as 3.5% of the stock value in a one year period. 
                                                 
1 Rule 10a-1 of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that an exchange-traded security may not be sold 
short at a price that is either lower or equal to the last trading price. We refer to this as the up-tick or the 
zero-plus tick rule on the NYSE. 
2 See Miller (1997), Harrison and Kreps (1978), Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite (1993), Morris (1996), 
Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2002), Scheinkman and Xiong (2001), and many others. 
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This result is consistent with the predictions of Miller (1977), Harrison and Kreps (1978), 
Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite (1993), Morris (1996), Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen 
(2002), and Scheinkman and Xiong (2001), who argue that stock overvaluation is 
associated with the presence of investor opinion dispersion and short sale constraints. The 
overvaluation reduction effect varies depending on the types of stocks; it is mostly driven 
by stocks with no options, small stocks, and value stocks. For stocks with Exchange 
Traded Options, it appears that the suspension of uptick rules can not effectively help to 
reduce the overvaluation since overvaluation in those stocks has already been mitigated 
by the introduction of options. This result is consistent with Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) 
and highlights the role of stock option as an alternative of short selling vehicle in 
reducing stock overvaluation. The implication here is that in order to mitigate stock 
overvaluation and to improve stock price efficiency, introducing stock options can be a 
substitute of removing uptick rules. 
On the NASDAQ, however, the results show that lifting the bid-price rule goes 
beyond correcting such overvaluation. The prices of high-dispersion stocks tend to be 
distressed relative to low-dispersion stocks. In this scenario, high investors’ opinions 
dispersion may be interpreted as a proxy for risk, which is consistent with Merton (1987), 
Varian (1985), Doukas et al. (2006), and Bai et al. (2006), who argue that divergence of 
opinion represents risk and consequently depresses asset prices. When the bid-price test 
rule on the NASDAQ is suspended for pilot stocks, investors who hold the most 
pessimistic opinions can aggressively submit downtick short sale orders, pushing stock 
prices down to a level that may be lower than the true stock value. In the meantime, the 
suspension of the bid-price test rule on the NASDAQ makes it easier for ‘predatory’ short 
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sellers to aggressively submit short orders and manipulate stock price downwards. 
Therefore, the results here suggest that the SEC’s recent decision to remove the bid-price 
rule on the NASDAQ may not be considered as an optimal policy if such undervaluation 
is driven by “predatory” short sellers’ price manipulation. 
In addition, I investigate the relation between daily short selling activities and 
stocks returns. The results show that on average short sellers are more likely to be value-
driven “contrarians” who short sell following high stocks returns. Such “contrarians” 
short selling is more profound in value stocks and large stocks. Comparing the long-term 
return differentials between high- and low-shorting portfolios for pilot and control stocks 
further confirms previous findings that NYSE pilot stocks tend to be less overvalued and 
NASDAQ pilot stocks tend to be undervalued. It appears that a daily rebalance portfolio 
consisting of a long position in high-shorting stocks and a short position in low-shorting 
stocks can generate an enormous return. I do not interpret this as a feasible investment 
strategy because a high level of short selling occurs simultaneously with high stock 
returns. Investing in a long/short portfolio based on past available shorting information is 
unlikely able to generate any significant abnormal returns.  
A large body of literature examines the relationship between stock returns and short 
sale constraints in the presence of heterogeneous investor expectation. Miller (1977) 
hypothesizes that stock prices reflect the most optimistic opinions since short sale 
constraints hold pessimists’ opinions off the market. In the presence of investor opinion 
dispersion and short sale constraints, asset prices tend to be overvalued. In the short term, 
the stock market only impounds the most optimistic opinions into current stock prices. As 
uncertainty resolves with time, the stock market provides lower returns for those 
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overvalued stocks. Several theoretical studies formalize Miller’s hypothesis, including 
Harrison and Kreps (1978), Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite (1993), Morris (1996), Duffie, 
Garleanu, and Pedersen (2002), and Scheinkman and Xiong (2001). However, Miller’s 
(1977) assertion that stocks would be always overvalued when short sales are restricted 
and investors’ expectations are dispersed has been challenged by Jarrow (1980), 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), Hong and Stein (2003), and Bai et al. (2007), which 
argue that divergence of opinion represents risk and consequently depresses asset prices. 
          To date, empirical studies motivated by this issue have had mixed results. For 
example, covering the period from 1988 to 2002, Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu (2006) 
find that the most short-sale constrained, high-dispersion stocks earn annualized 
abnormal returns of -14.8% to -20.7%. This suggests firms subject to both short sale 
constraints and investors’ disagreement are likely to be overvalued. In contrast, Doukas, 
Kim, and Pantzalis (2006) cover the similar period from 1983 to 2001 and adopt a similar 
methodology to Boehme et al. (2006). They find that Boehme et al. (2006)’s results are 
not systematically significant. By using an alternative proxy for investors’ opinions 
dispersion, they show that stock returns are positively associated with divergence of 
opinion. This contradicts Miller’s theory. Current conflicting empirical results could stem 
from certain limitations of study designs such as: (1) the use of proxies for short sale 
constraints with certain limitations. For example, the use of institutional ownership as a 
proxy for short sale constraint is subject to an endogeneity criticism; (2) low data 
frequency not allowing for the exploration of the time dynamics of stock returns subject 
to short sale constraints and investor opinion dispersion. Indeed, by using monthly short 
interest data, one can only construct monthly rebalanced portfolios, possibly overlooking 
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the short-term dynamics of the impact of short sale constraints on stock returns; (3) 
previous literature focuses on the long term stock returns of stocks with high-dispersion 
and high short sale constraints, ignoring the short-term feature of the stock overvaluation 
correction process.   
This paper contributes to the ongoing research by investigating whether stocks tend 
to be less overvalued when a certain short sale constraint is relaxed, using a study design 
that complements prior studies. First, I use Regulation SHO daily short selling data from 
2005 that clearly separates stocks with short sale constraints (control stocks) from stocks 
with lower short sale constraints (pilot stocks). Using this method, I examine the impact 
of the removal of short sales price test rules on stock returns. The suspension status of the 
short sales price-test rules for stocks, based on the SEC’s recently adopted Regulation 
SHO, provides us with a proxy for short sale constraints that is easy to identify and is not 
subject to an endogeneity criticism.  
Second, the use of high frequency data improves upon the calendar time portfolio 
approach in the literature. Previous literature that uses monthly short interest as a proxy 
for short sale constraints is unable to capture the daily variation of short selling activities, 
overlooking the impact of short selling on short-term stock returns. Using daily short 
selling data facilitates the examination of the impact of relaxing a short sale constraint on 
stock returns and allows me to further explore the time dynamics of how the market 
corrects stock overvaluation.  
Thirdly, the relation between daily short selling activities and stock returns is 
investigated. This paper complements the literature by providing evidence that on 
average short sellers are more likely to be “contrarians” who short sell following positive 
 7
stock returns. This is the first paper to explore the shorting-stock returns relationship by 
using a comprehensive U.S. stock market daily short selling dataset. 
Nevertheless, this study has several limitations. First, the sample period is short. I 
use only eight months of data in the analysis and this restricts the generalizability of the 
conclusions to other periods. Second, I rely on the mean scaled standard deviation of sell-
side brokerage firms’ earnings forecasts to measure the dispersion of investors’ opinions. 
This may not be a perfect proxy for opinion dispersion, because aggregated sell-side 
brokers’ earnings forecasts may be upwardly biased due to interest conflicts. Also, 
investors may form different evaluations on stock prices even when they have the same 
earnings forecast information. Thirdly, the causality relationship between “predatory” 
short selling and the undervaluation of high-dispersion stocks on the NASDAQ has yet 
been established in this paper. It is important to justify the assertion that removing the 
bid-price test rule on the NASDAQ was not an optimal policy for the SEC. Future 
research that examines the impact of removing uptick rules on “predatory” short selling 
would be a fruitful extension of this study.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the background of 
short sale constraints, uptick rules, the recently adopted Regulation SHO, and the Pilot 
Program. Section 3 reviews the current literature. Section 4 presents the testable 
hypotheses, describes data and methodologies, and constructs samples. Section 5 presents 
and discusses testing results. Several robustness tests are conducted in Section 6. Section 
7 investigates the relation between daily short selling activities and stock returns. Section 
8 provides conclusions. 
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2. The Background of Uptick Rules and the Regulation SHO 
 
2.1 Short Sale Constraints 
 
A short sale is the sale of a security by an investor who does not own it. Although 
short sales are allowed in the US equity markets, short sellers face many prohibitions and 
restrictions. First, proceeds from short sales must be deposited in the investor account as 
collateral for borrowing the shares. Short sale proceeds cannot be used to purchase other 
securities until the short position is covered. Short sellers must deposit more cash as 
collateral to meet the margin requirements if the stock price increases. Second, short 
sellers must pay interest on the shares they borrow to short. Brokers will pay rebate rates, 
which are typically lower than the market interest rate, on investors’ short sale proceeds. 
The difference between the rebate rate and the market interest rate is the direct share 
borrowing cost. In most cases, brokers also charge short sellers a share lending fee. Third, 
not all shares outstanding in the market are available for investors to borrow. Institutional 
ownership and breadth of institutional ownership are two important factors determining 
the supply of shares available to lend. It is easier for short sellers to borrow shares in 
stocks with large institutional ownership. Finally, short sellers face risks associated with a 
“short squeeze”. When the stock price jumps up dramatically in a short period, short 
sellers who don’t have enough cash to meet the margin requirement may be forced to 
close out. Moreover, many mutual funds, among other institutional investors and 
corporate insiders, are contractually or legally prohibited from short selling activities.  
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 2.2 Uptick Rules   
 
This paper focuses on uptick rules; SEC-imposed short sale constraints. The SEC 
requires investors to follow specific rules when executing a short order. The tick test rule 
was implemented in the 1930s. Rule 10a-1 of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides 
that an exchange-traded security may not be sold short at a price that is either lower or 
equal to the last trading price. We refer to this as the up-tick or the zero-plus tick rule on 
the NYSE. Since the NASDAQ was not operating as an exchange before August 1, 2006, 
NASDAQ listed stocks were not subject to Rule 10a-1. Instead, the NASD (the National 
Association of Securities Dealers) introduced in 1994 a bid-price test for NASDAQ listed 
stocks, the NASD Rule 3350, which provides that when the bid is a downtick from the 
previous bid, short sellers other than market dealers cannot short at prices lower than one 
penny above the bid. In this paper, I refer to these short sale price-test rules as uptick 
rules. The uptick rules targeted at stabilizing the market and preventing short sellers from 
manipulating stock prices downwards.  
 
2.3. Regulation SHO and the Pilot Program 
 
Regulation SHO (REG SHO) was adopted by the SEC on June 23, 2004 to provide 
a new regulatory framework associated with short sale activities in U. S. stock markets. 
Compliance with the new rule began January 3, 2005. Starting on May 2, 2005, about 
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1,000 U.S. so called Pilot Stocks, listed on both the NYSE and NASDAQ, are exempt 
from uptick rules for short sale orders. The temporary suspension was set to expire on 
April 28, 2006, but was extended to August, 2007. This experiment was designed by the 
SEC to examine whether Rule 10a-1 is effective and to evaluate the overall effectiveness 
and necessity of the tick test rule.3 The SEC's Office of Economic Analysis and academic 
researchers provided the SEC with analyses of the empirical data obtained from the pilot. 
In addition, the SEC held a roundtable in September of 2006 to discuss the results of the 
pilot. The general consensus from these analyses and the roundtable was that the SEC 
should remove tick test restrictions because they modestly reduce liquidity and do not 
appear necessary to prevent manipulation. In addition, the empirical evidence did not 
provide strong support for extending a price test to either small or thinly-traded securities 
not currently subject to a price test. In June, 2007, the SEC voted to remove the tick-test 
rule for all U.S. exchanged traded securities, effective June 6, 2007. During the period 
from May 02, 2005 to March 30, 2007, REG SHO provided us with a natural experiment 
that facilitates comparison between stocks with less short sales constraints (pilot stocks) 
and stocks with relatively more short sales constraints (control stocks) in a controlled 
environment. It also provided us with high frequency short selling data, enabling us to 
study the impact of removing the uptick rules on various market quality measures.  
 
 
                                                 
3 See http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/keyregshoissues.htm 
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3. The Literature Review 
 
3.1 Theoretical Debates 
 
 
One question that has motivated many early studies is whether stock prices tend to 
be overvalued in the presence of both investors’ opinion dispersion and short sale 
constraints. When we consider investors’ opinion dispersion and short sale constraints 
independently, rational equilibrium models tend to show that both factors may 
independently lead to a lower current price and higher future returns. Rubinstein (1974) 
argues that heterogeneous beliefs have no effect on equilibrium prices because only the 
mean of investors’ beliefs determines the current price in different states, given no short 
sale constraints. Varian (1985) adopts a utility function with constant proportional risk 
aversion and finds that divergence of investor opinion leads to a lower stock price. 
Considering short sale constraints in a rational equilibrium model, Merton (1987) shows 
that short selling constraints, by reducing the size of the market, should tend to reduce 
prices.  
Miller (1977) was the first to consider heterogeneous investors’ beliefs and short 
sale constraints together in a simple rational equilibrium model. He showed that with a 
downward sloping demand curve, higher dispersion in investors’ expectations leads to 
higher stock prices given that the supply of stocks is limited by short sale constraints. He 
also argued that “since divergence of opinion is likely to increase with risk, it is quite 
possible that expected returns will be lower for risky securities.” Therefore, with the 
existence of investor opinion dispersion and short sale constraints, asset prices tend to be 
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overvalued. In the short-term, the stock market only impounds the most optimistic 
opinions into current prices. In the long-term, as uncertainty resolves over time, the stock 
market provides lower future returns to those overvalued stocks.  
Theoretical studies in line with Miller (1977) are Harrison and Kreps (1978), Allen, 
Morris, and Postlewaite (1993), Morris (1996), Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2002), 
and Scheinkman and Xiong (2001). For example, Harrison and Kreps (1978) recognize 
that investors may have different opinions even when they have the same public 
information. There can be no objective intrinsic stock value, since stock prices are 
obtained by the market’s aggregation of diverse investor assessments. When short sales 
are constrained and speculative trading exists, some investors tend to attach a higher 
value to the ownership of the stock than they do to the ownership of the dividend streams 
because they anticipate that other investors will value the asset more, and will pay for 
more than the fundamental valuation in the future. Further, Morris (1996) shows that 
small initial differences in opinions can lead to large speculative premiums and those 
speculative premiums never disappear, even when the probability of dividend distribution 
becomes certain over time and disagreement among investors diminishes. Moreover, 
Duffie et al. (2002) build a dynamic model that considers share lending fees and short 
interest by assuming that potential short sellers must search for securities lenders and 
bargain over the lending fee. Their model shows that a decline in the lending fee 
reflecting a decline in the valuation of marginal investors will lead to a decline in stock 
prices. They also show that lending fee effects are larger for small stocks, and for stocks 
with larger differences of opinions. More recently, Schinekeman and Xiong (2003), 
replaced the finite period equilibrium model of Harrison and Kreps (1978) with a 
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continuous-time equilibrium model, in which overconfidence generates disagreements 
among investors. The authors treat the speculative holding of stocks as an option in that 
current stockholders have the right to sell when other investors have more optimistic 
opinions. Their model shows that even small differences in beliefs are sufficient to 
generate trades and inflate stock prices. 
Miller’s (1977) assertion that stocks would be overvalued when short sales are 
restricted and investors’ expectations diverge has been challenged by Jarrow (1980), 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), Hong and Stein (2003), and Bai et al. (2007), among 
others. Jarrow (1980) extends Miller’s work and shows that Miller’s argument would be 
valid only if investors agree about the covariance matrix of next period stock prices. He 
argues that when investors disagree about the covariance matrix of next period stock 
prices, the combination of heterogeneous investor beliefs (in expected returns) and short 
sale constraints will not necessarily lead to overvalued stock prices. Further, Diamond 
and Verrecchia (1987) develop a rational expectations model in which rational market 
makers set bid and ask prices such that the losses from transacting with informed traders 
are equal to profits from transacting with uninformed traders. In their model, all investors 
take into account the possibility that bad news known by pessimists has not been fully 
reflected in prices, thus they may bid down prices to reflect this unknown pessimistic 
information. Although the actual negative information is not reflected in stock prices due 
to short sale constraints, the expected negative information may already be incorporated 
in prices. Therefore, stocks may or may not be overvalued.  
Hong and Stein (2003) rely on the existence of perfectly rational arbitrageurs who 
do not face arbitrage costs. Unbiased prices are achieved by assuming that perfectly 
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rational arbitrageurs can short sell at any time without cost, thus clearing the market at a 
price equal to the expected stock value. Rational arbitrageurs who recognize that true 
stock value is lower than the optimistic investor’s valuation will short sell the stock and 
push its price back to the true value. Their model predicts unbiased prices when 
investors’ opinions diverge, especially for those stocks with very low arbitrage costs.  
More recently, Bai et al. (2007) consider a fully rational expectations equilibrium 
model, in which investors trade either to share risk or to speculate on private information. 
The existence of short sale constraints limits both types of trades and reduces the market 
informational efficiency. Their model shows that constraining short sales driven by 
private information increases the uncertainty about expected asset returns as perceived by 
uninformed investors, therefore reducing the demand for assets. When this information 
effect dominates, short sale constraints actually reduce asset prices and increase price 
volatility.  
 
3.2 Empirical Studies  
 
 
To test directly the relation between stock returns and the joint existence of short 






3.2.1 Proxies for Investor Opinion Dispersion 
 
The most commonly used proxy for dispersion of investor opinions is the standard 
deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts. For instance, Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina 
(2002) examine the valuation effect of the dispersion in analyst forecasts and find 
evidence of a “Miller effect” in that  raw returns of stocks with higher dispersion of 
analysts’ earnings forecasts (from I/B/E/S) earn lower future returns than control firms. 
The effect is more pronounced for small firms, value firms, and low momentum firms. In 
addition, Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) conduct tests using standard deviations of 
analysts’ forecasts and two additional proxies for dispersion of beliefs. They find that 
option introduction relaxes short sale constraints and explains abnormal returns resulting 
form dispersion of beliefs.  
Moreover, idiosyncratic firm volatility, the standard deviation of the error term 
from the market model, has been adopted as a proxy for investors’ disagreement.4 For 
example, Shalen (1993) and Harris and Raviv (1993) investigate the role of belief 
dispersion on trading volume and volatility and find a positive relation between return 
volatility and the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts. Other examples are Diether et al. 
(2002), and Danielsen and Sorescu (2001), among others. Further, previous literature 
reveals that high turnover and relative divergence of opinions tend to move together, thus 
high volume and turnover might indicate divergence of investors’ opinions.5 Examples 
                                                 
4 See Brown and Warner (1985) 
5 See Cooley and Roenfeldt (1975) and Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1973), among others, for detailed 
discussions. 
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that use trading volume or turnover as the proxy for investor opinions dispersion are 
Danielsen and Sorescu (2001), and Diether et al. (2002).  
More recently, Doukas et al. (2006) use an alternative measure of divergence of 
investor opinions that filters out the effect of information uncertainty. Their method is 
inspired by Barron, Kim, Lim, and Steven (1998), who argue that the dispersion in 
analysts’ forecasts is likely to be a poor proxy for investor disagreement since it is 
contaminated by the effects of uncertainty in individual forecasts about the future payoffs 
of stocks. The authors use (1-ρ) as the measure of diversity in analysts’ forecasts, where ρ 
measures the consensus in analysts’ forecasts as measured by the correlation of forecast 
errors. They find a positive relation between future stock returns and investor opinion 
dispersion, in contrast to Miller’s hypothesis. They argue that previous studies using the 
standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts as a proxy for dispersion in opinion might be 
flawed, since their dispersion measure is driven by uncertainty in analysts’ forecasts.  
 
 
3.2.2 Proxies for Short Sale Constraints 
 
Many proxies for short sale constraints have been adopted in the previous literature. 
Figlewski (1981) used monthly short interest as a proxy for short sale constraints to 
investigate whether more short sale constrained firms are overvalued, and finds evidence 
that more heavily shorted firms under-perform less than less heavily shorted firms. 
Unfortunately, his results generated from a limited sample from 1973 to 1979 also show 
that the most shorted deciles do not produce statistically significant abnormal returns. 
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Other studies using monthly short interest as a proxy for short sale constraints yield 
similar but more statistically significant results. Examples are Figlewski and Webb 
(1993), Dechow et al. (2001), and Desai et al. (2002).  
Recently, other proxies for short sales constraints have been adopted in the 
literature, such as breadth of ownership, institutional ownership, the availability of option 
chains, and the actual costs of borrowing stock. Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) test 
Miller’s hypothesis by using the breadth of stock ownership as a proxy for short sale 
constraints. They argue that a low level of institutional stock ownership signals that a 
short sales constraint is tightly binding since fewer shares will be available for short 
selling. They find that stocks whose change in breadth in the prior quarter is in the 
bottom deciles of the sample under-perform those in the top deciles by 4.95% after 
adjusting for size, book-to-market, and momentum factors. Further, Nagel (2004) 
suggests that stock loan supply tends to be spare and short sales become more expensive 
when institutional ownership is low. Using institutional ownership as a proxy for short 
sale constraints, the author finds that stocks with low institutional ownership under-react 
to bad news and over-react to good news. Similarly, Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) 
use both short interest and institutional ownership as proxies for short supply and find 
evidence consistent with Miller’s hypothesis.  
Duffie et al. (2002) emphasize the role of the share lending market in shaping short 
sale constraints by assuming that short sellers face significant search costs and need to 
bargain over the lending fee. For rational arbitrageurs, arbitrage is not costless. For the 
short seller, the costs associated with short selling directly reduce the shorting demand. 
D’Avolio (2002) directly links short sale constraints with share lending costs. The author 
 18
used data for costs of short selling during the period from 2000 to 2001 to examine the 
relationship between short sale constraints and stock returns. He found that an increase in 
share lending costs accompanies higher disagreement among investors. Similarly, Reed 
(2003) studied rebate rates in the equity market as a proxy for short sale constraints. He 
showed that stock prices are slower to incorporate information when lending fees are 
high. Jones and Lamont (2002) utilized share lending costs data covering the period from 
1926 to 1933, when there was a centralized market on the NYSE for borrowing stocks. 
They found that overpricing of stocks that are expensive to short is sufficiently large to 
produce profits for short sellers after adjusting for lending costs.  
These proxies for short sale constraints have certain limitations. First, due to data 
frequency, prior studies using monthly short interest as the proxy for short sale 
constraints may overlook the short-term impact of short sale constraints on stock returns 
and thus be unable to carry out a time dynamics analysis of how the market corrects stock 
overvaluation over time. Second, adopting institutional ownership as a proxy for short 
sale constraints may be subject to an endogeneity problem. Indeed, Chen et al. (2002) 
point out that the positive relation between institutional ownership and subsequent stock 
return may not be due to short sale constraints at all, but rather may be due to institutional 
investors’ ability to choose stocks that perform better. Third, if divergence of investors’ 
opinions is an increasing function of share lending costs, then we need to pay attention to 
multicollinearity in econometric tests.  
In this paper, high-frequency Regulation SHO data allows for the analysis of daily 
short selling data instead of monthly short interest to explore the time dynamics of the 
impact of certain short sale constraints, namely, the uptick rules, on stock returns. Also, 
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the use of uptick rule exempt status to proxy for short sale constraints clearly 
distinguishes stocks with less short sale constraints (pilot stocks) from stocks with more 
short sale constraints. 
 
3.3 Regulation SHO and Related Studies 
 
 
To enable the SEC and academics to study the effect of uptick rules on market 
quality and the trading process, beginning on May 2, 2005, the SEC implemented the 
Pilot Program, which suspends uptick rule restrictions for a set of pre-chosen “pilot 
stocks”. The Pilot Program, established by the Regulation SHO, facilitates comparison 
between pilot and control stocks, thus providing us with a natural experiment to study the 
effect of removing the uptick rules in a controlled environment. Many researchers have 
been motivated to investigate the relation between short selling price test rules and 
market quality.  
The Office of Economics Analysis of the SEC (2007) used SHO data during the 
period from January to October in 2005 to compare pilot and control stocks along 
numerous dimensions. They found that price restrictions constitute an economically 
relevant constraint on short selling. Suspending price restrictions for pilot stocks has an 
effect on the mechanics of short selling, order routing decisions, displayed depth, and 
intraday volatility, but does not has a deleterious impact on market quality or liquidity. 
They also found that the tick test of Rule 10a-1 on the NYSE acts as a more binding 
constraint than the bid test on the NASDAQ. Similarly, Diether, Lee, and Werner (2006) 
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examined a SHO dataset for a shorter period from February to July in 2005. They found 
that the suspension of the tick-test rule for NYSE pilot stocks was associated with wider 
spreads, more symmetric trading patterns, and higher volatility, while there is no 
significant effect on market quality for NASDAQ pilot stocks, suggesting that the lifting 
of the bid-test rule for NASDAQ stocks may not improve price efficiency. Further, 
Alexander and Peterson (2006) utilized a two month SHO dataset from April to May in 
2005, and found that lifting the tick-test rule for NYSE pilot stocks is associated with a 
decrease in liquidity but similar measures of market efficiency as control stocks, and that 
the suspension of the NASDAQ bid test rule has little impact on nearly all market price 
efficiency measures.  
While these studies examine the effect of removing uptick rules on various market 
quality measures, this paper complements the literature by focusing on examining the 
impact of relaxing one kind of short sale constraint, the uptick rule, on cross-sectional 





4.1 Testable Hypotheses   
 
 
          The goal of this paper is to analyze the role of short sale constraints in shaping 
cross sectional future stock returns. Specifically, three non-mutually-exclusive 
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hypotheses about the relation between short sale constraints, investor opinion dispersion, 
and stock future returns are tested.  
          The first hypothesis takes Miller’s (1977) view that stock prices tend to be 
overvalued in the presence of both short sale constraints and investor opinion dispersion. 
In this paper, I measure overvaluation in stocks with high investor opinion dispersion as 
the return differential between low- and high-dispersion portfolios, and examine the role 
of uptick rules as a short sale constraint. When uptick rules are in effect, a significant 
proportion of investors who hold the most negative opinions on a certain stock are 
prohibited from short selling at a desired price.  Reduced selling pressure on this stock 
leads to an upwardly biased price and a subsequent low future return. When uptick rules 
are suspended for pilot stocks during the pilot program, it would help short sellers to 
promptly register their negative opinions into stock value, thus mitigating the 
overvaluation in stocks with high investor opinion dispersion. Therefore, the first 
hypothesis states that the return differential between low- and high-dispersion portfolios 
should be positive for both pilot and control stocks, and that the return differential 
between low- and high-dispersion portfolios should be smaller for pilot stocks than for 
control stocks. Specifically, the first hypothesis can be expressed as the following.  
0)31()31(:1 >−>− pilotcontrol DDDDH ,  
where D1 is the low-dispersion portfolio return and D3 is the high-dispersion portfolio 
return.  
          The second hypothesis states that market prices will be unbiased and future returns 
will be independent of uptick rule restrictions. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) model a 
rational market maker who sets bids and asks prices rationally. Even with heterogeneous 
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expectation and short sale constraints, the equity price may be unbiased. Similarly, Hong 
and Stein (2000) introduce rational arbitrageurs who face no short sale constraints in a 
rational equilibrium model. The arbitrageurs observe the actions of overconfident 
investors with short sale constraints and formulate rational expected stock prices. Any 
upward biased stock price will be corrected by arbitrageurs. Thus, the second hypothesis 
states that there is an ambiguous relation between short sale constraints and future stock 
returns, and the return differential between high and low dispersion portfolios will not be 
smaller for pilot stocks than those for control stocks. The second hypothesis can be 
expressed as the following. 
0)31()31(:2 =−=− pilotcontrol DDDDH  
          The third hypothesis views investors’ disagreement as a measure of risk. According 
to Merton (1987), this indicates a more volatile and less predictable earnings stream, and 
stocks with higher dispersions in analysts’ forecast should earn higher future returns. 
More recently, Bai et al (2006) suggest that constraining short sales increases the 
uncertainty about expected assets returns as perceived by uninformed investors. When the 
difference between investors’ opinions is significant, short sale constraints increase risk, 
thus lowering asset prices, leading to higher future returns. Hence, the third hypothesis 
suggests that the return differential between low and high dispersion portfolios should be 
negative, and that the return differential between low- and high-dispersion portfolios will 
not necessarily be smaller for pilot stocks than for control stocks. The third hypothesis is 
expressed as the following. 
Controlpilotpilotcontrol DDDDandDDDDH )31()31(,0)31(,0)31(:3 −><=−<−<−  
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4.2 Description of the Regulation SHO Data  
 
This study covers the period from January 2005 through December 2005. The 
NYSE Regulation SHO data is obtained from the NYSE TAQ dataset and the NASDAQ 
SHO data is provided by the NASD (National Association of Stock Dealers). The 
following variables are included in the Reg SHO data: market center, stock symbol, trade 
date, trade time, price, and short size (number of shares sold short). To demonstrate the 
difference in short selling activities between the pilot and control samples, I measure 
short selling activity in four different ways. The first measure is the short selling ratio, the 
fraction of trading volume for a given stock on a given day associated with short selling. 
Second, I define the short order size as the number of shares in a given short selling order 
for a given stock on a given day. The third measure is the number of executed short sale 
orders. The fourth measure is the total number of shares short sold on a given stock on a 
given day and is referred to as the daily short volume. Table 1 compares four measures of 
short selling activities for the pilot and control samples during both the post and pre-SHO 
periods on either the NYSE or the NASDAQ. The post-SHO period was from May to 
December 2005 and the pre-SHO period was from January to April 2005.  
Panel A of Table 1 shows that during the post-SHO period, on the NYSE, the short 
selling ratio for pilot stocks is greater than for control stocks by approximately 2%. It also 
shows that the daily short volume and the number of short orders are significantly greater 
for pilot stocks than for control stocks. This result is in line with the expectation that the 
relaxation of short selling restrictions effectively stimulates short selling activities. Of 
interest here, the average short order size for pilot stocks was significantly smaller than 
 24
that for the control stocks. Here, I consider two possible explanations. The first is that 
lifting the tick-test rule restriction may increase short demand from smaller traders, and 
the second is that relaxing the tick-test restriction may make it easier for institutional 
investors to split a big short order into several smaller ones, a trading pattern known as 
the ‘stealth trading’.6 In addition, the pre-SHO short selling measures for the pilot and 
control samples were not statistically different from zero, indicating that when the pilot 
and control stocks are subject to identical uptick rule restrictions, as they were before the 
pilot program, there is no observable difference in short selling activities between the 
pilot and control samples. 
Panel B of Table 1 shows that the effect of the suspension of the bid-price rule on 
the short selling ratio on the NASDAQ was similar to that on the NYSE. The short 
selling ratio for pilot stocks was 1.4% greater than that for control stocks. Not 
surprisingly, it also shows that while the shorting volume and the number of shorting 
orders were greater in the pilot sample than in the control sample, the shorting size was 
smaller in the pilot sample than in the control sample. Again, during the pre-SHO period, 
those short selling measures were essentially the same for the pilot and control samples 
on the NASDAQ.  




                                                 
6 See details of ‘stealth trading’ in Barclay and Warner (1993) 
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4.3 Sample Construction and Descriptive Summaries  
 
Previous literature reveals that the impact of uptick rule suspension on market 
quality is different for NYSE-listed stocks and for NASDAQ-listed stocks. Diether, Lee, 
and Werner (2006) and the Office of Economic Analysis of the SEC (2007) argue that the 
NYSE’s tick test is a more binding rule for short sellers. Furthermore, Diether, Lee, and 
Werner (2006) argue that NASDAQ’s bid-price test rule has a much more limited effect 
on the trading strategies of short sellers than the tick-test rule on the NYSE, because short 
sellers of NASDAQ-listed stocks can use a more natural mixture of aggressive 
marketable limited orders and passive limit orders to execute their short sales.7 Therefore, 
I perform separate analyses of NYSE-listed and NASDAQ-listed stock to accommodate 
different natures of uptick rule constraints on the NYSE and NASDAQ-listed stocks.  
The NYSE daily pilot stocks lists are obtained from the NYSE. On May 2, 2005, 
there are 486 NYSE-listed pilot stocks. To eliminate the potential effect of index 
inclusion or index exclusion on stock returns, I require that sample stocks were members 
of the Russell 3000 index after the June 2004 reconstitution, and remained in the Russell 
3000 member list after the June 2005 reconstitution. Thus, I exclude stocks that were 
added to the index due to IPOs during the period June 2004 through the end of 2005, as 
well as stocks that were eliminated during the same period due to mergers, bankruptcies, 
and ticker changes. The remaining NYSE pilot stock sample includes 466 stocks.  
                                                 
7 If the short seller submits a market order that cannot be executed at or below the bid due to the uptick rule, 
market dealers on the NASDAQ will treat this order as a limit order to sell at a price of one penny above 
the bid. This is a typical marketable limited order. 
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The SEC chose pilot stocks from the Russell 3000 membership list by ranking on 
average daily dollar trading volume for the previous year and then selecting every third 
stock as a pilot stock; the remaining stocks in the Russell 3000 are control stocks. This 
process should have eliminated any systematic difference between pilot and control 
stocks. To construct the NYSE samples, I first include the Russell 3000 stocks that were 
listed on the NYSE. Second, I exclude stocks that were added to or eliminated from the 
index. Excluding stocks on the pilot stock list as of May 2, 2005 resulted in 937 stocks in 
the control sample; roughly as twice as many as the pilot sample.  
The NASDAQ pilot stock list is from the NASD (National Association of Securities 
Dealers). Following similar selection criteria as used for the NYSE pilot and control 
samples, I construct a NASDAQ pilot sample with 404 pilot stocks and a NASDAQ 
control sample with 778 control stocks.  
Stock returns are from the Center for Research in Securities Price (CRSP) Daily 
Stocks Combined Files. Firms’ book values are from COMPUSTAT. Book value is 
defined as the book value of stockholders’ equity, plus deferred tax and investment tax 
credits, minus the book value of preferred stock. Preferred stock values are calculated by 
taking the maximum of redemption, liquidation, or par value of preferred stock. Then the 
firm’s book value is divided by market capitalization to form the book to market ratio, 
which was updated each day. The data on analysts’ earnings estimates are from the Fist 
Call Historical Estimates. Option availability data was obtained from CBOE (Chicago 
Board of Option Exchange). The summary statistics based on various firm-specific 
characteristics for both pilot sample and control sample during the pre- and post-SHO 
period from May to December 2005 are detailed in Table 2.  
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(Insert Table 2 about here) 
 
Table 2 shows that during the post-SHO sample period, the pilot sample is 
generally well-matched with the control sample on firm size, book to market ratio, daily 
turnover, and analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion. Differences in these characteristics 
between two samples are not significantly different from zero. Panel A of Table 2 shows 
that the average daily raw return for the pilot sample is significantly greater than for the 
control sample, indicating that without the tick-test rule restriction, pilot stocks tended to 
be less overvalued. However, factors other than the tick-test rule suspension status may 
have contributed to such return difference. To adjust for stock market systematic risk, I 
use the risk-adjusted (beta excess) returns to measure the return differences. The results 
show that there is no statistically significant distinction between the pilot sample and the 
control sample. According to option availability information from the CBOE, about 50% 
of control stocks have options available while 46% of pilot stocks have options available. 
This slight difference in the option availability may also contribute to the return 
difference between pilot and control samples, making it necessary to control for the 
option availability in later analysis. Panel B of Table 2 shows that there is no statistically 
significant difference between the NASDAQ pilot sample and the NASDAQ control 
samples in terms of various firm-specific characteristics, such as investor opinion 
dispersion, firm size, book-to-market ratio, turnover, and daily stock returns, except that 
the option availability ratio was slightly greater in the NASDAQ pilot sample than in the 
NASDAQ control sample.  
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4.4 Matching Samples by Firm size and Book-to-Market Ratio 
 
One of the potential problems in the previous sample construction is that the sample 
size was not matched for the pilot and control samples. There are about twice as many 
stocks in the control sample as in the pilot sample. The larger the number of stocks in the 
control sample the greater the portfolio diversification effect will be, because the 
idiosyncratic risk would be lower in a larger portfolio than in a smaller portfolio. Thus, 
when we compare the stock overvaluation, measured by the return differential between 
low and high dispersion portfolios for the pilot and control samples, t-statistics for both 
low- and high-dispersion portfolio returns may be overestimated in control stocks.  
To address the issue, I further construct the control sample that matches the pilot 
sample on firm size and book-to-market ratio and with the same number of stocks in the 
sample. Matching is performed as follows. First, I select 466 NYSE-listed pilot stocks. 
Then the CRSP and COMPSTAT databases are checked to see if the stocks had positive 
book-to-market ratios. Stocks with negative book-to-market ratios are excluded from the 
analysis to reduce the effect of outliers. The resulting pilot sample has 418 stocks. Next, 
stocks in the control sample are matched with selected pilot stocks by year-end 2004 
market capitalization and year-end 2004 book-to-market ratios, resulting in 418 pairs of 
stocks in both the pilot and the control samples. The same matching process is conducted 
for NASDAQ-listed stocks. The matched NASDAQ sample includes 358 pairs of pilot 
and control stocks. The results for the matched control samples are presented with those 
for the un-matched control samples in the following analysis. 
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4.5. The Calendar-time Portfolio Approach with Holding Period Dynamics 
 
The extant literature measures stock overvaluation by the subsequent abnormal 
returns of various test portfolios.8 In this paper, I use the return differential between low- 
and high-dispersion portfolios as a proxy for overvaluation in high-dispersion stocks 
relative to low-dispersion stocks. If overvaluation is caused by disagreement among 
investors, then portfolios consisting of high-dispersion stocks would yield lower risk-
adjusted returns than the portfolio consisting of low-dispersion stocks in the presence of 
short sale constraints. Therefore, a positive value of the return differential between low- 
and high-dispersion portfolios would provide evidence in support of the first hypothesis 
which states that high-dispersion stocks tend to be overvalued relative to low-dispersion 
stocks and consequently have lower subsequent future returns than low-dispersion stocks. 
Similarly, a negative value of the return differential between low- and high-dispersion 
stocks would support the second hypothesis which states that high-dispersion stocks tend 
to be undervalued, and thus outperform low-dispersion stocks in the subsequent period.  
One of most important issues in measuring portfolio returns is how to remedy the 
cross-sectional dependence among stocks. Cross-sectional dependence in stock returns 
data is likely to exist when at least some of the returns are sampled from common time 
periods. Cross-sectional stock return variations are likely correlated with each other due 
to the common market shocks. In such a context, procedures based on the assumption of 
independence can yield biased estimates of standard error and, therefore, can lead to 
incorrect statistical inferences. Instead of using the buy and hold abnormal returns 
                                                 
8 Methodology details can be found in Diether et al. (2002) and Boehme et al. (2006) 
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method (BHAR) or the cumulative abnormal return method (CAR) adopted by Denielsen 
and Sorescu (2001), I adopt a calendar-time portfolio approach, which was proposed by 
Boehme and Sorescu (2002) and adopted by Boehmer et al. (2006). Each day, I sort 
stocks into different categories based on the measure of investors’ opinions dispersion, 
then I hold an equally weighted portfolio for a specific holding period and calculat3 the 
holding period on the cumulative portfolio return. This process is repeated each day 
during the sampling period from May to December 2005, generating series of 170 
observations of cumulative portfolio returns for each holding period. Finally, the specific 
holding period cumulative return is defined to the simple average of 170 different holding 
period portfolio returns, and t-statistics are calculated based on the standard error of this 
time series of observations. 
The BHAR and CAR methods are highly vulnerable to the problems of cross 
sectional dependence among firms, which may exacerbate the effects of a potentially 
misspecified asset pricing model, thus inflating t-statistics. The calendar-time 
methodology automatically remedies the cross correlations of event firm abnormal 
returns by aggregating data so as to form a time series of observations and conducting 
hypothesis tests based on the standard errors of those series of (presumably) cross-
sectional independent observations.9 Thus, the calendar-time portfolio approach is less 
susceptible to the misspecified model problem in the context of cross-sectional 
dependence among stocks.  
Another issue in measuring the portfolio returns is the choice of the stock returns 
period. Due to data frequency limitations, the previous literature measures portfolio 
                                                 
9 see Bernard (1987)  
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returns by holding stocks for a period equal to or longer than one month, assuming that it 
takes more than a month for the market to correct stock overvaluation. However, it is 
possible that the impact of short sale constraints will be reflected in stock prices sooner 
than one month. Previous studies using monthly short interest have been unable to 
investigate the short-term dynamics on how stock overvaluation is corrected as 
uncertainty resolves over time. Indeed, previous literature that calculates one month or 
one year portfolios’ returns yields conflicting results. For example, Boehme, Danielsen, 
and Sorescu (2006) find that during the period 1988-2002, the monthly holding period 
abnormal returns for stocks with the most short sale constraints and opinion dispersion 
were significantly negative. In contrast, covering the period from 1983 to 2001 and using 
similar proxies for short sale constraints and dispersion, Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis 
(2006) adopt a similar monthly holding period portfolio construction approach, but fail to 
draw a significant statistical inference for negative abnormal returns for high-dispersion 
stocks. In this paper, high frequency data provides me with great flexibility in choosing 
stock return period, and allows me to conduct a time dynamics analysis on how the 
market corrects stock overvaluation as uncertainty resolve over time.  
In this section, I develop a holding period dynamic analysis method based on the 
calendar-time portfolio approach. To construct portfolios with holding periods ranging 
from one day to one year, I first sort both pilot and control stocks into thirds based on the 
measure of investors’ opinions dispersion. Investors’ opinions dispersion is measured as 
the standard deviation of earnings forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the mean 
earnings forecasts. Then I hold an equally-weighted portfolio for a variety of periods 
ranging from one day to one year. This process is repeated each day from May 2, 2005 to 
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Dec 30, 2005, so there is an overlap of 170 holding periods on the portfolio returns. Each 
portfolio return is the average of 170 different accumulative portfolio returns with 
holding periods in the same range as above. If lifting uptick rules relaxes short sale 
constraints and mitigates stock overvaluation, then the return differential between low 
and high dispersion portfolios will be less for pilot stocks than for control stocks. 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
 
5.1. The Impact of Uptick Rules on Stock Raw Returns      
      
In this section following the calendar-time portfolio approach described in the 
previous section, I use raw stock returns in calculating portfolio returns for both low-and 
high-dispersion stock portfolios. Then, the return differentials between low-and high-
dispersion portfolios, the proxy for the overvaluation in high-dispersion stocks relative to 
low-dispersion stocks, are calculated for both the pilot and control samples on the NYSE. 
The return differentials are denoted as (D1-D3) in Table 4, where D1 is the low-
dispersion portfolio return and D3 is the high-dispersion portfolio return.  
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
 
Table 4 shows that the raw-return differential between low- and high-dispersion 
portfolios in the control sample is significantly positive for holding periods greater than 
42 days (approximately two months), indicating that it takes at least two months for the 
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market to begin to correct overvaluation in high opinion dispersion stocks. In contrast, 
return differentials between low- and high-dispersion portfolios in the pilot sample are 
not statistically different from zero for any holding periods, suggesting that when the 
uptick restriction is no longer biding, high-dispersion stocks do not underperform relative 
to low-dispersion stocks in the pilot sample. This is supportive of the first hypothesis 
which states that the suspension of the tick-test rule helps to impound available negative 
opinions into stocks prices, thus reducing overvaluation in high-dispersion pilot stocks.  
 
5.2. Controlling for Systematic (beta) Risk  
 
It appears that on the NYSE, the suspension of uptick rules eliminates stock 
overvaluation when the raw stock returns are used in calculating portfolio returns. 
However, it is realistic to expect that overvaluation in pilot stocks would be mitigated, 
rather than be entirely eliminated, because other short sales constraints still exist and are 
effective in preventing the market from reflecting the most pessimistic opinions. The 
unmatched risk profiles in the pilot and the control samples may bias the results. To 
control for the systematic (beta) risk factor, I re-calculate the return differentials between 
low- and high-dispersion portfolios by using the systematic risk adjusted returns (beta 
excess returns). To calculate the beta excess returns, I follow a two-step procedure. First, 
I run the following market model based on previous year stock returns data to calculate 
beta estimates for all available stocks in the CRSP dataset.  
itftmtiitftit RRRR εβα +−⋅+=− )( ;  
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In the equation, itR  is stock returns, mtR is the market return, measured by value-weighted 
market return, and ftR  is the risk free rate, measured by three-month Treasury bill rate. 
Then, I rank stocks into 10 deciles based on beta estimates. Finally, I calculate beta 
excess return as the difference between the stock daily returns and beta ranking portfolio 
returns for both pilot and control stocks.  
Table 5 reports the mean beta estimates for both the pilot and control samples on 
the NYSE based on 2004 and 2005 stock returns data. It shows that the pilot sample has a 
lower mean estimated beta than the control sample in year 2004 and year 2005. One-
tailed tests for the beta difference between two samples generate p-value of 81% for year 
2004 and 84% for year 2005. Although the differences are not significant at the 
conventional level of 95%, it suggests that using raw returns to compare the pilot sample 
and the control sample may be misleading because the beta risk profiles for both samples 
are essentially different. This motivates me to use beta excess returns to calculate return 
differentials between low-and high-dispersion portfolios hereafter.  
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
 
Next, the calendar time portfolio approaches based on the beta excess returns are 
conducted for the pilot sample, the control sample, and the size and book-to-market ratio 
matched control sample on either the NYSE or the NASDAQ. The results are presented 
in Table 6. Panel A in Table 6 report the beta excess return differentials between low- 
and high-dispersion portfolios for the pilot sample, control sample, and size and book-to-
market ratio matched control sample on the NYSE. It shows that after controlling for 
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systematic risks, the return differentials between low and high-dispersion portfolios are 
significantly positive for holding periods greater than ten days in the pilot sample, and 
such positive differentials are significant for holding periods greater than five days in the 
control sample. This is in line with the first hypothesis, which states that high-dispersion 
stocks tend to be overvalued relative to low-dispersion stocks in the presence of both 
short sale constraints and investor opinion dispersion. Since the return differentials 
between low- and high-dispersion portfolios are positive for both pilot and control stocks 
during the post-SHO period, investor opinion dispersion tends not be a measure of risk.  
Further, comparing columns (1) and (2), I find that low- and high-dispersion 
portfolio return differentials are smaller for pilot stocks than for control stocks across 
most holding periods. The hypothesis that the return differential between low- and high-
dispersion portfolios is smaller for pilot stocks than for control stocks cannot be rejected 
at a 5% significance level for most holding periods. The results are stronger, when I use 
the firm size and book-to-market ratio matched control sample, as shown in column (3) 
of Table 6. The magnitude of the return differential between low- and high-dispersion 
portfolios is generally greater in the matched control sample than in the un-matched 
control sample. While t-statistics for return differentials are slightly lower in the matched 
control sample than in the un-matched control sample, they remain statistically 
significant across virtually all holding periods. Comparing the matched pilot and control 
samples in columns (1) and (3), I find that in a one year time period, the difference of 
return differential between the match pilot and control samples can be as high as 3.5% of 
the stock value, suggesting that the suspension of uptick rules on the NYSE can mitigate 
stock overvaluation as much as 3.5% of the stock value. Again, I cannot reject the 
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hypothesis that the return differential between low- and high-dispersion portfolios is 
smaller in the pilot sample than in the control sample at a 5% significance level for 200 
out of 251 holding periods.  
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
 
Figure 1 shows the time paths of correcting stock overvaluation as uncertainty 
resolves over time on the NYSE for pilot and control stocks. First, the return differentials 
between low- and high-dispersion portfolios in the control sample are generally greater 
than in the pilot sample across virtually all holding periods. Second, the return 
differentials between low- and high-dispersion portfolios are even greater in the matched 
control sample than in the control sample. Thirdly, the return differentials between low- 
and high-dispersion portfolios in the pilot sample diminish, but never reach zero over a 
one year time period. This is a reasonable result, because on the one hand, when the tick-
test rule is suspended for pilot stocks, other short sale constraints still exist, preventing 
the market from fully correcting all the overvaluation; on the other hand, firms’ earnings 
uncertainty will not diminish to zero over time, because as the uncertainty in the most 
recent quarter’s earning resolves with time, the uncertainty in the forthcoming quarter’s 
earnings emerges.  
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
 
The NASDAQ results are presented in Panel B of Table 6. These results show a 
similar pattern of the return differentials between low- and high-dispersion portfolios for 
control stocks listed on the NASDAQ as for control stocks listed on the NYSE. 
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Surprisingly, instead of having a smaller positive return differential than control stocks, 
pilot stocks on the NASDAQ now have a significant negative return differential between 
low- and high-dispersion portfolios across most holding periods. This result indicates that 
when uptick rules were suspended on the NASDAQ during the Pilot Program, high-
dispersion stock prices were depressed relative to low-dispersion stock prices. This leads 
to higher subsequent future returns for high-dispersion stocks than for low-dispersion 
stocks, or negative low- and high-dispersion portfolio return differentials.  In particular, 
column (1) in Panel B of Table 6 shows that high-dispersion pilot stocks subsequently 
out-perform low-dispersion pilot stocks by as much as 4.17% of the stock value in a one 
year time period. Further, Figure 2 shows that on the NASDAQ, the market corrects 
overvaluation in high-dispersion pilot stocks quickly in a very short time period, then it 
goes further to depress high-dispersion pilot stock prices. Such negative return 
differential eventually diminishes to zero over a longer period.  
(Insert Figure 2 about here) 
 
The surprising results here suggest that removing the bid-test rule on the 
NASDAQ goes beyond mitigating overvaluation in high-dispersion stocks; it leads to 
depressed prices for those stocks. This is supportive of Merton (1975), Bai et al (2006), 
and Doukas et al. (2006) who argue that opinions’ dispersion represents risk, thus 
depressing stock prices. When the bid-price test rule is suspended for NASDAQ pilot 
stocks, dispersion in analysts’ forecasts likely indicates a more volatile earnings stream, 
and prices of stocks with higher dispersion are downwardly biased, leading to a higher 
future return than low-dispersion stocks. With no bid-price test restriction, investors who 
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hold more pessimistic opinions can short sell stocks at a price that may be lower than the 
true stock value. Also, the suspension of the bid-price test rule makes it easier for 
predatory short sellers to aggressively submit short orders and manipulate stock prices 
downwards.10 Therefore, the results here also indicate the possibility that removing the 
bid-price test rule on the NASDAQ makes it easier for “predatory” short sellers to 
manipulate stock prices downward. According to Reuters News August 9, 2007, "The 
hedge funds were very, very aware of this (the removal of the tick-test rule). They sit 
around and giggle when this stuff happens," said Mallory Hill, chief executive of 
mortgage lender Novelle Financial Services. "Without the uptick rule, they can put 
anyone out of business." Further, Mortgage lenders, battered by the subprime lending 
crisis, are particularly worried that removing short sale restrictions has contributed to 
their sector's troubles. These media reports highlighted concerns that the bid-price test 
rule on the NASDAQ may be effective in preventing short sellers from manipulating 
prices downwards and suggested that removing the bid-price test rule on the NASDAQ 
may not be considered as an optimal policy.  
 
6. Robustness Tests 
 
To ascertain that the effects of the suspension of uptick rules on the stock return I 
have documented thus far are not caused by statistical flukes or by other systematic 
                                                 
10 Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) define predatory short selling as the trading that induces and/or 
exploits the need of other investors to reduce their positions. If one or a group of traders needs to sell, 
others may also engage in selling (or short selling) and then cover their positions for a profit by buying the 
stock at a lower price. 
 39
differences between the pilot and control stocks, I conduct several additional tests to 
demonstrate robustness. 
 
6.1 Controlling for Exchange Traded Options 
 
Since options provide pessimists with an alternative vehicle to speculate on their 
negative private information, short sale constraints will be mitigated by their presence. 
Stocks with options will be less overvalued (or depressed) than those without (e.g. 
Danielsen and Sorescu (2001)). Therefore, for stocks with options, it is reasonable to 
expect that the effect of the suspension of the tick-test rule in mitigating high-dispersion 
stock overvaluation would be minor. In this section, I control for the effect of option 
availability by separating stocks with options from stocks with no options. Table 7 
presents the return differentials between low- and high-dispersion portfolios for stocks 
with options and stocks with no options.  
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
 
First, Panel A of Table 7 shows that on the NYSE, control stocks with options tend 
to have a smaller return differential between low- and high-dispersion portfolios than 
control stocks with no options. This suggests that the presence of options tended to 
mitigate stock overvaluation for control stocks. This finding is consistent with Danielsen 
and Sorescu (2001), who argue that as an alternative to short selling, the option relaxes 
short sale constraints, thus mitigating stock overvaluation. Second, comparing columns (1) 
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and (3), it shows that for stocks with no option, the effect of mitigating overvaluation in 
the high-dispersion portfolio due to the suspension of the tick-test rule was profound. In 
contrast, comparing columns (4) and (6), I do not find a smaller return differential 
between low- and high-dispersion portfolios for pilot stocks with options. This is in line 
with the expectation that the effect of reducing high-dispersion stock overvaluation by the 
suspension of the tick-test rule is not significant for stocks with options, because as an 
alternative to short, exchange traded options helped to reduce the overvaluation in pilot 
stocks before the suspension of the tick-test rule took effect. This is consistent with 
Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) and highlights the role of stock option as an alternative of 
short selling vehicle in reducing stock overvaluation. The implication here is that in order 
to mitigate stock overvaluation and to improve stock price efficiency, introducing stock 
options can be a substitute of removing uptick rules. 
The overvaluation correction time paths for NYSE stocks with no option and with 
options are displayed in Figure 3. It illustrates that the suspension of the tick-test rule 
works well in mitigating overvaluation for stocks with no option, but not in stocks with 
options.  
(Insert Figure 3 about here) 
 
Panel B of Table 7 reports the results for NASDAQ-listed stocks. Similarly, it 
shows that overvaluation in control stocks was less severe in the sample with options than 
in the sample with no options. For pilot stocks, those with options experienced more 
undervaluation than those with no options, indicating that in addition to the suspension of 
the bid-price test rule, the option is another important force that depresses high-dispersion 
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stocks listed on the NASDAQ. The time paths of correcting overvaluation 
(undervaluation) for both pilot and control stocks on the NASDAQ are presented in 
Figure 4. 
(Insert Figure 4 about here) 
 
6.2. Double Sorting by Size and Dispersion 
 
One may argue that the stock return difference may be caused by firm-specific 
characteristics such as firm size. To control for the firm size factor, the portfolios are 
double sorted by size and investors’ opinion dispersion. Each day, stocks are assigned to 
one of three thirds based on the level of market capitalization. Then, I rank stocks in each 
size thirds into three further thirds based on analyst earnings forecasts dispersion. Each of 
the nine resulting portfolios contained an average of 51 stocks in the pilot sample and 104 
stocks in the control sample for the NYSE-listed stocks. For NASDAQ-listed stocks, 
there was an average of 45 stocks in the pilot sample and 100 stocks in the control sample. 
(Insert Table 8 about here) 
 
Panel A of Table 8 presents the return differentials between low- and high-
dispersion portfolios in small and large stocks for both the pilot and control samples on 
the NYSE. It suggests that the effect of overvaluation reduction is much more profound 
in small stocks than in large stocks. Comparing columns (1) and column (3) in Panel A of 
Table 8, I find that the return differential between low- and high-dispersion portfolios in 
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small pilot stocks is much less than that in small control stocks across all holding periods, 
and that the difference of return differential between the pilot and the control samples can 
be as much as 5.7 % of the stock value over a one year time period.  
In contrast, such effect was relatively small in large stocks with the largest 
overvaluation reduction of 2.26% for pilot stocks with the180-day holding period. It 
seems that we are picking up a small firm effect, which is further demonstrated in Figures 
5. Here, I consider two explanations for the “small firm effect” shown in Table 8. First, it 
is likely that the actual earnings uncertainty in a small firm would be much larger than 
what is reflected in analysts’ earnings estimates due to the lower analyst coverage in 
small firms than in large firms. When a short sale constraint is relaxed, the initial larger 
overvaluation in small stocks will be corrected by short sales with a larger magnitude. 
Second, stock trading liquidity is generally lower for a small firm than for a large firm. 
Made feasible by the suspension of uptick rules, downtick shorting orders may have a 
larger impact on small stock prices than on large stock prices.  
(Insert Figures 5 and 6 about here) 
 
Panel B of Table 8 shows the results for NASDAQ-listed stocks. It shows that the 
previously documented undervaluation of high-dispersion pilot stocks was mostly driven 
by large stocks. In particular, while the market corrected as much as 5.98 % 
undervaluation in large pilot stocks in 140 days (about seven months), there is no 
systematic undervaluation in small pilot stocks. I do not find a “small firm effect” in the 
NASDAQ results. Instead, the results in column (1) and column (3) of Panel B show that 
overvaluation in small pilot stocks was even larger than that in small control stocks for 
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holding periods less than 40 days. The time paths of correcting overvaluation or 
undervaluation in NASDAQ stocks are graphed in Figure 6.  
 
6.3. Double Sorting by Book-to-Market Ratio and Dispersion 
 
To test if I was picking up a book-to-market effect in returns, I double sort stocks 
on book-to-market ratio and investors’ opinions dispersion. Each day, stocks are first 
sorted into three categories based on the level of book-to-market ratio. Then, in each 
book-to-market category, I further sort stocks into three thirds according to dispersion in 
analysts’ forecasts, resulting in nine portfolios for both pilot and control stocks. Table 9 
presents the return differentials between low- and high-dispersion portfolios for the pilot 
sample, the control sample, and firm size and book-to-market matched control sample on 
either the NYSE or the NASDAQ. The time paths of correcting overvaluation are 
displayed in Figure 7 for NYSE stocks and in Figure 8 for NASDAQ stocks. 
(Insert Table 9 about here) 
(Insert Figures 7 and 8 about here) 
 
Panel A of Table 9 and Figure 7 show that the reduction of overvaluation due to the 
suspension of the tick-test rule was mostly reflected in value stocks, but not in growth 
stocks on the NYSE. Moreover, it also shows that the return differential between low- 
and high-dispersion portfolios was larger for value stocks than for growth stocks in 
control samples. This is a surprising and counter-intuitive result. The main streams in 
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finance literature overwhelmingly use book-to-market ratio as a proxy for a firm’s 
investment opportunity set. The firms with high book-to-market ratio (growth firms) 
generally have more investment opportunity and consequently greater earnings 
uncertainty, which may result in a greater stock overvaluation given the existence of short 
sale constraints. A higher dispersion and higher overvaluation in growth stocks than in 
value stocks would be expected. However, the results in Table 9 show that this was not 
the case during the sample period. This result may be extended to longer periods, since 
Diether et al. (2002) find a similar book-to-market anomaly, which documents a higher 
dispersion and a higher stock overvaluation in value stocks than in growth stocks during a 
sample period from 1976 to 2000.  
Panel B of Table 9 and Figures 8 present the results for NASDAQ-listed stocks. 
The results suggest that when the bid-price test rule is removed, overvaluation in pilot 
value stocks is corrected quickly in about 40 days (two months); the market goes further 
to depress prices in those stocks and causes undervaluation in high-dispersion stocks 
relative to low-dispersion stocks in value stocks. Further, the results here do not show an 
undervaluation effect in pilot growth stocks listed on the NASDAQ. Rather, it shows that 
the suspension of the bid-price rule helps mitigate overvaluation in high-dispersion 





6.4. Time Series Fama-French Regressions  
 
Fama-French (1993) suggests that a three-factor model may explain the time series 
of stock returns. If high-dispersion stocks earn lower returns than low-dispersion stocks 
due to the short sale constraints, then time-series portfolio of high (low) dispersion stocks 
should be associated with lower (higher) returns relative to an explicit asset pricing 
model. To asses whether overvaluation in high dispersion pilot stocks is reduced when 
uptick rules are suspended by controlling simultaneously for firm size, book-to-market, 
and momentum factors, I adopt a multi-factor time series regression method suggested by 
Fama-French (1996) and Carhart (1997). The model uses excess return (portfolio return 
minus the one-month Treasury bill rate) as the dependent variables. In the regression 
model, )( ftmt RR − , is the excess return on the value-weighted market portfolio, SMB is 
the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a 
portfolio of large stocks, and HML is the difference between the return on a portfolio 
consisted of high book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio comprised of low 
book-to-market stocks. The variable HML represents the value premium and the variable 
SMB represents the size premium. Fama and French (1996) and Carhart (1997) also 
document a momentum bias for the traditional three factor model, especially when firms 
are subject to unusually high or low returns prior to their inclusion in the test portfolios. 
Therefore, to capture the momentum factor, I include the variable UMD, the return 
difference between a portfolio comprised of stock with high return from t-12 to t-2 and a 
portfolio consisted of stocks with low return from t-12 to t-2. The multi-factor time series 
regression model is presented as follows:  
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pttptptpftmtppftpt UMDuHMLhSMBsRRRR εβα ++++−+=− )(  
SMB: the difference in returns of small and big firm stocks  
HML: the difference in returns of value weighted portfolio of high and low book-to-market stocks 
UMD: the difference in returns of valued weighted portfolios of firms with high and low prior momentum 
 
In such regressions, a well-specified asset pricing model produces intercepts that 
are indistinguishable from zero11. The estimated intercepts provide “a simple return 
metric and a formal test of how well different combinations of the common factors 
capture the cross section of average return.”12 While the intercept in the regressions 
appears to be similar to Jensen’s alpha in the context of the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM), I do not interpret it as a measure of portfolio performance attribution.  
Next, I run four-factor Fama-French time series regressions on low-, medium-, and 
high-dispersion portfolios separately for both the pilot and control samples.  If stock 
overvaluation is caused by investors’ opinions dispersion, then I expect to find a negative 
unexplained intercept in the regression on high-dispersion stock portfolios and a positive 
unexplained intercept in the regression on low dispersion stock portfolios. Each 
regression covers the period from May 02 to Dec 30, 2005 with a total of 170 time-series 
observations. The holding period dynamic analysis requires me to repeat the regressions 
for various holding periods ranging from one day to 251 days. Therefore, for portfolios 
with holding periods greater than one day, I need to include stock returns data from 2006. 
For example, for portfolios with a holding period of 251 days, the first observation in the 
                                                 
11 Merton (1973) 
12 Fama and French (1996) 
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time series is the return of a one year period from May 2, 2005 to May 2, 2006, and the 
last observation in the time series is the return of a one year period from December 31, 
2005 to December 31, 2006. So there were 251 regressions for each dispersion stock 
portfolio, resulting in a total of 753 of regressions for either the pilot or control sample. I 
report the intercept estimates in those regressions for portfolios with holding periods of 
one day, five days, 10 days, 20 days, 60 days, 120 days, and 251 days in Table 10.  
Panel A of Table 10 reports the estimates of the intercepts in four-factor time-series 
regressions for NYSE-listed stocks. The estimated intercepts for the control sample 
indicate that the four-factor model leaves an unexplained large negative return for the 
high-dispersion portfolio and an unexplained large positive return for the low-dispersion 
portfolio. This is consistent with the regression results in Diether et al. (2002). In contrast, 
for pilot stocks, high-dispersion portfolios did not systematically produce unexplained 
negative intercepts, and low-dispersion portfolios rarely showed unexplained positive 
intercepts, indicating that the four-factor asset pricing model does a better job in 
capturing expected stock returns based on common risk factors for pilot stocks than for 
control stocks. It also shows that for pilot stocks, the unexplained intercepts, periodically 
but not predominately demonstrate significance for certain holding periods, suggesting 
that the overvaluation anomaly in pilot stocks has not been completely eliminated. This is 
consistent with previous results and the fact that the uptick rule is not the only short sale 
constraint that prevents short sellers from projecting their negative opinions into stock 
prices. In essence, the regression results suggest that after controlling for firm size, book-
to-market, and momentum factors, the stock overvaluation anomaly existing in the 
control stocks has been mitigated in the pilot stocks on the NYSE.  
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Panel B of Table 10 presents the intercept estimates in four-factor time-series 
regressions for NASDAQ-listed stocks. Consistent with the results in the NYSE, the four-
factor model leaves unexplained negative intercepts for high-dispersion portfolios and 
unexplained positive intercepts for low-dispersion portfolios in the control sample. For 
the NASDAQ pilot sample, however; the results show that the undervaluation of high-
dispersion stocks relative to low-dispersion stocks is caused by either the negative 
deviation of high-dispersion stock values from the fair valuation reflected in the four-
factor model or the positive deviation of low-dispersion stock values relative to the fair 
valuation in the model.  
In addition, the three-factor regressions shown in Table 11 produce essentially 
similar results as those in Table 10 for NYSE-listed stocks.  
One point worth noticing here is that the regression coefficients of market return, 
size, book-to-market, and momentum factors, which are not reported in this paper, are 
mostly different among low-, medium-, and high-dispersion portfolios. If investor 
opinion dispersion is correlated with common stock risk factors, such as size, book-to-
market ratio, and momentum, then Fama-French regression results here are not sufficient 
to reject the hypothesis that investor opinion dispersion represents risk. In fact, in the 
control sample during the post-SHO period, the high-dispersion portfolio has higher 
loadings on both size and book-to-market ratio factors, suggesting that the high-
dispersion portfolio may be riskier than the low-dispersion portfolio and should have 
higher unconditional expected returns. In this case, negative (positive) intercepts in high 
(low)-dispersion stocks can not be interpret as the evidence that investor opinion 
dispersion is not the proxy for risk.  
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6.5. Pre-SHO Results 
 
If the suspension of the uptick rules contributes to different overvaluation patterns 
for the pilot and control samples, then the control and pilot samples should have similar 
overvaluation patterns prior to the pilot program, when pilot stocks and control stocks 
undergo identical treatment based on uptick rules. Therefore, I construct four more 
samples similar to those in section 4.3, but for the sample period from September 2003 
through the end of April of 2004, a period featuring the same uptick rule treatment for 
pilot and control stocks. The summary statistics for the pre-SHO period from September 
2003 to April 2004 are presented in Table 3.  
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
 
It shows that all firm characteristics differences between the pilot and control 
samples were not significantly different from zero, indicating that pilot and control 
samples are matched on various stock returns sensitive factors very well during the pre-
SHO period.  
The return differentials between low- and high-dispersion portfolios during the pre-
SHO period from September 2003 to April 2004 for both pilot and control stocks in both 
exchanges are presented in Table 12. The time paths for correcting overvaluation during 
the same period are displayed in Figure 9. 
(Insert Table 12 about here) 
(Insert Figures 9 about here) 
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Table 12 shows that differences of return differential between the pilot and the 
matched control samples are not significantly distinguishable from zero across any 
holding period on either the NYSE or the NASDAQ. Figures 9, further, shows that time 
paths for correcting overvaluation for both the pilot and control samples essentially move 
together in both exchanges. It appears that for NASDAQ-listed stocks, the return 
differentials between low- and high-dispersion portfolios in the pilot sample are 
consistently greater than those in the control sample across all holding periods. But none 
of those differences are statistically significant. The pre-SHO test results confirm that the 
changed overvaluation patterns for pilot stocks were unique during the Pilot Program and 
were associated with the suspension of the short sales price test rules on both exchanges.  
        To control for firm size, book-to-market ratio, and momentum factors 
simultaneously, I run time-series Fama-French four-factor regressions for the pilot and 
control samples during the pre-SHO period. The intercepts of the regressions are reported 
in Table 13. It shows that the four-factor model leaves an unexplained large negative 
return for the high-dispersion portfolio and an unexplained large positive return for the 
low-dispersion portfolio for both pilot and control samples on either the NYSE or the 
NASDAQ. The regression results for the pre-SHO period confirm that after controlling 
for firm size, book-to-market ratio, and momentum factors, there is no systematic 
difference between the pilot and control samples.  
(Insert Table 13 about here) 
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6.6. An Alternative Measure of Investors’ Opinions Dispersion 
 
In previous analyses, I measured investors’ opinions dispersion as the standard 
deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts scaled by the mean estimations. For days with no 
analyst forecasts, I adopted the value of dispersion on the most recent day as the value of 
dispersion, assuming that investors’ opinions dispersion would not change until new 
information associated with analyst forecast became available. For those days with only 
one analyst forecast, I treated the dispersion on that day as missing value first. Then, I 
adopted the most recent dispersion value as the one relevant to that date. This approach 
may either underestimate or overestimate the dispersion on those days with only one 
analyst earnings forecast. Because, from an investor’s perspective, when a new earnings 
forecast becomes available, he or she will consider both the current forecast and the 
previous forecasts. Therefore, in this section, I adopt an alternative measure of investors’ 
opinion dispersion by considering the dispersion measures on those days with single 
analyst forecast. Instead of treating them as missing values, I calculate standard 
deviations based on the pool of the current day’s forecast and the most recent forecasts. 
For example, stock A has one forecast today with EPS of $0.5, and three forecasts one 
week ago with estimated EPSs of $0.3, $0.4, and $0.5. In the previous analysis, the 
standard deviations on the current day took the value of the standard deviation of (0.3, 0.4, 
0.5), which is 0.1. Now, the standard deviation on that day changed to the standard 
deviation of (0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.5), which is 0.0957. The return differential between low- and 
high-dispersion portfolios for both pilot and control stocks based on the alternative 
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measurement of dispersion are detailed in Table 14. The time paths for correcting 
overvaluation for the pilot and control stocks are presented in Figures 17 and 18.  
(Insert Table 14 and Figure 10 about here) 
 
Comparing the major results shown in Table 6 and the results in Table 14, I find a 
similar mitigated overvaluation in the NYSE pilot stocks and emerging undervaluation in 
the NASDAQ pilot stocks. The use of alternative measure of dispersion does not change 
the major conclusions in this paper.  
 
7. Daily Short Selling Activities  
 
 
7.1 Daily Short Selling Activities and Stock Returns 
 
Diamond and Verechia (1987) argue that when short selling is costly, short sellers 
are more likely to be informed traders. Consequently, high short selling activities should 
imply lower future stocks returns. However, if short selling is motivated by hedging 
strategies and arbitrage transactions, then short selling may be unrelated to stock returns. 
Desai, Ramesh, and Thiagarajan (2002) use monthly short interest to proxy for short 
selling activities and find that a high level of short interest is a strong bearish signal. 
Further, Diether, Lee, and Werner (2005) use daily short selling data to test whether short 
sellers are able to predict future returns, and find that short sellers are on average 
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contrarians who sell short following positive returns and that short sales predict future 
negative returns.  
In this section, I apply the calendar-time portfolio approach and use daily short 
selling data to explore the time dynamics of how daily short selling activities shape stock 
returns for pilot and control stocks. First, I sort stocks into three categories based on daily 
short selling activities, measured by the proportion of trading volume related to short 
selling. Then, both raw returns and beta excess returns are applied to calculate portfolio 
holding period returns for those three portfolios in both the pilot and control samples. 
Further, I calculate the return differential between high- and low-shorting portfolios. If 
short sellers are informed traders, then this differential should have been negative. The 
holding period cumulative return differentials between high- and low-shorting portfolios 
are presented in Table 15, and the annualized holding period return differentials between 
high- and low-shorting portfolios for different types of stocks are presented in Table 16.  
(Insert Table15 and 16 about here) 
 
Table 15 and Table 16 reveal several interesting results. First, for both pilot and 
control stocks listed on either the NYSE or the NASDAQ, the annualized return 
differential between high- and low-shorting portfolios with holding periods less than 7 
days were significantly positive for both pilot and control stocks, indicating that a high 
level of short selling activities are accompanied with high stock returns. This result 
suggests that on average, short sellers behave more like “contrarians” who short sell 
following positive stock returns. This is consistent with the finding of Dechow, Hutton, 
Meulbroek, and Sloan (2001) that short sellers are able to identify over-valued stocks, 
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and the finding of Diether et al. (2006) that short sellers on average are contrarians who 
short sell following positive stock returns. The results remain essentially the same when I 
used beta excess returns to calculate the portfolio returns, as shown in Table 16. 
Second, it shows that those high stock returns only persisted for a short time period 
ranging from 7 to 15 days and diminished quickly as the number of days in the holding 
period increased. This suggests that it is difficult to capture shorting profits for short-term 
traders and it is unlikely that on average short sellers are information-driven traders.  
Third, it shows that in the longer term, high daily short selling activities were 
associated with long term negative returns for control stocks listed on either the NYSE or 
the NASDAQ. For pilot stocks listed on the NYSE, such long term return never fell 
below zero, indicating that while short sellers to some extent were competent in 
forecasting the long term stock returns for control stocks, they did not possess such 
capability relative to pilot stocks. This can be explained by the fact that NYSE pilot 
stocks were less overvalued due to the relaxation of tick-test restrictions. Shorting on 
less-overvalued stocks would generate less future returns for short sellers. For pilot 
stocks listed on the NASDAQ, however; those long term negative returns were even 
greater for pilot stocks than for control stocks. This is consistent with the previous 
analysis associated with NASDAQ pilot stocks, which shows that those stocks tended to 
be undervalued due to the suspension of uptick rules.  
To investigate the impact of firm-specific characteristics on stock returns after 
heavy shorting, I sort stocks in each portfolio into three further categories based on firm 
size, book-to-market ratio, and option availability. Then, I calculate holding period 
returns for those hedge portfolios based on the beta excess returns. The return 
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differentials between high- and low- shorting portfolios are presented in columns (3), (4), 
(5), (6), (7), and (8) in Table 16 for small stocks, large stocks, value stocks, growth stocks, 
stocks with no options, and stocks with options, respectively. The results here show that 
the contrarians’ short selling was more profound in large stocks, value stocks, and stocks 
with options in the NYSE pilot sample, and such effect was more profound in large 
stocks and value stocks in the NYSE control sample. In contrast, the NASDAQ results 
show that the value stocks experienced the most profound “contrarians” short selling.  
           
7.2 Potential Long/Short Investment Strategies Based on Past Shorting Information 
 
The results in Table 16 not only reveal value-oriented “contrarians” short selling 
behavior, but also suggest a potential profitable long/short investment strategy. It seems 
that a daily rebalanced portfolio consisting of a long position in high-shorting stocks and 
a short position in low-shorting stocks can generate an enormous annual return of more 
than 400%. However, I do not interpret those returns as the abnormal returns in such 
long/short hedging portfolios. First, investors need to know the shorting information 
before they can form the long/short portfolio. But the positive return differential between 
high- and low-shorting portfolios exists simultaneously with high short selling activities, 
as shown in Table 15 and Table 16. Second, trading costs were not included in the 
portfolio returns. Substantial trading costs associated with a daily rebalanced portfolio 
may wipe out any potential profits in those strategies.  
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          To implement the long/short investment strategy, on the first day, investors need to 
collect short selling activities information. Then investors build the portfolio on the 
second day and hold the portfolio on the third day. Such process will be repeated on each 
day. Therefore, to calculate the long/short portfolio returns, each day, all stocks are sorted 
into thirds based on short selling activity level. Then, I skip one day and hold the 
portfolio for various holding periods from one day to 251 days. Next, I repeat the 
calendar-time approach to calculate holding period return differentials between high- and 
low-shorting portfolios. The results are presented in Table 17, which shows that investing 
in a long/short portfolio consisting of a long position in high-shorting stocks and a short 
position in low-shorting stocks is enable to generate significant profits, since t-statistics 
for those holding period returns barely showed any significance across virtually all 
holding periods. One exception was that for NASDAQ stocks, while the long/short 
portfolio with holding period of one year generated a significant positive return of 2.45% 
for pilot stocks, such return was -2.63% for control stocks. This further confirms the 
previous finding that NASDAQ pilot stocks tended to be undervalued. Shorting on those 
undervalued stocks is unlikely to generate profits for short sellers in the long-term.  








The recently adopted SHO Regulation provided us with a natural experiment to 
study the impact of relaxing short sale constraints on stock returns in a controlled 
environment. In this paper, I used Regulation SHO data from 2005 to examine whether 
the suspension of uptick rules mitigates overvaluation in high-dispersion stocks relative 
to low-dispersion stocks by comparing stocks with less short sale constraints (pilot stocks) 
and stocks with more short sale constraints (control stocks). The results showed that the 
suspension of the uptick rule for pilot stocks mitigated stock overvaluation on the NYSE 
during the sample period from May to December 2005. In particular, the comparison 
based on the matched pilot and control samples shows that the suspension of uptick rules 
on the NYSE can mitigate stock overvaluation as much as 3.5% of the stock value in a 
one year time period. Such effect was more profound in small stocks, value stocks, and 
stocks with no options. This is consistent with the predictions of Miller (1977), Harrison 
and Kreps (1978), Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite (1993), Morris (1996), Duffie, 
Garleanu, and Pedersen (2002), and Scheinkman and Xiong (2001), who argue that stock 
overvaluation is associated with the presence of high investors’ opinion dispersion and 
more short sale constraints. For stocks with Exchange Traded Options, it appears that the 
suspension of uptick rules can not effectively help to reduce the overvaluation since 
overvaluation in those stocks has already been mitigated by the introduction of options. 
This result is consistent with Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) and highlights the role of 
stock option as an alternative of short selling vehicle in reducing stock overvaluation. The 
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implication here is that in order to mitigate stock overvaluation and to improve stock 
price efficiency introducing stock options can be a substitute of removing uptick rules.  
Surprisingly, I also found that on the NASDAQ, the lifting of the bid-price test rule 
went beyond correcting stock overvaluation. Prices of high-dispersion stocks tended to be 
depressed relative to prices of low-dispersion stocks when the bid-price test rule was 
suspended. In this scenario, high investors’ opinions dispersion may be interpreted as a 
proxy for risk, which is consistent with Merton (1987), Varian (1985), Doukas et al. 
(2006), and Bai et al. (2006), who argue that divergence of opinion represents risk and 
consequently depresses asset prices. The results here also suggest that the SEC’s recent 
decision to remove bid-test restrictions for NASDAQ listed securities may not be 
considered as an optimal policy if such undervaluation is driven by ‘predatory’ short 
sellers’ price manipulations. 
Moreover, I investigated the relationship between daily short selling activities and 
stock returns. The results show that on average short sellers were more likely to be value-
driven “contrarians” who short sell following high stocks returns. Such “contrarians” 
short selling is more profound in value stocks and large stocks. Comparing the long-term 
return differential between high- and low-shorting portfolios for pilot and control stocks 
further confirmed previous findings that NYSE pilot stocks are less overvalued and 
NASDAQ pilot stocks tend to be undervalued. Although it appears that a daily rebalance 
portfolio consisting of a long position in high-shorting stocks and a short position in low-
shorting stocks can generate an enormous return, I do not interpret this as a feasible 
investment strategy because high level of short selling occurs simultaneously with high 
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stock returns. Investing in a long/short portfolio based on past shorting information is 
unlikely to generate any significant short-term returns.  
The results in this paper generate several interesting questions for future research. 
First, why are the effects of removing the uptick rules on stock returns so different for the 
NYSE and the NASDAQ? Is this caused by different market microstructures, such as 
trading liquidity and trading costs, or other unknown forces? Second, it would be a 
promising extension to establish a direct link between predatory short sellers’ price 
manipulation and the undervaluation in the NASDAQ pilot stocks. Finally, taking a 
closer look at how the suspension of the uptick rule and intra-day stock returns by using 
intra-day short selling data would improve our understanding of how the suspension of 
the uptick rules help improve stock price efficiency, a key issue that is of interest to both 
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Table 1.1 Short Selling Activities during the pre- and post-SHO periods 
 
This table details short selling activities measures for post- and pre-SHO periods. The post-SHO period is 
from May to December 2005, and the pre-SHO period is from January to April 2005. Panel A reports the 
results for NYSE-listed stocks and Panel B details the results for NASDAQ-listed stocks. Short selling ratio 
is defined as average daily shorting volume divided by the trading volume. Short order size is the daily 
average number of shares in each shorting order. Daily short order number is the daily average number of 
short selling transactions for each stock. Short selling volume is measured as the average total number of 
shares shorted for each stock on each given day, and is measured in thousand shares. Pilot sample and 
control sample are constructed as described in section 4.1. The differences of shorting measures between 
the pilot and control samples are measured as Diff.  
 
Panel A: NYSE-listed Stocks 
Pre-SHO Period Pilot   Control     
 Mean Stderr N  Mean Stderr N  Diff t value 
Short Selling Ratio 21.19% 0.0028 463 21.74% 0.0019 826 -0.55% -1.57 
Short Order Size 437.6 10.5 463 446 5.3 826 -8.4 -0.71 
Daily Short Number 361 14.2 463 353 10 826 8.2 0.45 
Short Selling Volume 201 1.60 463 199.2 1.34 826 1.8 0.86 
         
Pre-SHO Period Pilot   Control     
 Mean Stderr N  Mean Stderr N  Diff t value 
Short Selling Ratio 21.19% 0.0028 463 21.74% 0.0019 826 -0.55% -1.57 
Short Order Size 437.6 10.5 463 446 5.3 826 -8.4 -0.71 
Daily Short Number 361 14.2 463 353 10 826 8.2 0.45 
Short Selling Volume 201 1.60 463 199.2 1.34 826 1.8 0.86 
         
Panel B: NASDAQ-listed Stocks 
Pre-SHO Period Pilot   Control     
  Mean Stderr N  Mean Stderr N  Diff t value 
Short Selling Ratio 19.3% 0.0018 404 19.16% 0.0012 778 -0.14% 0.65 
Short Order Size 453.4 11.2 404 448 8.6 778 5.4 0.38 
Daily Short Number 408 25.03 404 409 14.5 778 -1 -0.04 
Short Selling Volume 160.2 1.45 404 158 0.98 778 2.2 1.26 
         
Post SHO Period Pilot   Control     
  Mean Stderr N  Mean Stderr N  Diff t value 
Short Selling Ratio 20% 0.0015 404 18.6% 0.0010 778 1.34%*** 7.63 
Short Order Size 345 10.9 404 458 8.7 778 -113 *** -8.10 
Daily Short Order 
Number 315 22.9 404 419 12.7 778  104 *** 3.96 
Short Selling Volume  146 1.37 404 156.8 1.08 778  10.8 *** 3.55 
         
***,** are significant at 1% and 5% level, respectively 
Note: short selling ratio is in percentage, short order size is in shares, and short selling volume is in thousand shares. 
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Table 1.2 Descriptive Summary for the Pilot and Control Samples during the pre-SHO 
Period from September 2003 to April 2004 
 
This table presents firm level characteristics for both pilot and control samples. The time period is from September 02 
to April 30, 2005. The statistics summary for samples on the NYSE is reported in Panel A and results for NASDAQ are 
listed in Panel B. The dispersion is defined as the analyst earnings forecast standard deviation scaled by absolute value 
of the mean earnings estimates. The short selling ratio is the ratios of short selling volume to stock trading volume. Size 
is the market capitalization of individual stocks, which equals to the product of shares outstanding and the daily closing 
price. Book value= shareholders’ equity+ deferred taxes+ investment tax credit- book value of preferred stock. 
Turnover is the ratio of daily trading volume to shares outstanding. Beta excess returns are calculated as the excess 
return of a specific stock less the average return of all stocks in its beta portfolio based on previous year beta ranking. 
Standard errors for mean estimates are in parentheses. The differentials between the pilot and control samples are 
shown as Diff with t-statistics.  
 
 
Panel A:  
NYSE-listed Stocks                 
  Pilot Sample  Control Sample   
Variables n Mean  Stderr n Mean  Stderr Diff t-stat 
Opinion dispersion 416 0.37 0.03 814 0.365 0.021 0.005 0.14 
Firm size (in million 
dollar) 416 7501 1065 809 7894 848 -392 -0.29 
book-to-market ratio 416 0.540 0.02 798 0.539 0.0172 0.001 0.04 
Turnover 416 0.64% 0.020% 809 0.68% 0.017% -0.04% -1.46 
Daily Stock Return  416 0.077% 0.004% 809 0.072% 0.004% 0.00% 0.81 
Beta Excess Return 416 0.012% 0.005% 809 0.007% 0.003% 0.01% 0.92 
# of Stocks with Option  184 44%   372 46%       
         
Panel B:  
NASDAQ-listed Stocks                 
  Pilot Sample  Control Sample   
Variables n Mean  Stderr n Mean  Stderr Diff t-stat 
Opinion dispersion 357 0.42 0.038 710 0.45 0.0334 -0.03 -0.59 
Firm size (in million 
dollar) 357 1986 531 710 2404 503 -417 -0.57 
book-to-market ratio 357 0.396 0.015 706 0.395 0.0109 0.0008 0.04 
Turnover 357 1.15% 0.103% 710 1.05% 0.036% 0.090% 0.83 
Daily Stock Return  357 0.052% 0.007% 710 0.058% 0.005% -0.006% -0.69 
Beta Excess Return 357 0.002% 0.007% 710 0.006% 0.005% -0.004% -0.45 












Table 1.3 Descriptive Summary for the Pilot and Control Samples during the post-SHO 
period from May to December 2005 
 
This table presents firm level characteristics for both pilot and control samples during the psot-SHO period. The 
statistics summary for samples on the NYSE is reported in Panel A and results for NASDAQ are listed in Panel B. The 
dispersion is defined as the analyst earnings forecast standard deviation scaled by absolute value of the mean earnings 
estimates. The short selling ratio is the ratios of short selling volume to stock trading volume. Turnover is the ratio of 
daily trading volume to shares outstanding. Beta excess returns are calculated as the excess return of a specific stock 
less the average return of all stocks in its beta portfolio based on previous year beta ranking. Standard errors for mean 
estimates are in parentheses. The differentials between pilot and control stocks are shown as (pilot-control). 
 
Panel A: NYSE-listed Stocks 
 Pilot Sample Control Sample Pilot-Control 
  n Mean n Mean Difference t-stat 
Short Selling Ratio 435 23.00% 836 20.94% 2.06% *** 6.83 
  (0.25%)  (0.17%)   
Opinion Dispersion 435 0.5228 857 0.3907 0.1321 0.97 
  (0.1323)  (0.0299)   
Size ( in million dollars ) 463 7668 926 7974 -306 -0.24 
  (915)  (915)   
Book-to-Market 443 0.558 875 0.599 -0.0408 -1.43 
  (0.0175)  (0.0226)   
Turnover  463 0.70% 925 0.74% -0.04% -1.52 
  (0.02%)  (0.02%)   
Daily Stock Return 463 0.08% 925 0.04% 0.04%*** 6.25 
  (0.01%)  (0.00%)   
Daily Beta Excess Return 463 -0.02% 925 -0.01% -0.01% -1.49 
  (0.01%)  (0.00%)   
# of Stocks with Options  215 46.14% 469 50.70% -4.57%  





Sample Pilot-Control  
  n Mean n Mean Difference t-stat 
Short Selling Ratio 372 19.99% 725 18.60% 1.39%*** 7.63 
  (0.0015)   (0.0010)   
Opinion Dispersion 372 0.426 733 0.405 0.0207 0.5 
  (0.0345)  (0.0226)   
Size ( in million dollars ) 372 1967 733 2526 -559 -0.82 
  (485)  (473)   
Book-to-Market 363 46.73% 721 43.41% 3.32% 1.25 
  (0.0167)  (0.0206)   
Turnover  372 0.97% 733 0.95% 0.02% 0.42 
  (0.0004)  (0.0003)   
Daily Stock Return 372 0.11% 733 0.12% -0.01% -0.48 
  (0.009%)  (0.006%)   
Daily Beta Excess Return 372 -0.03% 733 -0.02% -0.01% -0.9 
  (0.009%)  (0.006%)   
# of Stocks with Options  180 46% 382 43% 3%  
              
*** is significant at 1% level 
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Table 1.4 The Raw Return Differential between Low- and High-Dispersion Portfolios for 
Pilot and Control Samples on the NYSE during the post-SHO period 
 
Each day stocks are sorted into three groups based on the level of dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts for both pilot 
and control samples. The time period considered is May 02, 2005 through Dec 30, 2005. The cumulative portfolio 
returns are calculated for those portfolios. The overvaluation is measured as the portfolios’ returns differentials between 
the low and high dispersion portfolios, (D1-D3), where D1 stands for low dispersion portfolio returns and D3 refers to 
high dispersion portfolio returns. T-statistics are presented for each mean.  
 
  NYSE           NYSE       
HD Pilot  Control   HD Pilot  Control  
1 0.02% 0.20 0.02% 0.22  80 0.29% 0.52 2.09% 3.24 
5 0.00% 0.02 0.12% 0.64  100 0.68% 1.18 2.42% 3.60 
20 0.13% 0.36 0.41% 1.07  120 0.91% 1.58 2.57% 3.85 
      140 0.52% 1.00 2.86% 4.81 
42 -0.07% -0.15 1.08% 2.05  160 0.46% 0.96 2.98% 5.39 
43 0.03% 0.05 1.02% 1.87  180 0.01% 0.02 2.12% 3.86 
44 0.00% 0.01 1.11% 2.06  200 -0.06% -0.10 2.14% 3.60 
45 -0.10% -0.19 1.18% 2.16       
46 -0.04% -0.07 1.09% 1.98  214 0.09% 0.12 1.83% 2.77 
47 -0.16% -0.30 1.19% 2.12  215 0.05% 0.07 1.73% 2.58 
48 -0.12% -0.23 1.31% 2.25  216 -0.03% -0.04 1.79% 2.64 
49 0.03% 0.05 1.38% 2.31  217 -0.09% -0.12 1.84% 2.68 
50 -0.05% -0.08 1.55% 2.56  218 -0.03% -0.03 1.75% 2.53 
51 -0.02% -0.04 1.44% 2.39  219 -0.09% -0.12 1.71% 2.46 
52 -0.03% -0.05 1.46% 2.39  220 -0.22% -0.30 1.70% 2.42 
53 0.05% 0.10 1.54% 2.48  221 -0.23% -0.31 1.74% 2.45 
54 0.09% 0.15 1.84% 2.74  222 -0.19% -0.26 1.69% 2.36 
55 0.06% 0.11 1.84% 2.73  223 -0.10% -0.13 1.60% 2.23 
56 0.14% 0.24 2.00% 2.94  224 -0.26% -0.35 1.54% 2.13 
57 0.07% 0.11 1.97% 2.90  225 -0.19% -0.26 1.51% 2.08 
58 0.05% 0.09 1.82% 2.76  226 -0.18% -0.25 1.55% 2.11 
59 0.05% 0.09 1.84% 2.80  227 -0.19% -0.26 1.60% 2.17 
60 0.04% 0.07 1.39% 2.12  228 -0.29% -0.40 1.54% 2.07 
61 0.10% 0.17 1.82% 2.78  229 -0.32% -0.44 1.48% 1.97 
62 0.03% 0.06 1.82% 2.73  230 -0.38% -0.50 1.48% 1.94 
63 0.10% 0.18 1.86% 2.78  231 -0.42% -0.55 1.46% 1.90 
           
      240 -1.00% -1.30 1.29% 1.64 
      251 -1.40% -1.72 1.11% 1.40 
        **, *** Statistically significant at the one and five percent levels, respectively 








Table 1.5 Means of Estimated Betas for Pilot and Control Sample on the NYSE in 2004 and 
2005 
 
This Table reports the mean beta estimates for both the pilot and control sample based on 2004 and 2005 
stock returns data. I followed a two-step procedure to calculate the beta excess return. First, I ran the 
market model based on previous year stock returns data to get beta estimates for all available stocks in the 
CRSP dataset. Then, I ranked stocks into 10 deciles based on the value of the beta estimates. Finally, I 
calculated beta excess return as the difference between the stock daily returns and the beta ranking portfolio 
returns for both pilot and control stocks.  
 
Beta Control n=454 Pilot n=898 Df=1350  
 Mean Stderr Mean Stderr Diff p 
2004 0.916 0.019 0.895 0.0148 0.021 81% 



































Table 1.6The Beta Excess Return Differential between Low- and High-Dispersion Portfolios 
for Pilot, Control, and Size-BM Matched Control Samples during the post-SHO period 
 
Each day stocks are sorted into three groups based on the level of dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts for the pilot, 
control, and matched control samples. The time period considered is May 02, 2005 through Dec 30, 2005. The holding 
period cumulative portfolio return differential between low- and high-dispersion portfolios are calculated and presented 
in this table. T-statistics are presented following the mean estimations. HD represents holding period (in days). Control 
M is the size and book-to-market matched control sample. The significance level for the mean estimations in column (1) 
and column (2) are based on two-tail tests, and the significance level of the mean estimation in column (4) is based on 
one-tail test.  
 
Panel A: NYSE-listed Stocks 
 NYSE        
HD Pilot t Control t Control M t (Control M-Pilot) t 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)=(3)-(1)  
1 0.03% 0.99 0.03% 1.11 0.04% 1.15 0.01% 0.18 
5 0.06% 0.94 0.19%*** 2.76 0.19%** 2.20 0.13% 1.22 
10 0.20%** 2.33 0.25%*** 2.67 0.34%*** 2.71 0.14% 0.93 
20 0.49%*** 3.64 0.60%*** 3.47 0.41%** 2.24 -0.07% -0.21 
30 0.43%*** 2.51 0.71%*** 2.66 0.86%** 2.20 0.43% 0.99 
40 0.56%*** 2.70 1.09%*** 3.52 1.23%*** 2.62 0.67%* 1.31 
50 0.72%*** 2.94 1.98%*** 6.55 1.99%*** 3.64 1.27%** 2.11 
60 0.93%*** 3.70 1.94%*** 5.41 2.18%*** 3.11 1.25%** 1.68 
70 1.23%*** 5.26 2.62%*** 7.50 2.83%*** 4.87 1.60%*** 2.56 
80 1.49%*** 7.82 2.79%*** 8.45 3.28%*** 5.08 1.79%*** 2.66 
90 2.08%*** 7.76 2.74%*** 6.67 3.93%*** 7.38 1.85%*** 3.10 
100 2.08%*** 11.34 3.33%*** 7.66 4.11%*** 8.03 2.03%*** 3.73 
110 2.22%*** 11.81 3.43%*** 8.37 4.37%*** 7.56 2.15%*** 3.53 
120 2.42%*** 12.26 3.63%*** 8.46 4.97%*** 8.05 2.56%*** 3.94 
130 2.34%*** 12.01 3.58%*** 9.13 4.53%*** 7.78 2.19%*** 3.56 
140 2.50%*** 12.05 3.80%*** 11.01 5.02%*** 7.45 2.52%*** 3.57 
150 2.50%*** 11.39 3.89%*** 9.72 4.88%*** 6.85 2.38%*** 3.20 
160 2.50%*** 10.86 3.76%*** 9.88 4.71%*** 6.69 2.21%*** 2.98 
170 2.49%*** 9.34 3.56%*** 9.27 5.16%*** 6.76 2.67%*** 3.30 
180 2.38%*** 8.99 3.10%*** 10.18 5.00%*** 5.86 2.62%*** 2.93 
190 2.36%*** 8.93 2.83%*** 9.61 5.49%*** 6.47 3.13%*** 3.52 
200 2.42%*** 8.52 2.81%*** 10.61 4.96%*** 7.04 2.53%*** 3.34 
210 2.39%*** 8.17 2.62%*** 9.24 5.11%*** 7.14 2.72%*** 3.52 
220 2.26%*** 7.36 2.34%*** 8.14 5.19%*** 6.51 2.93%*** 3.43 
230 2.03%*** 6.71 2.14%*** 7.47 3.89%*** 4.64 1.86%** 2.09 
240 1.63%*** 5.13 1.95%*** 6.70 5.13%*** 5.26 3.50%*** 3.42 
251 1.16%*** 3.45 1.82%*** 6.20 3.21%*** 3.84 2.06%** 2.28 









Table 1.6 Panel B: NASDAQ-listed Stocks during the post-SHO period 
 
 NASDAQ        
HD Pilot t Control t Control M t (Control M-Pilot) t 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)=(3)-(1)  
1 0.03% 0.24 0.03% 0.64 0.04% 0.88 0.02% 0.14 
5 0.03% 0.16 0.15%* 1.46 0.11% 1.03 0.08% 0.32 
10 0.03% 0.10 0.27%* 1.65 0.31%** 1.93 0.28% 0.83 
20 -0.20% -0.45 0.26% 1.27 0.60%*** 2.70 0.80%* 1.63 
30 -0.40% -0.77 0.53%** 2.02 1.00%*** 3.40 1.40%** 2.34 
40 -0.68% -1.14 0.84%*** 2.84 1.36%*** 4.20 2.04%*** 3.00 
50 -1.33%** -2.05 0.66%** 2.32 1.24%*** 3.95 2.57%*** 3.57 
60 -1.94%*** -2.90 0.68%** 2.31 1.22%*** 3.62 3.16%*** 4.22 
70 -2.60%*** -3.94 0.77%*** 2.50 1.21%*** 3.40 3.81%*** 5.08 
80 -3.01%*** -4.66 0.81%** 2.26 1.16%*** 3.06 4.16%*** 5.57 
90 -3.27%*** -5.25 0.64%** 1.84 1.04%*** 2.88 4.32%*** 5.99 
100 -3.42%*** -5.78 0.45% 1.25 0.97%*** 2.72 4.39%*** 6.35 
110 -3.53%*** -5.67 0.44% 1.21 1.05%*** 3.04 4.58%*** 6.43 
120 -3.67%*** -5.62 0.55%* 1.43 1.16%*** 3.31 4.83%*** 6.52 
130 -4.09%*** -5.97 0.37% 1.02 0.97%*** 2.40 5.06%*** 6.36 
140 -4.17%*** -5.79 0.18% 0.49 1.02%*** 2.80 5.18%*** 6.43 
150 -3.98%*** -5.21 0.17% 0.43 1.06%*** 2.75 5.03%*** 5.89 
160 -3.81%*** -4.73 0.39% 1.08 1.44%*** 3.84 5.25%*** 5.91 
170 -3.52%*** -3.97 0.57%* 1.46 1.74%*** 4.32 5.25%*** 5.40 
180 -3.31%*** -3.53 0.68%** 1.90 2.18%*** 6.25 5.49%*** 5.49 
190 -2.94%*** -2.98 0.73%** 2.10 2.30%*** 6.55 5.24%*** 5.00 
200 -2.54%*** -2.49 0.98%*** 2.67 2.54%*** 6.84 5.08%*** 4.67 
210 -2.24%** -2.17 1.16%*** 3.34 2.87%*** 7.89 5.11%*** 4.68 
220 -1.81%** -1.73 1.43%*** 4.14 3.22%*** 9.24 5.02%*** 4.55 
230 -1.44%* -1.39 1.59%*** 4.21 3.42%*** 8.44 4.85%*** 4.37 
240 -0.98% -1.01 1.84%*** 4.61 3.59%*** 8.43 4.57%*** 4.29 
251 -0.14% -0.15 2.17%*** 5.15 3.65%*** 7.95 3.79%*** 3.75 


















Figure 1.1 Cumulative Holding Period Beta Excess Return Differential between Low- and 
High-Dispersion Portfolios on the NYSE during the post-SHO Period 
 
Figure 1 display the time path of correcting overvaluation for pilot stocks and control stocks listed on the NYSE during 
the sample period from May to December 2005. The x-axis represents holding period in days and the y-axis measures 
cumulative holding period beta excess return differential between low- and high-dispersion portfolios. The pilot, 
control, and matched control samples are graphed separately.  
The Time Path of Correcting Overvaluation: 
Holding Period Cumulative Return Differential Between Low-and High-Dispersion Porrfolios 
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Figure 2 Cumulative Holding Period Beta Excess Cumulative Return Differential between 
Low- and High-Dispersion Portfolios on the NASDAQ during the post-SHO Period 
 
Figure 2 shows the time path of correcting overvaluation due to the opinion dispersion and short sale constraints for 
pilot stocks and control stocks listed on the NASDAQ during the sample period from May to December 2005. The pilot, 
control, and matched control samples are graphed separately.  
The Time Path of Correcting Overvaluation: Holding Period Cumulative 
Return Differential between Low- and High-Dispersion Portfolios 
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Table 1.7 The Beta Excess Cumulative Return Differential between Low- and High-
Dispersion Portfolios for Pilot, Control, and Size-BM Matched Control Samples during the 
post-SHO period: Controlling for Exchange Traded Option Availabilities 
 
This table presents the beta excess cumulative return differentials between low- and high-dispersion 
portfolios for stocks with and with no options. The time period is from May 02, 2005 to Dec 30, 2005. The 
low and high dispersion portfolios are constructed as in Table 4 and t-statistics are reported with the mean 
estimations.  
 
Panel A: NYSE Stocks 
  Stock with no  Options    Stock with  Options   
HD Pilot  t Control t 
Control  
Match t   Pilot  t Control t 
Control  
Match t 
 (1)  (2)  (3)   (4)  (5)  (6)  
1 0.02% 0.53 0.03% 1.14 0.04% 0.92  0.03% 1.18 0.01% 0.36 0.03% 1.00
2 0.03% 0.62 0.06% 1.34 0.10% 1.59  0.08% 1.66 0.02% 0.52 0.07% 1.47
3 0.02% 0.30 0.08% 1.56 0.17% 2.01  0.07% 1.40 0.04% 0.67 0.14% 2.05
4 -0.02% -0.24 0.11% 1.75 0.19% 2.05  0.11% 1.74 0.04% 0.71 0.17% 2.25
5 -0.02% -0.28 0.14% 1.93 0.20% 2.07  0.14% 2.14 0.05% 0.76 0.19% 2.23
6 -0.03% -0.34 0.17% 2.11 0.23% 2.13  0.16% 2.27 0.05% 0.71 0.24% 2.57
7 0.05% 0.55 0.21% 2.40 0.24% 2.01  0.16% 2.05 0.06% 0.71 0.31% 3.15
8 0.08% 0.83 0.25% 2.65 0.26% 2.08  0.18% 2.13 0.06% 0.74 0.36% 3.32
9 0.07% 0.66 0.30% 2.91 0.26% 1.95  0.22% 2.54 0.07% 0.82 0.39% 3.35
10 0.07% 0.68 0.34% 3.14 0.30% 2.09  0.26% 2.90 0.08% 0.88 0.42% 3.46
              
20 0.21% 1.52 0.62% 3.93 0.60% 2.47  0.66% 4.51 0.19% 1.48 0.34% 0.69
30 0.05% 0.32 0.96% 4.73 1.00% 3.28  0.83% 4.11 0.36% 2.27 0.87% 1.53
40 0.04% 0.21 1.39% 6.02 1.25% 3.37  1.15% 5.04 0.64% 3.65 1.13% 1.59
50 -0.02% -0.11 1.68% 6.69 1.65% 4.04  1.49% 5.67 0.92% 5.14 1.90% 2.40
60 0.19% 0.90 2.01% 7.87 2.21% 5.19  1.79% 5.96 1.10% 6.33 2.45% 3.62
70 0.36% 1.98 2.32% 8.87 3.05% 6.66  2.09% 7.61 1.26% 7.48 3.05% 5.38
80 0.55% 3.65 2.64% 9.89 3.64% 7.70  2.51% 10.08 1.42% 8.47 3.01% 4.82
100 1.24% 7.57 3.08% 11.02 4.31% 8.73  2.97% 11.91 1.95% 9.74 3.34% 6.38
120 1.71% 9.57 3.12% 12.25 4.89% 9.23  3.19% 11.89 2.61% 11.41 4.12% 6.63
140 1.73% 10.00 3.17% 13.29 5.87% 9.65  3.36% 11.46 2.83% 11.70 3.53% 5.09
160 1.65% 8.11 3.03% 12.76 5.39% 9.56  3.47% 10.58 2.41% 9.69 4.31% 6.83
180 1.47% 7.18 2.80% 11.34 5.67% 10.49  3.57% 9.82 1.82% 6.59 4.75% 5.30
200 1.30% 6.38 2.74% 12.16 4.65% 8.22  3.89% 9.65 1.30% 3.95 4.08% 5.33
220 0.98% 4.10 2.53% 10.24 3.95% 6.22  3.93% 9.37 0.89% 2.60 4.14% 5.51
240 0.37% 1.36 2.29% 8.04 3.22% 4.56  3.32% 8.26 0.71% 2.10 3.00% 3.77
















Table 1.7 Panel B: NASDAQ Stocks during the post-SHO period 
 
  Stocks with No Options    Stocks with Options   
HD Pilot  t Control t 
Control 
Match Pilot  t Control t 
Control 
Match t 
 (1)  (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  
1 0.08% 1.47 0.05% 0.87 0.05% 0.78 0.02% 0.46 0.00% 0.12 0.03% 0.58
2 0.14% 1.92 0.15% 1.99 0.10% 1.24 0.05% 0.86 0.05% 0.81 0.01% 0.09
3 0.21% 2.34 0.16% 1.72 0.10% 0.96 0.07% 0.86 0.05% 0.61 0.04% 0.45
4 0.25% 2.50 0.22% 2.02 0.12% 0.98 0.07% 0.84 0.04% 0.52 0.11% 1.05
5 0.28% 2.49 0.25% 2.22 0.14% 1.11 0.09% 0.92 0.06% 0.62 0.13% 1.13
6 0.31% 2.48 0.24% 2.01 0.15% 1.08 0.11% 0.98 0.10% 0.93 0.15% 1.11
7 0.37% 2.73 0.32% 2.47 0.19% 1.31 0.12% 0.98 0.07% 0.50 0.21% 1.45
8 0.43% 2.87 0.35% 2.50 0.21% 1.32 0.11% 0.89 0.13% 0.92 0.22% 1.40
9 0.48% 2.93 0.37% 2.49 0.22% 1.30 0.11% 0.81 0.07% 0.43 0.34% 2.00
10 0.50% 2.94 0.42% 2.70 0.29% 1.63 0.14% 0.94 0.07% 0.41 0.37% 2.05
11 0.52% 2.87 0.48% 2.82 0.35% 1.88 0.15% 0.94 0.11% 0.65 0.43% 2.30
12 0.57% 2.99 0.39% 2.10 0.35% 1.81 0.16% 0.97 0.14% 0.82 0.46% 2.39
13 0.59% 3.04 0.41% 2.12 0.39% 2.04 0.15% 0.85 0.19% 1.08 0.46% 2.36
14 0.62% 3.07 0.37% 1.82 0.43% 2.20 0.12% 0.69 0.24% 1.34 0.46% 2.25
15 0.63% 3.04 0.41% 2.04 0.47% 2.31 0.10% 0.52 0.30% 1.64 0.44% 2.09
             
20 0.66% 2.78 0.75% 3.34 0.72% 3.12 0.01% 0.04 0.38% 1.88 0.67% 2.84
30 0.76% 2.57 1.27% 4.59 1.34% 4.58 0.05% 0.18 0.62% 2.69 0.82% 2.82
40 0.68% 2.01 1.68% 5.52 1.69% 5.26 0.03% 0.09 0.54% 1.93 1.08% 3.27
60 0.07% 0.19 1.93% 5.80 1.85% 5.45 -0.69% -2.39 0.88% 3.14 1.17% 3.25
80 -0.38% -0.94 2.14% 4.98 2.20% 5.83 -1.17% -4.25 1.01% 3.27 1.07% 2.67
100 -0.46% -1.10 1.82% 4.33 2.19% 5.19 -0.85% -2.51 1.49% 4.71 0.65% 1.73
120 -0.26% -0.64 1.96% 4.31 2.17% 4.84 -1.15% -3.17 1.69% 5.73 0.95% 2.52
140 -0.84% -2.14 1.87% 4.00 2.13% 5.18 -1.54% -4.06 2.42% 8.51 0.57% 1.30
160 -1.10% -3.42 2.05% 4.64 2.67% 6.94 -0.90% -1.97 2.39% 7.24 0.43% 0.88
180 -1.41% -5.77 2.35% 6.30 3.47% 11.20 0.21% 0.38 2.27% 5.05 0.72% 1.24
200 -0.90% -3.33 2.45% 5.32 3.90% 9.77 0.96% 1.75 2.10% 4.77 0.82% 1.70
220 -0.18% -0.69 2.83% 6.39 4.56% 13.55 0.98% 2.12 1.58% 3.64 1.60% 3.37
240 0.80% 2.81 3.24% 6.74 5.42% 14.32 0.71% 1.63 1.25% 2.72 1.36% 2.34















Figure 1.3 Cumulative Holding Period Beta Excess Return Differential between Low- and High-
Dispersion Portfolios on the NYSE during the post-SHO period: Controlling for Option 
Availability  
 
Figure 3 displays the time paths of correcting overvaluation for pilot stocks and control stocks listed on the NYSE 
during the sample period from May to December 2005. The pilot and matched control samples are graphed separately. 
The results for stocks with no option are in Figure 3.A and the results for stocks with options are in Figure 3.B.  
 
Figure 3.A. NYSE Stocks with no Options            Figure 3.B. NYSE Stocks with Options  
Controlling for Option Availability: Stocks with no Options 
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Controlling for Option Availability: Stocks with Options 























Figure 1.4 Cumulative Holding Period Beta Excess Return Differential between Low- and High-
Dispersion Portfolios on the NASDAQ during the post-SHO period: Controlling Option 
Availability 
 
Figure 4 displays the time paths of correcting overvaluation for pilot stocks and control stocks listed on the NYSE 
during the sample period from May to December 2005. The pilot and matched control samples are graphed separately. 
The results for stocks with no option are in Figure 4.A and the results for stocks with options are in Figure 4.B 
 
Figure 4.A. NASDAQ Stocks with no Options     Figure 4.B. NASDAQ Stocks with Options 
 
Controlling for Option Availability: Stocks with no Options 























Controlling for Option Availability: Stocks with Options 
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Table 1.8 The Beta Excess Cumulative Return Differential between Low- and High-Dispersion 
Portfolios for Pilot, Control, and Size-BM Matched Control Samples during the post-SHO 
period: Controlling for Firm Size  
 
This table presents the beta excess cumulative return differentials between low- and high-dispersion 
portfolios for small stocks and large stocks. The time period is from May 02, 2005 to Dec 30, 2005. The 
low- and high-dispersion portfolios are constructed as in Table 4 and t-statistics are reported in parentheses 
under the mean estimations. Panel A reports the results for NYSE stocks and Panel B presents the results 
for NASDAQ stocks.  
 
Panel A: NYSE-listed Stocks during the post-SHO period 
   Small Stocks         Large Stocks       
 Pilot t Control t 
Control 
Match t Pilot t Control t 
Control  
Match t 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
1 0.02% 0.43 0.05% 0.93 0.08% 1.47 -0.02% -0.65 0.01% 0.30 0.01% 0.37 
2 0.01% 0.15 0.13% 1.79 0.17% 2.06 -0.01% -0.30 0.00% 0.08 0.04% 0.96 
3 0.00% -0.04 0.20% 2.38 0.29% 2.74 -0.03% -0.47 0.03% 0.54 0.09% 1.66 
4 -0.03% -0.38 0.26% 2.72 0.37% 3.12 -0.03% -0.52 0.06% 0.90 0.13% 2.08 
5 -0.06% -0.62 0.34% 3.19 0.46% 3.44 -0.03% -0.35 0.07% 0.89 0.14% 2.24 
6 -0.07% -0.70 0.40% 3.33 0.57% 3.80 -0.01% -0.11 0.06% 0.79 0.19% 2.52 
7 -0.07% -0.66 0.47% 3.70 0.65% 4.00 0.06% 0.63 0.07% 0.83 0.23% 2.97 
8 -0.08% -0.66 0.54% 3.93 0.71% 4.13 0.08% 0.88 0.09% 1.00 0.29% 3.43 
9 -0.09% -0.68 0.59% 4.03 0.78% 4.27 0.12% 1.20 0.09% 0.98 0.32% 3.65 
10 -0.07% -0.54 0.64% 4.17 0.85% 4.40 0.14% 1.39 0.11% 1.13 0.36% 3.80 
20 0.11% 0.62 1.24% 5.65 1.26% 2.31 0.31% 2.18 0.24% 1.38 0.53% 2.89 
30 -0.03% -0.13 1.82% 6.91 1.98% 3.13 0.35% 1.92 0.24% 0.84 1.07% 4.02 
40 -0.39% -1.74 2.20% 5.42 2.53% 3.38 0.75% 3.63 0.55% 1.76 1.56% 5.83 
60 -0.61% -2.58 3.34% 11.8 3.44% 4.48 1.48% 6.57 1.05% 3.07 2.73% 8.88 
80 -0.34% -1.50 3.95% 18.1 5.11% 6.88 2.26% 9.95 1.89% 7.19 3.53% 11.2 
100 0.16% 0.74 5.04% 22.3 6.14% 8.88 3.47% 15.55 2.27% 6.18 4.78% 12.4 
120 0.51% 1.89 6.02% 20.8 7.34% 10.9 4.24% 21.56 2.33% 7.06 5.49% 11.5 
140 0.91% 3.41 6.69% 20.0 8.65% 11.7 4.23% 20.01 2.40% 10.3 6.17% 11.2 
160 1.37% 4.73 6.92% 21.3 9.30% 14.4 4.21% 16.96 1.91% 7.07 5.85% 13.6 
180 1.69% 5.80 6.50% 19.5 10.63% 16.4 4.10% 14.23 1.63% 5.46 6.36% 11.9 
200 2.37% 9.36 5.70% 13.1 10.17% 14.2 4.26% 14.23 1.36% 4.68 5.69% 10.1 
220 2.72% 9.26 5.04% 10.4 9.91% 16.1 3.99% 11.90 0.88% 2.80 6.09% 12.4 
240 2.43% 7.55 4.74% 10.5 9.10% 12.0 3.18% 9.49 0.55% 1.68 5.36% 8.6 














Table 1.8.Panel B: NASDAQ-listed Stocks during the post-SHO period: Controlling for 
Firm Size 
 
 Small Stocks         Large Stocks         
 Pilot t Control t 
Control 
Match  t Pilot t Control t 
 Control 
Match  t 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
1 0.08% 1.26 0.05% 0.85 0.07% 0.97 0.01% 0.14 -0.03% -0.87 -0.01% -0.22
2 0.16% 1.78 0.10% 1.15 0.10% 1.10 0.00% 0.07 0.00% 0.08 0.04% 0.63
3 0.23% 2.04 0.10% 0.97 0.10% 0.87 -0.01% -0.09 0.03% 0.52 0.09% 1.08
4 0.30% 2.28 0.11% 0.89 0.12% 0.88 -0.05% -0.48 0.07% 1.00 0.14% 1.58
5 0.38% 2.54 0.13% 0.94 0.15% 1.00 -0.07% -0.71 0.11% 1.34 0.19% 1.88
6 0.46% 2.84 0.11% 0.76 0.17% 0.98 -0.10% -0.87 0.12% 1.39 0.21% 1.96
7 0.56% 3.13 0.14% 0.88 0.18% 0.99 -0.13% -1.08 0.17% 1.66 0.26% 2.19
8 0.63% 3.28 0.12% 0.67 0.17% 0.89 -0.17% -1.24 0.19% 1.81 0.32% 2.51
9 0.70% 3.40 0.11% 0.58 0.17% 0.81 -0.19% -1.33 0.27% 2.26 0.43% 2.99
10 0.78% 3.56 0.12% 0.61 0.19% 0.86 -0.22% -1.43 0.32% 2.39 0.51% 3.33
11 0.82% 3.52 0.15% 0.70 0.21% 0.92 -0.28% -1.67 0.36% 2.60 0.58% 3.72
12 0.86% 3.58 0.13% 0.60 0.20% 0.86 -0.29% -1.65 0.35% 2.39 0.63% 3.94
13 0.93% 3.70 0.13% 0.56 0.22% 0.92 -0.36% -1.92 0.37% 2.43 0.68% 4.16
14 0.96% 3.67 0.13% 0.56 0.23% 0.94 -0.42% -2.15 0.39% 2.47 0.72% 4.28
15 1.02% 3.76 0.15% 0.61 0.26% 1.05 -0.48% -2.38 0.40% 2.48 0.71% 4.16
16 1.06% 3.73 0.21% 0.83 0.31% 1.20 -0.55% -2.62 0.43% 2.59 0.73% 4.07
17 1.08% 3.67 0.25% 0.91 0.34% 1.28 -0.61% -2.79 0.45% 2.57 0.77% 4.11
18 1.10% 3.63 0.24% 0.86 0.33% 1.25 -0.65% -2.89 0.49% 2.67 0.82% 4.29
19 1.10% 3.56 0.26% 0.93 0.40% 1.44 -0.68% -2.98 0.55% 2.98 0.89% 4.50
20 1.13% 3.57 0.29% 1.01 0.41% 1.46 -0.72% -3.07 0.53% 2.89 0.87% 4.62
             
30 1.35% 3.54 0.55% 1.54 1.07% 3.18 -1.07% -3.95 0.68% 3.47 0.99% 4.65
40 1.52% 3.54 0.90% 2.37 1.47% 4.12 -1.89% -5.37 0.97% 4.44 1.33% 5.39
50 1.43% 3.12 0.91% 2.35 1.30% 3.55 -2.81% -6.82 0.91% 4.56 1.26% 5.44
60 0.86% 1.75 1.08% 2.74 1.34% 3.60 -3.35% -7.64 0.87% 4.23 1.01% 4.15
80 -0.08% -0.14 1.37% 3.56 1.53% 4.34 -4.07% -8.67 0.43% 1.97 0.07% 0.26
90 0.14% 0.24 1.18% 3.11 1.36% 3.71 -4.28% -8.71 0.29% 1.31 0.44% 1.47
100 0.27% 0.48 0.86% 2.36 1.25% 3.25 -4.38% -8.90 0.24% 1.04 0.58% 1.71
120 0.09% 0.17 0.77% 2.39 1.73% 4.37 -5.05% -11.31 0.33% 1.15 0.81% 2.05
             
140 -0.99% -2.70 0.58% 1.93 2.16% 5.09 -5.98% -15.64 0.43% 1.64 1.04% 2.81
160 -1.79% -5.27 1.24% 3.98 4.25% 8.57 -5.34% -13.88 0.99% 4.71 1.12% 3.40
180 -1.07% -2.25 1.36% 4.06 5.76% 11.66 -4.07% -13.69 2.02% 9.75 0.78% 2.39
181 -0.99% -2.07 1.36% 4.01 5.79% 11.71 -4.01% -13.92 2.06% 9.98 0.77% 2.36
182 -0.91% -1.89 1.36% 3.96 5.82% 11.74 -3.95% -14.10 2.10% 10.13 0.77% 2.34
183 -0.83% -1.70 1.36% 3.89 5.84% 11.76 -3.89% -14.31 2.12% 10.21 0.78% 2.36
220 1.61% 2.78 1.86% 4.22 7.61% 13.87 -2.78% -9.41 3.25% 14.82 0.86% 2.40
240 2.45% 3.86 2.48% 5.35 8.60% 15.44 -2.10% -6.40 3.32% 13.66 0.73% 2.03
251 3.24% 4.78 2.99% 6.89 9.04% 17.42 -1.59% -5.08 3.29% 12.75 0.72% 1.94
  
 
HD: Holding Period (in days) 
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Figure 1.5 Cumulative Holding Period Beta Excess Return Differential between Low- and High-
Dispersion Portfolios on the NYSE during the post-SHO period: Controlling for Firm Size  
 
Figure 5 displays the time paths of correcting overvaluation for pilot stocks and control stocks listed on the NYSE 
during the sample period from May to December 2005. The pilot and matched control samples are graphed separately. 
Small firms’ results are in Figure 5.A and large firms’ results are in Figure 5.B. 
 
Figure 5.A. NYSE Small Firms                            Figure 5.B. NYSE Large Firms                                            
Controlling for firm size: Small Firms
 NYSE Pilot Vs. Matched Control Sample 




















Controlling for firm size: Large Firms 
NYSE Pilot Vs. Matched Control Sample 

























Figure 1.6 Cumulative Holding Period Beta Excess Return Differential between Low- and 
High-Dispersion Portfolios on the NASDAQ during the post-SHO period: Controlling for 
Firm Size   
 
Figure 6 displays the time paths of correcting overvaluation for pilot stocks and control stocks listed on the NASDAQ 
during the sample period from May to December 2005. The pilot and matched control samples are graphed separately. 
Small firms’ results are in Figure 6.A and large firms’ results are in Figure 6.B. 
 
Figure 6.A. NASDAQ Small Firms                  Figure 6.B. NASDAQ Large Firms 
  
Controlling for Firm Size: Small Stocks 
NASDAQ Pilot vs. Matched Control Samples




















Controlling for Firm Size: Large Stocks 
NASDAQ Pilot Vs. Matched Control Samples 
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Table 1.9 The Beta Excess Return Differential between Low- and High-Dispersion Portfolios for 
Pilot, Control, and Size-BM Matched Control Samples during the post-SHO period: 
Controlling for Book to Market Ratio 
 
This table presents the beta excess cumulative return differentials between low- and high-dispersion 
portfolios for stocks with low book-to-market ratio (growth) and for stocks with high book-to-market ratio 
(value stocks). The time period is from May 02, 2005 to Dec 30, 2005. The low- and high-dispersion 
portfolios are constructed as in Table 4 and t-statistics are reported following the mean estimations. NYSE 
results are in Panel A and NASDAQ results are in Panel B. Highlighted t-stat indicates the significance at 
5% level. 
 
Panel A: NYSE 
 Growth Stocks  Value Stocks   
 Pilot T Control T Control 
Match 
T Pilot T Control T Control 
Match 
T 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
1 0.02% 0.53 -0.01% -0.36 -0.39 0.03% 0.83 0.05% 1.62 0.09% 2.14
2 0.05% 1.00 -0.01% -0.30 -0.01% -0.24 0.03% 0.64 0.12% 2.34 0.23% 3.48
3 0.06% 0.91 0.00% -0.08 0.06% 0.74 0.03% 0.58 0.18% 2.96 0.35% 4.12
4 0.07% 0.82 0.00% -0.05 0.02% 0.21 0.03% 0.45 0.23% 3.40 0.44% 4.53
5 0.09% 0.93 0.01% 0.10 0.03% 0.33 0.03% 0.45 0.29% 3.72 0.51% 4.79
6 0.09% 0.92 0.02% 0.23 0.08% 0.81 0.05% 0.71 0.33% 3.89 0.60% 4.95
7 0.16% 1.39 0.03% 0.33 0.09% 0.87 0.07% 0.85 0.40% 4.26 0.69% 5.21
8 0.19% 1.62 0.04% 0.45 0.09% 0.86 0.09% 1.11 0.46% 4.64 0.83% 5.71
9 0.20% 1.63 0.06% 0.63 0.09% 0.79 0.10% 1.15 0.53% 4.97 0.90% 5.84
10 0.22% 1.69 0.08% 0.72 0.09% 0.79 0.15% 1.57 0.60% 5.27 1.00% 6.09
11 0.24% 1.75 0.09% 0.84 0.07% 0.57 0.18% 1.83 0.67% 5.52 1.10% 6.31
12 0.26% 1.84 0.11% 0.94 -0.02% -0.15 0.23% 2.14 0.73% 5.80 1.25% 6.75
13 0.29% 2.03 0.12% 0.99 0.06% 0.30 0.27% 2.41 0.79% 6.03 1.36% 7.19
14 0.34% 2.31 0.13% 1.00 0.19% 1.04 0.27% 2.43 0.86% 6.25 1.43% 7.39
15 0.35% 2.35 0.14% 1.05 0.07% 0.34 0.28% 2.50 0.91% 6.42 1.54% 7.64
      
30 0.48% 2.41 0.19% 0.98 0.26% 1.05 0.58% 3.19 1.77% 8.14 2.84% 8.36
40 0.77% 3.25 0.37% 1.71 0.30% 1.10 0.63% 2.68 2.45% 9.72 3.79% 9.95
50 1.06% 4.31 0.49% 2.03 0.79% 3.08 0.53% 1.98 2.92% 10.47 3.95% 4.67
60 1.33% 5.12 0.64% 2.60 0.80% 2.72 0.62% 2.13 3.23% 11.04 5.42% 11.93
      
80 2.31% 7.74 1.08% 4.04 1.29% 3.53 1.06% 4.12 3.78% 10.45 7.40% 15.88
100 3.82% 12.07 1.19% 4.20 0.68% 1.63 1.21% 5.17 4.60% 10.82 8.82% 17.29
120 5.00% 17.97 1.05% 4.55 0.87% 1.80 1.12% 4.97 5.07% 10.64 9.55% 15.38
140 5.38% 23.35 1.02% 4.63 1.35% 2.21 1.40% 6.56 5.35% 10.67 10.96% 17.52
160 6.02% 25.09 0.56% 2.35 1.90% 2.86 1.38% 5.16 4.69% 9.67 10.89% 16.64
180 7.10% 29.05 0.05% 0.17 2.14% 2.98 1.10% 3.39 3.84% 7.83 10.66% 15.12
200 8.02% 30.67 -0.32% -1.27 1.18% 1.66 0.85% 2.73 3.31% 6.62 8.95% 9.88
220 8.38% 27.63 -0.85% -2.96 0.08% 0.08 0.96% 3.13 2.77% 5.46 10.70% 12.32
240 7.82% 23.31 -1.45% -4.33 -1.49% -2.08 0.48% 1.74 2.45% 4.95 8.23% 10.69





Table 1.9 Panel B: NASDAQ-listed Stocks during the post-SHO Period 
 Growth Stocks  Value Stocks   
 Pilot T Control T Control 
Match 
T Pilot T Control T Control 
Match 
T 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
1 0.05% 0.77 0.00% 0.03 0.00% 0.01 0.07% 1.28 0.05% 0.96 0.07% 1.21
2 0.13% 1.51 0.02% 0.34 0.09% 1.08 0.09% 1.25 0.11% 1.49 0.12% 1.46
3 0.19% 1.87 0.03% 0.47 0.20% 1.99 0.12% 1.35 0.14% 1.45 0.13% 1.28
4 0.26% 2.18 0.07% 0.87 0.32% 2.67 0.12% 1.14 0.16% 1.45 0.14% 1.19
5 0.31% 2.35 0.07% 0.77 0.41% 3.04 0.11% 0.97 0.21% 1.78 0.17% 1.35
6 0.38% 2.67 0.08% 0.81 0.50% 3.39 0.12% 0.98 0.22% 1.75 0.16% 1.16
7 0.45% 2.94 0.11% 0.93 0.61% 3.80 0.13% 0.94 0.27% 1.92 0.18% 1.22
8 0.50% 3.19 0.12% 0.99 0.70% 4.09 0.13% 0.87 0.28% 1.87 0.19% 1.16
9 0.58% 3.54 0.14% 1.09 0.80% 4.41 0.13% 0.82 0.30% 1.89 0.19% 1.13
10 0.65% 3.79 0.14% 1.06 0.91% 4.85 0.14% 0.83 0.33% 1.94 0.21% 1.19
      
20 0.97% 4.00 0.28% 1.42 1.81% 6.72 0.16% 0.67 0.58% 2.53 0.49% 1.92
21 1.01% 4.04 0.28% 1.38 1.92% 6.99 0.18% 0.71 0.61% 2.61 0.52% 1.98
22 1.04% 4.13 0.30% 1.43 2.04% 7.26 0.17% 0.66 0.67% 2.72 0.59% 2.14
23 1.07% 4.19 0.33% 1.61 2.12% 7.44 0.17% 0.67 0.74% 2.85 0.64% 2.20
24 1.11% 4.31 0.32% 1.53 2.22% 7.64 0.16% 0.60 0.80% 2.95 0.55% 1.97
25 1.16% 4.46 0.33% 1.54 2.30% 7.83 0.14% 0.53 0.85% 3.11 0.61% 2.12
26 1.24% 4.69 0.34% 1.56 2.37% 7.99 0.11% 0.39 0.74% 2.92 0.65% 2.25
27 1.27% 4.78 0.37% 1.69 2.45% 8.17 0.08% 0.28 0.92% 3.27 0.70% 2.35
28 1.35% 5.03 0.40% 1.81 2.51% 8.29 0.06% 0.22 0.78% 3.04 0.73% 2.41
29 1.41% 5.22 0.44% 1.99 2.62% 8.55 0.05% 0.16 0.97% 3.43 0.77% 2.51
30 1.48% 5.37 0.47% 2.11 2.73% 8.81 0.04% 0.15 0.99% 3.51 0.80% 2.59
      
40 1.78% 5.54 0.97% 3.68 3.94% 11.28 -0.05% -0.17 1.21% 3.96 0.85% 2.45
60 1.30% 3.32 1.57% 5.41 5.21% 14.34 -0.50% -1.64 1.27% 4.26 0.70% 1.98
80 0.78% 1.79 2.07% 6.45 5.43% 12.12 -1.05% -3.67 1.49% 5.07 0.93% 2.86
100 0.95% 2.03 2.09% 6.25 5.51% 11.73 -0.83% -2.54 1.35% 4.89 1.10% 3.67
120 0.69% 1.49 2.16% 6.71 6.21% 13.59 -0.64% -2.10 1.82% 7.16 2.07% 7.20
140 0.07% 0.15 2.09% 6.55 6.53% 16.57 -0.54% -1.98 1.91% 7.81 2.66% 9.24
160 1.19% 2.26 2.22% 7.08 6.42% 19.06 -0.51% -1.74 2.61% 9.85 4.13% 12.42
180 3.08% 5.13 2.43% 7.46 7.06% 19.18 -1.01% -2.83 3.06% 10.80 4.91% 15.46
200 5.10% 8.84 2.50% 7.36 6.85% 16.60 -1.17% -3.33 3.43% 10.73 5.66% 16.13
220 5.08% 10.53 2.68% 7.45 6.40% 13.10 -1.06% -2.89 4.03% 12.62 6.89% 22.03
240 5.08% 10.91 2.79% 7.69 5.81% 10.35 -1.03% -2.57 4.72% 11.93 8.33% 24.09








Figure 1.7 Cumulative Holding Period Beta Excess Return Differential between Low- and 
High-Dispersion Portfolios on the NYSE during the post-SHO Period: Controlling for 
Book-to-Market Ratio 
 
Figure 7 displays the time paths of correcting overvaluation for pilot stocks and control stocks listed on the NYSE 
during the sample period from May to December 2005. The pilot and matched control samples are graphed separately. 
Value firms’ results are in the left and growth firms’ results are in the right.  
 






























Figure 1.8 Cumulative Holding Period Beta Excess Return Differential between Low- and 
High-Dispersion Portfolios on the NASDAQ during the post-SHO period: Controlling for 
Book-to-Market Ratio 
 
Figure 8 displays the time paths of correcting overvaluation for pilot stocks and control stocks listed on the NASDAQ 
during the sample period from May to December 2005. The pilot and matched control samples are graphed separately. 
Value firms’ results are in the left and Growth firms’ results are in the right.  
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Table 1.10 Time Series Tests of Four-factor Models for Dispersion Thirds during the Post-
SHO Period 
This table reports alpha, the intercepts in the Fama-French four-factor model for equal-weighted dispersion 
portfolios in both pilot and control sample. The model is shown as below. 
pttptptpftmtppftpt UMDuHMLhSMBsRRRR εβα ++++−+=− )( , The risk free rate Rf,t, the 
size premium SMB, the book to market premium, HML, and the momentum premium, UMD, are drawn 
from CRSP FAMA-FRENCH FACOTOR dataset. Holding periods are in days. The sample period is from 
May 02, 2005 through Dec 30, 2005. The dispersion equal-weighted thirds are formed as in Table 4. T-
statistics are in parentheses. 
 
 
Panel A: NYSE Stocks  
 
Holding   
Pilot 
Sample       
Control 
Sample   
Period D1 D2 D3   D1 D2 D3 
                
1 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002   0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002* 
  (0.98) (-1.80) (-0.95)   (0.99) (1.27) (-1.76) 
5 0.0001 -0.0014** -0.0002   0.0003 0.0001 -0.0016*** 
  (0.44) (-2.18) (-0.52)   (1.03) (0.50) (-2.91) 
10 0.0008* -0.0016 -0.0005   0.0013*** 0.0005 -0.0023*** 
  (1.80) (-1.70) (-1.03)   (2.88) (0.96) (-3.72) 
20 0.0013 -0.0046*** -0.0010   0.0034*** -0.0008 -0.0047*** 
  (1.21) (-3.01) (-1.17)   (3.75) (-0.54) (-2.67) 
30 -0.0017 -0.0045** -0.0039***   0.0058*** -0.0027 -0.0079* 
  (-0.95) (-2.36) (-2.89)   (5.23) (-1.36) (-1.77) 
60 0.0070 -0.0073 0.0119***   0.0209*** -0.0074 0.0088 
  (1.37) (-1.02) (2.70)   (8.40) (-1.36) (0.89) 
120 0.0174*** -0.0020 -0.0056   0.0201*** -0.0083 -0.0307** 
  (3.53) (-0.16) (-1.21)   (6.46) (-1.26) (-2.26) 
180 0.0397*** 0.0173 0.0099   0.0293*** -0.0043 -0.0540*** 
  (3.33) (0.81) (1.19)   (3.29) (-0.45) (-5.18) 
251 0.0293 -0.0206 -0.0762***   0.0202* 0.0260 -0.1522*** 
  (1.67) (-0.52) -5.14   1.81 (1.92) (-11.6) 
        










Table 1.10 Panel B: NASDAQ Stocks during the post-SHO period 
 
NASDAQ Pilot       Control      
HD D1 D2 D3   D1 D2 D3 
1 -0.002 0.01% 0.005***  0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
 (-1.21) (0.36) (2.70)  (3.38) (-0.47) (-0.49) 
10 -0.002 0.0007% 0.00%  0.005*** 0.000 -0.001 
 (-0.21) (-0.05) (0.02)  (4.83) (-0.03) (-1.11) 
20 -0.003 -0.001 0.17%  0.008*** 0.002 -0.004** 
 (-0.83) (-0.34) (0.71)  (5.21) (1.11) (-2.07) 
30 -0.008*** 0.002 0.18%  0.014*** 0.005 -0.007** 
 (-4.66) (0.08) (0.84)  (9.02) (1.26) (-2.45) 
40 -0.012*** -0.002 0.007*  0.018*** 0.006 -0.011*** 
 (-4.63) (-0.61) (1.87)  (9.79) (1.43) (-4.14) 
50 -0.014*** -0.004 0.009***  0.022*** 0.008 -0.012*** 
 (-4.34) (-1.06) (3.00)  (11.09) (1.34) (-5.31) 
60 -0.014*** -0.005 0.004**  0.023*** 0.007* -0.008** 
 (-4.75) (-1.39) (2.06)  (10.24) (1.75) (-2.46) 
70 -0.015** -0.008*** 0.001**  0.030*** 0.004* -0.009** 
 (-2.22) (-2.78) (1.92)  (11.67) (1.86) (-2.22) 
80 -0.026*** -0.007 0.001**  0.035*** 0.008 -0.016*** 
 (-5.53) (-1.64) (2.12)  (11.48) (0.91) (-3.14) 
90 -0.028*** 0.004 0.01%  0.040*** 0.014 -0.018*** 
 (-3.76) (0.52) (0.01)  (9.51) (1.21) (-3.54) 
120 -0.011 0.009 0.060**  0.033*** 0.017 0.020** 
 (-1.07) (0.57) (2.50)  (5.12) (1.60) (2.27) 
180 0.007 -0.031 0.030  0.009 0.002 0.040* 
 (0.24) (-1.17) (0.91)  (1.32) (0.39) (1.75) 
251 -0.015*** -1.00% 0.031  -0.004 0.009 0.049 
 (-4.41) (-0.30) (0.32)  (-0.27) (0.63) (1.47) 
***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively 

















Table 1.11 Time Series Tests of Three-factor Models for Dispersion Thirds during the post-
SHO Period: NYSE Stocks 
 
This table reports alpha, the intercepts in the Fama-French three-factor model for equal-weighted 
dispersion portfolios in both pilot and control sample. The model is shown as below. 
pttptpftmtppftpt HMLhSMBsRRRR εβα +++−+=− )( , The risk free rate Rf,t, the size 
premium SMB, the book to market premium, HML are drawn from CRSP FAMA-FRENCH FACOTOR 
dataset. Holding periods are in days. The sample period is from May 02, 2005 through Dec 30, 2005. The 
dispersion equal-weighted thirds are formed as in Table 4. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
Holding   Pilot Sample   Control Sample 
Period D1 D2 D3 D1 D2  D3 
1 0.0001 -0.0002  -0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002* 
 (0.99) (-1.67) (-1.07) (0.86) (1.38) (-1.78) 
5 0.0002 -0.0012 ** -0.0005 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0019** 
 (0.67) (-2.01) (-1.17) (0.54) (0.81) (-3.32) 
10 0.0012 *** -0.0017 ** -0.0013*** 0.0008* 0.0008 -0.0031*** 
 (2.90) (-1.95) (-2.46) (1.85) (1.65) (-5.05) 
20 0.0026 *** -0.0033 ** -0.0039*** 0.0017** -0.0002 -0.0088*** 
 (2.88) (-2.58) (-5.02) (2.10) (-0.19) (-5.63) 
30 0.0008 -0.0035 ** -0.0064*** 0.0037*** -0.0025* -0.0118*** 
 (0.59) (-2.45) (-6.24) (4.32) (-1.70) (-3.57) 
60 0.0059 ** -0.0073 ** -0.0074*** 0.0092*** -0.0065*** -0.0190*** 
 (2.26) (-2.01) (-3.06) (6.70) (-2.34) (-3.62) 
90 0.0093** -0.0123 * -0.0219*** 0.0066*** -0.0106*** -0.0416*** 
 (1.92) (-1.74) (-6.12) (3.34) (-2.65) (-4.85) 
120 0.0122*** -0.0086 -0.0205*** 0.0174*** -0.0121** -0.0412*** 
 (2.50) (-0.71) (-3.61) (5.73) (-1.92) (-3.14) 
180 0.0353*** 0.0201 0.0121 0.0283*** -0.0056 -0.0557*** 
 (3.03) (0.97) (1.49) (3.28) (-0.60) (-5.50) 
251 0.0305* -0.0238 -0.0811*** 0.0216** 0.0282** -0.1572*** 
  (1.74) (-0.60) (-4.82) (1.91) (2.03) (-10.33) 















Table 1.12 Cumulative Holding Period Beta Excess Return Differential between Low- and 
High-Dispersion Portfolios: the Pre-SHO Period from September 2003 to April 2004 
 
Each day stocks are sorted into three groups based on the level of dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts for both pilot 
and control samples on both the NYSE and the NASDAQ. Control samples here are firm size and book-to-market 
matched sample. The time period considered is from September 2003 through April 2004. The cumulative portfolio 
returns are calculated for those 4 portfolios. The overvaluation is measured as the portfolios’ beta excess returns 
differentials between the low and high dispersion portfolios, (D1-D3), where D1 stands for low dispersion portfolio 
returns and D3 refers to high dispersion portfolio returns. T-statistics are presented following the mean estimations. The 
difference between the pilot and the control samples are presented as Diff, followed by the T-statistics of the difference.  
 
 
 NYSE           NASDAQ           
HD Pilot t 
Control 
Match t Diff t Pilot t 
Control 
Match t Diff t 
 (1)  (2)  
(3)= 
(2)-(1)  (4)  (5)  
(6)= 
(5)-(4)  
1 0.04% 1.42 0.02% 0.53 -0.02% -0.56 0.07% 0.86 0.04% 0.52 -0.03% -0.27 
2 0.06% 1.15 0.06% 1.08 0.00% -0.05 0.30% 2.01 0.18% 1.17 -0.12% -0.56 
3 0.17% 2.51 0.12% 1.48 -0.05% -0.47 0.30% 1.76 0.16% 1.00 -0.14% -0.60 
4 0.19% 2.20 0.11% 1.42 -0.08% -0.71 0.40% 1.95 0.17% 1.06 -0.23% -0.91 
5 0.22% 2.40 0.16% 1.99 -0.07% -0.55 0.46% 1.89 0.15% 0.84 -0.31% -1.03 
6 0.25% 2.52 0.21% 2.32 -0.04% -0.29 0.54% 2.15 0.25% 1.29 -0.28% -0.89 
7 0.32% 3.16 0.20% 2.09 -0.12% -0.83 0.60% 2.20 0.30% 1.35 -0.31% -0.87 
8 0.38% 3.23 0.30% 2.66 -0.08% -0.50 0.62% 2.23 0.32% 1.38 -0.30% -0.82 
9 0.50% 4.13 0.37% 3.34 -0.13% -0.78 0.76% 2.64 0.36% 1.49 -0.40% -1.07 
10 0.59% 4.42 0.36% 3.47 -0.23% -1.38 0.84% 2.81 0.35% 1.41 -0.49% -1.25 
             
20 1.08% 5.23 0.78% 4.91 -0.31% -1.18 1.69% 4.68 0.93% 2.69 -0.76% -1.52 
40 2.00% 7.38 2.13% 9.31 0.12% 0.34 2.60% 5.01 1.98% 4.81 -0.62% -0.94 
60 2.61% 7.99 2.74% 8.24 0.13% 0.27 2.72% 4.70 2.14% 4.77 -0.59% -0.80 
80 3.06% 7.75 2.57% 6.05 -0.49% -0.85 2.45% 3.41 1.85% 3.13 -0.60% -0.65 
100 3.61% 9.16 3.51% 7.36 -0.11% -0.17 2.07% 2.76 1.27% 2.12 -0.79% -0.82 
120 4.16% 9.76 4.19% 7.84 0.03% 0.05 1.30% 1.79 0.94% 1.60 -0.36% -0.39 
140 4.64% 11.72 4.26% 9.01 -0.38% -0.62 0.42% 0.61 -0.21% -0.33 -0.63% -0.67 
160 5.60% 14.12 5.37% 9.32 -0.23% -0.33 -0.73% -1.14 -1.07% -1.98 -0.34% -0.40 
180 5.99% 16.61 5.24% 14.06 -0.75% -1.45 -1.45% -2.44 -2.06% -4.57 -0.61% -0.81 
200 6.25% 17.87 5.89% 14.39 -0.36% -0.66 -2.00% -3.44 -2.28% -4.66 -0.28% -0.37 
220 6.87% 18.29 6.73% 16.42 -0.13% -0.24 -2.37% -4.89 -2.73% -5.92 -0.35% -0.53 
240 7.79% 19.93 7.24% 17.31 -0.55% -0.96 -2.56% -4.51 -3.01% -7.28 -0.44% -0.63 
251 8.36% 21.60 7.53% 17.12 -0.84% -1.43 -2.61% -4.30 -2.90% -6.28 -0.29% -0.37 
  
 











Table 1.13 Time Series Tests of Four-factor Models for Dispersion Thirds during the Pre-
SHO Period 
 
This table reports the intercepts in the Fama-French four-factor model for equal-weighted dispersion portfolios in both the pilot and 
control samples. The model is shown as below. 
pttptptpftmtppftpt UMDuHMLhSMBsRRRR εβα ++++−+=− )( , Holding periods are in days. The 
sample period is from September 2, 2003 through April 30, 2004. The dispersion equal-weighted thirds are formed as in Table 4. D1, 
D2, D3 are low-, medium-, and high-dispersion portfolios.  T-statistics are reported following the means. Intercepts different from 
zero at p=0.05 are given in bold 
 
Panel A: NYSE Stocks during the pre-SHO period 
     Pilot       
HD D1 t D2 t D3 t 
1 5E-05 0.29 0.0001 0.78 0.000 -1.01 
5 0.0011 1.38 0.0027 0.66 -0.002 -3.42 
10 0.0017 2.45 -0.0040 -0.86 -0.006 -4.86 
20 0.0053 3.93 0.0097 0.77 -0.015 -6.92 
30 0.0089 4.95 -0.0142 -1.38 -0.020 -7.21 
60 0.0123 3.73 0.0131 1.18 -0.041 -8.74 
120 0.0083 2.03 -0.0055 -1.37 -0.059 -5.13 
180 0.0393 4.31 0.0026 1.54 -0.060 -4.07 
251 0.0718 6.41 0.0119 0.62 -0.116 -5.31 
      Control       
HD D1 t D2 t D3 t 
1 0.0001 0.65 0.0002 0.96 -0.0003 -1.69 
5 0.0005 0.75 -0.0010 -1.39 -0.0042 -2.75 
10 0.0022 2.66 0.0036 0.99 -0.0057 -3.86 
20 0.0033 2.16 -0.0098 -0.42 -0.0120 -6.61 
30 0.0069 3.75 -0.0120 -1.34 -0.0201 -7.70 
60 0.0111 2.91 -0.0140 -1.33 -0.0388 -5.18 
120 0.0098 2.88 -0.0095 -1.57 -0.0678 -6.36 
180 0.0372 3.04 0.0014 0.35 -0.0562 -4.44 

















Table 1.13 Panel B: NASDAQ Stocks during the pre-SHO Period 
 
      Pilot       
HD D1 t D2 t D3 t 
1 0.0013 1.56 0.0004 0.63 -0.0011 -3.86 
5 0.0042 4.65 0.0038 0.84 -0.0013 -4.19 
10 0.0073 4.67 0.0081 0.69 -0.0119 -6.33 
30 0.0083 4.44 0.0089 1.17 -0.0138 -5.46 
60 0.0256 9.45 0.0115 1.20 -0.0156 -1.81 
120 0.0149 6.65 0.0126 0.75 -0.0333 -2.44 
180 -0.0052 -0.42 -0.0059 -1.37 0.0144 1.37 
251 -0.0156 -0.71 -0.0091 -1.38 0.0129 1.23 
      Control       
HD D1 t D2 t D3 t 
1 0.0017 2.07 0.0005 0.37 -0.0005 -2.10 
5 0.0018 4.42 0.0022 1.09 -0.005 -2.94 
10 0.0049 4.80 0.0048 0.84 -0.011 -5.46 
30 0.0055 6.86 0.0039 1.01 -0.016 -4.55 
60 0.0261 9.24 0.0114 1.45 -0.016 -2.05 
120 0.0113 3.17 0.0074 0.74 -0.042 -3.84 
180 -0.0066 -0.74 -0.0032 -1.56 0.027 2.15 


























Table1.14 Cumulative Holding Period Beta Excess Return Differential between Low- and 
High-Dispersion Portfolios for Pilot and Size-BM Matched Samples during the post-SHO 
Period : An Alternative Dispersion Measure 
 
The table presents the beta excess return differential between low- and high-dispersion portfolios for the pilot, the 
control, and the matched control samples on either the NYSE or the NASDAQ. Here I use an alternative dispersion 
measure described in Section 6.6. The time period considered is from May to December 2005. The t-values given in 
bold are significant at 5% level. 
 
 
      NYSE           NASDAQ       
HD Pilot t 
Control  
Match t Diff t Pilot t 
Control  
Match t Diff t 
1 0.04% 1.26 0.03% 1.02 -0.01% -0.14 0.08% 1.12 0.05% 1.03 -0.03% -0.36
2 0.09% 1.85 0.09% 1.84 0.00% 0.06 0.14% 1.44 0.06% 0.94 -0.08% -0.66
3 0.09% 1.35 0.17% 2.37 0.09% 0.91 0.16% 1.22 0.09% 0.98 -0.07% -0.44
4 0.09% 1.27 0.19% 2.49 0.10% 0.94 0.20% 1.40 0.12% 1.14 -0.09% -0.48
5 0.12% 1.56 0.20% 2.29 0.07% 0.65 0.26% 1.60 0.14% 1.18 -0.12% -0.63
6 0.13% 1.55 0.22% 2.39 0.09% 0.74 0.30% 1.70 0.14% 1.16 -0.16% -0.75
7 0.20% 2.10 0.27% 2.69 0.07% 0.51 0.38% 1.95 0.21% 1.49 -0.17% -0.69
8 0.21% 2.20 0.30% 2.78 0.09% 0.62 0.41% 1.94 0.21% 1.40 -0.20% -0.77
9 0.26% 2.59 0.35% 2.86 0.09% 0.59 0.43% 1.95 0.31% 1.82 -0.13% -0.46
10 0.27% 2.74 0.40% 2.89 0.13% 0.74 0.45% 1.91 0.37% 2.03 -0.08% -0.26
             
20 0.48% 3.20 0.54% 1.60 0.06% 0.17 0.22% 0.56 0.60% 2.64 0.38% 0.85
40 0.44% 1.74 1.35% 2.82 0.91% 1.68 0.45% 0.99 1.38% 4.23 0.93% 1.67
60 0.80% 2.50 2.28% 3.18 1.48% 1.88 -0.71% -1.21 1.16% 3.40 1.88% 2.76
80 1.21% 3.40 3.66% 5.61 2.45% 3.29 -2.23% -3.50 1.14% 2.98 3.37% 4.54
100 1.73% 4.16 4.71% 8.19 2.97% 4.19 -2.37% -3.86 0.86% 2.36 3.23% 4.52
120 1.90% 4.15 5.24% 7.93 3.33% 4.14 -1.51% -2.51 0.92% 2.62 2.43% 3.49
140 1.70% 3.98 5.56% 7.64 3.85% 4.56 -1.32% -2.91 0.68% 1.88 2.00% 3.45
160 1.47% 2.61 5.00% 6.37 3.54% 3.66 -2.68% -6.76 1.14% 3.24 3.82% 7.21
180 1.24% 2.60 4.87% 5.45 3.63% 3.57 -2.68% -4.79 1.88% 6.05 4.56% 7.13
200 1.28% 2.86 5.86% 7.45 4.58% 5.06 -2.28% -3.04 2.28% 7.16 4.55% 5.60
220 1.01% 1.64 5.25% 5.75 4.24% 3.84 -2.35% -3.31 2.90% 9.54 5.26% 6.79
240 0.51% 0.88 5.40% 5.24 4.88% 4.12 -1.84% -2.56 3.25% 8.76 5.09% 6.30

















Figure 1.9 Cumulative Holding Period Beta Excess Return Differential between Low- and High-
Dispersion Portfolios during the pre-SHO Period from September 2003 to April 2004 
 
Figure 9 displays the time paths of correcting overvaluation for pilot stocks and control stocks during the pre-SHO 
period from September 2003 to April 2004. The pilot and matched control samples are graphed separately. The NYSE 
results are in the left and the NASDAQ results are in the right. 
Cumulative Holding Period Beta Excess Return Differential between Low-
and High-Dispersion Portfolios on the NYSE during the pre-SHO period 
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Figure 1.10 Cumulative Holding Period Beta Excess Return Differential between Low- and 
High-Dispersion Portfolios during the post-SHO Period: An Alternative Dispersion 
Measure 
 
Figure 10 displays the time paths of correcting overvaluation for pilot stocks and control stocks during the post-SHO 
period from May to December 2005 by using an alternative investor opinion dispersion measure stated in Section 6.7. 
The pilot and matched control samples are graphed separately. The NYSE results are in the left and the NASDAQ 
results are in the right. 
The Time Path of Correcting Overvaluation on the NYSE 
An Alternative Dispersion Measure 
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The Time Path of Correcting Overvaluation on the NASDAQ 
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Table 1.15 Cumulative Holding Period Raw Return Differentials between High- and Low-
Shorting Portfolios during the post-SHO period 
 
This table presents the return differential between high-and low-shorting portfolios with various holding 
periods, during the sample period from May to December 2005. Short selling activities are measured as the 
proportion of trading volume related to short selling.  
 
 NYSE     NASDAQ    
 HD Pilot t Control t   Pilot t Control t 
1 0.65%*** 22.07 0.66%*** 24.31  0.46%*** 11.18 0.55%*** 14.06 
2 0.57%*** 13.49 0.63%*** 9.80  0.39%*** 6.80 0.52%*** 9.55 
3 0.57%*** 12.00 0.53%*** 7.93  0.39%*** 5.24 0.50%*** 7.34 
4 0.57%*** 9.75 0.56%*** 7.35  0.36%*** 4.16 0.47%*** 6.38 
5 0.54%*** 8.74 0.55%*** 5.84  0.39%*** 4.14 0.43%*** 5.14 
6 0.51%*** 7.82 0.51%*** 5.07  0.34%*** 3.05 0.38%*** 3.93 
7 0.50%*** 7.53 0.53%*** 5.19  0.35%*** 2.84 0.40%*** 3.59 
8 0.45%*** 5.96 0.54%*** 4.81  0.22% 1.75 0.40%*** 3.99 
9 0.49%*** 6.22 0.52%*** 4.23  0.25% 1.64 0.43%*** 3.65 
10 0.41%*** 4.89 0.43%*** 3.55  0.22% 1.34 0.38%*** 2.89 
11 0.47%*** 5.32 0.50%*** 3.66  0.22% 1.27 0.29%** 2.43 
12 0.32%*** 3.43 0.39%*** 2.82  0.14% 0.81 0.30%** 2.30 
13 0.32%*** 3.69 0.37%*** 2.31  0.13% 0.81 0.31%** 2.65 
14 0.31%*** 3.14 0.07% 0.44  0.06% 0.34 0.34%** 2.67 
15 0.36%*** 3.87 0.42%* 1.89  0.16% 0.88 0.27%* 1.90 
          
30 0.63%*** 3.90 -0.78% -1.46  -0.23% -0.94 0.41% 1.80 
60 0.36% 1.58 -0.59% -1.75  -0.59% -1.51 0.40% 1.53 
90 0.65%*** 4.50 -1.17%*** -2.61  -0.73% -1.67 0.24% 0.96 
120 0.39% 1.26 -1.33%** -2.32  -0.19% -0.23 0.12% 0.48 
150 0.87%*** 5.21 -1.75%*** -3.20  -0.84% -0.93 -0.30% -1.53 
180 0.87%*** 4.40 -1.25%* -1.92  -1.10% -1.10 -0.76%*** -2.92 
210 1.09%*** 5.30 -2.75%*** -3.52  -4.20%*** -3.04 -1.15%*** -3.99 
240 1.25%*** 5.37 -1.88%*** -2.48  -3.48%* -1.91 -1.34%*** -5.00 
251 1.40%*** 5.86 -2.76%*** -3.21  -3.33%*** -4.66 -1.49%*** -5.51 
 
***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  

















Table 1.16 Annualized Holding Period Return Differential between High- and Low-Shorting 
Portfolios during the post-SHO Period from May to December 2005 
 
Table 13 presents annualized holding period return differentials between high-and low-shorting portfolios 
for different types of stocks. Column 1 presents the results based on stock raw return and column 2 presents 
the results based on beta excess returns. Small (large) stocks are stocks in the category of lowest (highest) 
firm size, and growth (value) stocks are in the category of lowest (highest) book-to-market ratio. Highlighted 
numbers are significant at 5% confidence level.  
 
 





















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1 423% 413% 421% 572% 537% 296% 352% 561% 
2 109% 105% 100% 147% 140% 81% 94% 137% 
3 65% 61% 51% 81% 83% 43% 57% 75% 
4 46% 43% 36% 53% 63% 29% 40% 51% 
5 33% 31% 28% 40% 47% 19% 28% 39% 
6 27% 24% 21% 28% 36% 13% 22% 30% 
7 22% 20% 16% 22% 30% 9% 17% 26% 
8 17% 15% 13% 18% 24% 6% 12% 21% 
9 16% 15% 11% 17% 23% 5% 13% 19% 
10 13% 11% 9% 14% 20% 3% 9% 16% 
11 13% 11% 7% 13% 19% 3% 9% 15% 
12 9% 7% 5% 11% 16% 1% 5% 13% 
13 9% 6% 3% 11% 14% 0% 5% 11% 
14 8% 6% 2% 9% 13% -1% 4% 10% 
15 7% 6% 1% 11% 14% -1% 3% 11% 
         
60 4% 2% 1% 3% 6% -2% 0% 4% 
120 3% 1% -1% 3% 5% -2% -1% 4% 
180 3% 1% -1% 3% 4% -3% -1% 4% 
250 3% 1% 1% 2% 3% -1% 0% 3% 
Panel B:NYSE Control        
1 425% 416% 456% 541% 521% 291% 425% 422% 
2 126% 120% 121% 148% 141% 79% 115% 121% 
3 61% 55% 64% 58% 64% 44% 59% 51% 
4 45% 42% 45% 45% 51% 28% 44% 40% 
5 34% 32% 30% 33% 39% 20% 34% 24% 
6 26% 24% 23% 29% 29% 16% 30% 17% 
7 24% 21% 21% 23% 24% 13% 26% 16% 
8 21% 19% 19% 21% 22% 12% 21% 12% 
9 18% 15% 16% 18% 19% 7% 17% 13% 
10 14% 11% 13% 15% 18% 7% 16% 7% 
11 16% 12% 11% 15% 15% 8% 12% 11% 
12 12% 8% 13% 8% 10% 4% 8% 7% 
13 11% 7% 10% 8% 6% 2% 8% 4% 
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14 3% 1% 10% 5% 6% 3% 4% -1% 
15 11% 7% 9% 5% 10% 1% 2% 6% 
60 0% -2% -1% -5% 3% -9% -3% -4% 
120 0% -3% -2% 0% 0% -6% 0% -5% 
180 -1% -2% -2% -2% 2% -4% 0% -4% 
250 -1% -3% -3% -1% 0% -4% -1% -7% 
         
Panel C 
NASDAQ 
Pilot       
 
1 217% 216% 231% 195% 362% 162% 218% 304% 
2 66% 64% 77% 51% 96% 64% 64% 72% 
3 39% 39% 48% 27% 51% 39% 39% 40% 
4 26% 26% 34% 20% 36% 29% 26% 25% 
5 22% 22% 29% 13% 28% 27% 22% 23% 
6 16% 16% 22% 6% 19% 22% 15% 20% 
7 14% 13% 16% 4% 15% 18% 13% 15% 
8 7% 7% 12% 0% 7% 16% 7% 11% 
9 8% 7% 9% 1% 8% 14% 7% 9% 
10 6% 6% 6% 0% 4% 11% 6% 8% 
11 6% 5% 6% 0% 3% 9% 5% 6% 
12 4% 3% 4% -1% 1% 8% 3% 5% 
13 2% 3% 2% 1% 1% 5% 3% 2% 
14 2% 1% 0% -2% -1% 4% 1% 3% 
15 3% 3% 1% 1% 0% 5% 3% 3% 
60 -3% -2% -1% -1% 2% -1% -2% -1% 
120 -1% 0% -3% 1% 3% -3% 0% -2% 
180 -2% -2% -3% -2% -1% -3% -2% -3% 
250 -4% -3% -3% -3% -3% -4% -3% -2% 
Panel D 
NASDAQ 
Control       
 
1 299% 300% 274% 299% 494% 219% 244% 398% 
2 95% 92% 82% 98% 156% 63% 80% 112% 
3 51% 52% 43% 58% 81% 36% 45% 66% 
4 35% 34% 29% 37% 51% 25% 29% 43% 
5 24% 24% 22% 27% 39% 19% 20% 32% 
6 17% 17% 17% 23% 30% 15% 13% 25% 
7 15% 15% 13% 20% 27% 11% 14% 21% 
8 13% 14% 12% 21% 22% 11% 13% 15% 
9 13% 13% 11% 17% 21% 11% 12% 14% 
10 11% 10% 7% 14% 15% 10% 8% 11% 
11 8% 7% 6% 11% 14% 9% 6% 6% 
12 6% 6% 2% 11% 13% 6% 7% 6% 
13 6% 6% 3% 11% 11% 6% 7% 5% 
14 7% 6% 2% 9% 10% 6% 6% 6% 
15 5% 5% 0% 8% 9% 4% 4% 4% 
60 2% 2% 0% 1% 2% 2% 3% -1% 
120 0% 0% 0% -1% 0% 0% 2% -2% 
180 -1% -1% -2% -2% 0% -1% 0% -3% 
250 -2% -1% -2% -2% -1% -2% -1% -2% 
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Table 1.17 Cumulative Holding Period Beta Excess Return Differential between High- and 
Low-Shoring Portfolios during the post-SHO period: Using the second lag of Short Selling 
Activities to form the Portfolios 
 
This table presents the return differential between high-and low-shorting portfolios with various holding 
periods, during the sample period from May to December 2005, by using the second lag of short selling 
information to form the portfolios. Short selling activities are measured as the proportion of trading volume 
related to short selling.  
 
  NYSE         NASDAQ       
HD Pilot t Control t   Pilot t Control t 
1 0.00% -0.01 -0.01% -0.06  -0.02% -0.27 -0.04% -0.37 
2 0.02% 0.11 -0.05% -0.42  -0.02% -0.18 -0.04% -0.29 
3 -0.10% -0.55 0.00% -0.03  0.01% 0.04 -0.12% -0.68 
4 -0.05% -0.24 -0.04% -0.24  0.01% 0.08 -0.20% -1.03 
5 -0.06% -0.26 -0.07% -0.33  0.00% 0.01 -0.14% -0.66 
6 0.01% 0.05 -0.04% -0.18  -0.03% -0.16 -0.15% -0.69 
7 -0.15% -0.60 0.05% 0.21  -0.09% -0.42 -0.09% -0.38 
8 -0.17% -0.62 0.09% 0.36  -0.11% -0.50 -0.16% -0.60 
9 -0.13% -0.44 0.12% 0.49  -0.09% -0.37 -0.23% -0.86 
10 0.03% 0.10 0.07% 0.28  -0.19% -0.77 -0.27% -0.95 
11 0.10% 0.29 -0.01% -0.05  -0.17% -0.65 -0.22% -0.76 
12 0.04% 0.11 -0.08% -0.26  -0.18% -0.67 -0.17% -0.55 
13 -0.01% -0.02 0.17% 0.55  -0.22% -0.81 -0.28% -0.89 
14 -0.06% -0.18 0.32% 0.88  -0.20% -0.71 -0.29% -0.89 
15 -0.05% -0.12 0.07% 0.18  -0.19% -0.65 -0.17% -0.50 
          
20 0.02% 0.04 0.72% 1.12  -0.18% -0.52 -0.43% -1.07 
40 0.34% 0.56 0.77% 1.21  0.17% 0.35 -0.22% -0.42 
60 0.58% 0.62 0.54% 0.70  0.34% 0.62 -0.20% -0.34 
80 0.71% 0.88 0.37% 0.48  0.32% 0.55 -0.20% -0.34 
100 -0.77% -0.99 2.32%*** 3.07  0.69% 1.13 -0.63% -1.23 
120 -0.12% -0.14 0.99% 1.79  1.05% 1.70 -0.52% -0.89 
140 -0.24% -0.17 1.76%** 2.09  1.52%** 2.60 -1.05% -1.53 
160 -1.01% -0.67 1.36% 1.54  1.78%*** 3.10 -1.34% -1.71 
180 -1.68% -1.28 0.45% 0.45  1.52%*** 2.65 -1.80%** -1.98 
200 -1.27% -0.92 1.93% 1.89  1.85%*** 3.12 -2.14%** -2.24 
220 0.64% 0.42 0.02% 0.01  1.89%** 2.49 -2.29%** -2.26 
240 -0.53% -0.37 1.01% 0.95  2.35%*** 2.64 -2.59%*** -2.76 
251 -2.72%** -2.06 1.09% 0.79   2.45%*** 2.92 -2.63%*** -2.97 






Information Driven Short Selling and the Suspension of Uptick Rules 
 
Abstract 
         I use the Regulation SHO data  in 2005 to examine the information content and 
market impact of short selling around the release of analyst recommendations for stocks 
that are exempt from uptick rule restrictions (pilot stocks) and stocks that are subject to 
such restrictions (control stocks). By looking at the magnitude and the speed of price 
responses to analyst downgrade recommendations, this paper provides intra-day evidence 
supporting the documented assertion that suspension of the uptick rule helps improve 
stock price efficiency. In particular, for after-hour downgrades, pilot stocks respond 
quickly, with virtually all of the price response incorporated by the following open, while 
control stocks take an extra half hour after opening to fully reflect the new information. 
For downgrades that occur during normal trading hours, the results show that downgrade 
information is partially incorporated into pilot stock prices up to two hours before the 
recommendation is released, while control stocks take up to an hour and a half after the 
recommendation release to impound the information into stock prices. Moreover, short 
selling activities prior to the release of analyst recommendations indicate that short sellers 
capitalize on their private information associated with upcoming downgrades in the 
control sample, but such behavior seems to disappear in the pilot sample. I conjecture that 
during the pilot program short sellers were aware of the SEC’s regulatory scrutiny of 






         For many years, academics viewed uptick rules as short sale constraints that hamper 
stock price efficiency.13 A large body of literature has been devoted to information arrival 
and stock price efficiency in the context of short sale constraints.14 For example, 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) develop a rational expectations model in which investors 
take short sale constraints into consideration in formulating their trading decisions. They 
argue that short sale constraints limit trade from both informed and uninformed short 
sellers and reduce stock price informational efficiency, especially on the private bad news 
side. Following this reasoning, uptick rules restrict short sellers from promptly registering 
negative private information into stock prices, increasing the time it takes for stock prices 
to adjust to negative private information.  
          To enable the SEC and academics to study the effect of uptick rules on market 
quality and the trading process, the SEC implemented the pilot program, beginning on 
May 2, 2005, which suspends uptick rule restrictions for a set of pre-chosen “pilot 
stocks”. The pilot program established by the Regulation SHO facilitates comparison 
between pilot and control stocks, and allows direct examination of the way in which the 
suspension of uptick rules characterizes short sellers’ behaviors and affects stock price 
efficiency in a controlled environment. Such an investigation not only contributes to the 
literature by providing high frequency and direct evidence on the shorting-efficiency 
                                                 
13 The SEC 10a-1 Rule provides that a short sale is only allowed at a price that is greater than or equal to 
the previous trading prices. NASD Rule 3350 specifies that whenever a bid is a downtick from the previous 
bid, traders other than market markers may short sale only at a price one penny above the bid. In this paper, 
those short selling price restriction rules are referred to as uptick rules for simplicity. 
14 For example, Miller (1979), Jarrow (1980), Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), Allen, et al (1993), Duffie 
et al (2002), Hong and Stein (2002), Bai et al (2006), amongst others. 
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relationship, but also generates useful information for the SEC regarding short selling 
regulations.  
         Using the Regulation SHO intra-day short selling data from 2005 I examine the 
information content and market impact of short selling around the release of analyst 
recommendations for stocks that are exempt from uptick rule restrictions (pilot stocks) 
and stocks that are subject to such restrictions (control stocks). The unique study design 
in this paper is characterized by choosing analyst recommendations as information events, 
using the magnitude and speed of price response to recommendation changes as the 
measures of stock price efficiency, and adopting uptick rule exempt status as the proxy 
for short sale constraints. By looking at the magnitude and speed of price responses to 
analyst downgrade recommendations, this paper provides intra-day evidence supporting 
the documented assertion that suspension of the uptick rule helps improve stock price 
efficiency. In particular, for after-hour downgrades, pilot stocks respond quickly, with 
virtually all of the price response incorporated by the following open, while control 
stocks take an extra half hour after opening to fully reflect the new information. For 
downgrades that occur during normal trading hours, the results show that downgrade 
information is partially incorporated into pilot stock prices up to two hours before the 
recommendation is released, while control stocks take up to an hour and a half after the 
recommendation release to impound the information into stock price.  Both results show 
that removing uptick rule restrictions increases the speed with which negative 
information is impounded into stock prices. Furthermore, the pre-recommendation price 
decline in pilot stocks is associated with lower levels of non-exempt shorting and higher 
levels of exempt shorting. This suggests that at least some informed short sellers are 
 97
avoiding shorting pilot stocks with forthcoming bad news.  Despite lower levels of 
informed shorting in pilot stocks, rapid price response occurs, confirming the hypothesis 
that short selling without uptick rule restrictions can more efficiently impound 
information into prices. Finally, short selling activities prior to the release of analyst 
recommendations indicate that short sellers capitalize on their private information 
associated with upcoming downgrades in the control sample, but such behavior seems to 
disappear in the pilot sample. I conjecture that, during the pilot program, short sellers 
were aware of the SEC’s regulatory scrutiny of pilot stocks and thus avoided trading on 
their private information in those stocks. 
         In this paper, the intra-day evidence of improved price efficiency due to the 
suspension of uptick rules extends the results in recent studies on the relationship 
between short sale constraints and stock price efficiency. Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu 
(2006) used delayed price response to market shocks as a proxy for price efficiency, and 
found that stock prices in countries with short selling constraints in place are less efficient 
than those where investors are allowed to short stocks. Similarly, Saffi and Sigurdsson 
(2007) measured price efficiency as the correlation between contemporaneous stock 
returns and lagged market returns as well as the R square of a market model regression. 
They compared short selling in 26 markets around the world, and found that short sale 
constraints are associated with lower price efficiency. More recently, Wu (2007) adopted 
the dispersion of pricing error as a measure of relative informational efficiency. She 
suggests that increased daily short selling activities due to suspension of uptick rule for 
pilot stocks directly drive the improvement in price efficiency. These studies, due to the 
low frequency of the data cannot directly reveal how actual shorting flow affects 
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informational efficiency on an intra-day basis.  Instead of applying indirect measures of 
price efficiency as suggested by previous studies, the high frequency shorting flow data 
allows me to adopt the magnitude and speed of price response to analyst downgrades as a 
straightforward and direct measure of price efficiency. 
        Second, this paper complements the literature on informativeness of short selling by 
linking short sales to private information in which an analyst downgrade is soon to occur. 
Prior studies have concluded that short selling is informative by examining the 
relationship between short selling activities and subsequent risk adjusted returns without 
linking the short selling activities directly to private information. For example, Diether, 
Lee, and Werner (2005) conclude that short selling are informative based on the negative 
relation between increasing short sales and subsequent future returns. Recent studies have 
used earnings announcements as a source of private information. For instance, Christophe, 
Ferri, and Angel (2004) investigated short selling before earnings announcements and 
found that abnormal short selling is significantly related to post-announcement stock 
returns. Moreover, Reed (2007) used quarterly earnings announcements as information 
events, where earnings are taken to be private information until they are publicly 
announced, to test the hypothesis that short sale constraints reduce the speed at which 
prices adjust to private information. These studies ignore the legal risk involved in insider 
trading associated with firm’s earnings information. Also, given the same earnings 
information, investors may formulate different evaluations on stock prices. Using analyst 
recommendations as information events is a more appropriate choice because trading on 
forthcoming analyst recommendations imposes less legal risk than trading on 
forthcoming earnings information. Also, it allows for different opinions given the same 
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earnings information. To date, this paper is the first to use analyst recommendations as 
information events to study information-driven short selling.  
          Thirdly, this paper is among only a few studies that employ high frequency 
shorting flow data, and is the first that provides intra-day evidence of the shorting-
efficiency relationship. Previous empirical literature has mainly relied on monthly short 
interest, which ignores the short-term feature of short selling. Wall Street professionals 
claim that the average shorting period is roughly 7 days. Reed (2003) estimates the 
average short holding period is about 10 days. More recently, Diether, Lee, and Werner 
(2007) have estimated that the average number of days to cover a shorted stock in 2005 is 
only about five. Monthly short interest data cannot capture the short-term pattern of 
information driven short selling, but in this paper the use of daily and intra-day shorting 
flow data can.  
          Finally, this paper extends the current literature that uses Regulation SHO data to 
examine the impact of the pilot program on market quality.15 While these studies 
examine general market quality measures such as bid-ask spread, bid and ask depth, 
liquidity, and volatility, this paper adds to the literature by focusing on one key 
dimension of market quality, that of informational stock price efficiency, and by 
providing direct intra-day evidence on how the suspension of uptick rules affects price 
efficiency. In addition, the finding that short sellers altered their information driven 
trading strategy during the sample period suggests a need for caution in using the 
Regulation SHO data for short selling related studies.  
                                                 
15 see Diether, Lee, and Werner (2006) and Alexander and Peterson (2006) 
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          This paper is also related to the literature on the investment value of financial 
analyst recommendations.16 Green (2006) examines the price response to 
recommendations occurring outside regular trading hours and shows that early access to 
stock recommendations provides investors with 1.5% two-day returns from shorting 
stocks with downgrade recommendations after controlling for transaction costs.  These 
short-term profit opportunities persist for only two hours following the pre-market release 
of analyst recommendation changes. This result highlights the speed at which private 
information is incorporated into stock prices and motivates the use of high frequency 
short selling data in this study. This paper complements the literature in this area by 
conducting an intra-day analysis of analyst recommendations that occur during normal 
trading hours.  
         Nevertheless, this study has a number of limitations. Firstly, only one year’s data is 
used in the analysis and this restricts generalization to other periods. Secondly, only the 
impact of short selling on a specific information event is examined: analyst 
recommendation downgrades. There may be other events for which the different 
information driven short selling patterns associated with the suspension of the uptick rule 
can be discovered. Thirdly, due to the data limitation, this paper could not go further to 
test whether after hours shorting and short selling orders at the market opening auction 
are important forces that contribute to the improved stock price efficiency. Such analysis 
would be an interesting and promising extension for future research. 
                                                 
16 see Womack (1996), Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2001), Brav and Lehavy (2003), Ivkovic 
and Jegadeesh (2004), Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (2004), Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004), 
amongst others. 
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         The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
background of uptick rules and the pilot program as implemented by regulation SHO. 
Section 3 reviews the literature. Section 4 examines the intra-day evidence of improved 
stock price efficiency associated with the suspension of the uptick rules. Section 5 
investigates short selling prior to analyst recommendations downgrades.  Section 6 
contains a summary and concludes.  
 
2.  Uptick Rules, the Regulation SHO, and the Pilot Program 
 
      A short sale is a sale of a security by an investor who does not own the security. 
Before June 2007, the SEC required investors to follow specific rules when executing a 
short order. Rule 10a-1 of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that an exchange-
traded security may only be sold short at a price that is either above the last trading price 
or equal to the last trading price. We refer to this as the up-tick and zero-plus tick rule on 
the NYSE. Since NASDAQ was not operating as an exchange before August 1, 2006, 
NASDAQ listed stocks were not subject to Rule 10a-1 until the NASD (the National 
Association of Securities Dealers) introduced a bid test for NASDAQ listed stocks with 
the adoption of NASD Rule 3350 in 1994, which provides that when the bid is a 
downtick from the previous bid, short sellers other than market dealers can only short at 
prices one penny above the bid. In this paper, I generally refer these short selling price 
restrictions as “uptick rules” for simplicity. The rules are targeted at reducing the 
possibility that short selling will put downward pressure on stock prices.  
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      To enable the SEC and academics to study the effect of the uptick rules on market 
quality and the trading process, beginning on May 2, 2005, the SEC implemented the 
Pilot Program, which suspended the uptick rule restrictions for a set of pre-chosen “pilot 
stocks”. The Pilot Program established by Regulation SHO facilitates comparison 
between the pilot and control stocks, thus providing us with a natural experiment to study 
the effect of removing the uptick rules in a controlled environment. Many studies have 
been motivated to investigate the relation between short selling price test rules and 
market quality. The Office of Economics Analysis of the SEC (2007) uses SHO data 
during the period from January to October in 2005 to compare pilot and control stocks 
along numerous dimensions. They find that price restrictions constitute an economically 
relevant constraint on short selling. Suspending price restrictions for pilot stocks has an 
effect on the mechanics of short selling, order routing decisions, displayed depth, and 
intraday volatility, but does not has a deleterious impact on market quality or liquidity. 
They also find that the tick test of Rule 10a-1 on the NYSE acts as a more binding 
constraint than the bid test on the NASDAQ. Similarly, Diether, Lee, and Werner (2006) 
examine a SHO dataset for a shorter period from February to July in 2005. They find that 
the suspension of the up-tick test rule for NYSE pilot stocks is associated with wider 
spreads, more symmetric trading patterns, and higher volatility, while there is no 
significant effect on market quality for NASDAQ pilot stocks, suggesting that the lifting 
of bid price test rule for NASDAQ stocks may not improve the price efficiency of stock 
price. Further, Alexander and Peterson (2006) utilize a two month SHO dataset from 
April to May in 2005, and find that the lifting of uptick rules for NYSE pilot stocks is 
associated with a decrease in liquidity compared to control stocks, while market 
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efficiency is similar. They find that lifting of NASDAQ bid test rule has little impact on 
nearly all market price efficiency measures.  
 
3. Literature Review 
 
3.1 Short Selling and Stock Price Efficiency 
 
 
3.1.1 Theory  
 
           A large body of literature has revolved around the themes of information arrival 
and stock price efficiency in the context of short sale constraints. For example, Miller 
(1977) argues that short sale constraints prevent negative information from being 
registered into the stock price by restricting pessimistic investors from short selling while 
imposing no such restriction for optimistic investors, leading to an upwardly biased stock 
price, especially when investors’ opinions diverge. Further, Diamond and Verrecchia 
(1987) develop a rational expectations model in which investors take short sale 
constraints into consideration in formulating their trading decisions. They argue that short 
sale constraints limit trades from both informed and uninformed short sellers and reduce 
stock price informational efficiency, especially on the private bad news side. More 
recently, Bai et al (2007) have considered a fully rational expectations equilibrium model 
in which investors trade either to share risk or to speculate on private information. Short 
sale constraints limit both types of trades and reduce the informational efficiency of the 
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market. Their model shows that the loss of informational efficiency from short sale 
constraints increases the risk as perceived by less informed investors, thus driving down 
the security price.  
 
3.1.2 The Proxies for Short Sale Constraints 
 
         The empirical literature on the relationship between short selling and price 
efficiency has focused on obtaining proper proxies for either short sale constraints or 
stock price efficiency.  Figlewski (1981) uses monthly short interest as a proxy for short 
sale constraints and finds evidence that more heavily shorted firms under-perform less 
than heavily shorted firms. Unfortunately, his results are generated from a limited sample 
from 1973 to 1979 and also show that the most shorted deciles do not produce 
statistically significant abnormal returns. Other studies using monthly short interest as a 
proxy for short sale constraints yield similar but more statistically significant results. 
Examples are Figlewski and Webb (1993), Dechow et al. (2001), and Desai et al. (2002).  
          Recently, other proxies for short sale constraints, such as breadth of ownership, 
institutional ownership, the availability of option chains, and the actual costs of 
borrowing stock, have been adopted in the literature. Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) use 
the breadth of stock ownership as a proxy for short sale constraints, and find that  stocks 
whose changes in breadth in the prior quarter is in the lowest deciles of the sample under-
perform those in the top deciles by 4.95% after adjusting for size, book-to-market, and 
momentum factors. Nagel (2004) suggests that stock loan supply tends to be spare and 
short sales become more expensive when institutional ownership is low. Using 
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institutional ownership as a proxy for short sale constraints, the author finds that stocks 
with low institutional ownership under-react to bad news and over-react to good news. 
Similarly, Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) use both short interest and institutional 
ownership as proxies for short sale constraints.  
          Duffie et al. (2002) emphasize the role of the share lending market in shaping short 
sale constraints by assuming that short sellers face significant search costs and need to 
bargain over the lending fee. For short sellers, costs associated with short selling directly 
reduce the shorting demand. Further, D’Avolio (2002) directly links short sale constraints 
with share lending costs. Similarly, Reed (2003) studies rebate rates in the equity market 
as a proxy for short sale constraints. He finds that stock prices are slower to incorporate 
information when lending fees are high. Jones and Lamont (2002) utilize share lending 
cost data covering the period from 1926 to 1933, when there was a centralized market for 
borrowing stocks on the NYSE. They find that overpricing of stocks that are expensive to 
short is sufficiently large to produce profits for short sellers after adjusting for lending 
costs.  
          In this paper, uptick rule exemption status is used as a proxy for short sale 
constraints. This has several advantages. Firstly, while institutional ownership is subject 
to the endogeneity problem, it is least likely that this proxy will be subject to such a 
problem. Secondly, it clearly separates stocks with more short sale constraints (control 
stocks) from stocks with less short sale constraints (pilot stocks), allowing analysis of the 
impact of relaxing short sale constraints on stock price efficiency in a controlled 
environment. Thirdly, combining tick-by-tick shorting flow data with high-frequency 
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transaction data, it is possible to explore the intra-day aspects of the shorting-efficiency 
relationship.   
 
3.1.3. The Proxies for Stock Price Efficiency 
 
          If stock price efficiency is low, then the market will incorporate information slowly. 
Based on this idea, Hou and Moskowitz (2005) propose a price efficiency measure by 
examining the price delay, which can be captured from a market model regression 
extended with lagged returns of a market index. The larger the explanatory power of 
these lags, the higher the delay in responding to information (and so the lower the price 
efficiency). Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2006) examine the shorting-efficiency relation in 
46 different countries by using delayed price response to market shocks as a proxy for 
price efficiency. They find that stock price in countries with constraints in place are less 
efficient than those in which investors are allowed to short stocks. Another measure of 
price efficiency related to the price delay is the cross-correlation between current stock 
returns and lagged market returns. Saffi and Sigurdsson (2007) compute the correlation 
between weekly stock returns at time t and the local value-weighted market return at time 
(t-1) to measure how the previous market shock is related to current returns and find that 
short sale constraints are associated with lower price efficiency.           
          The R square of a market model regression has gained support in recent years as an 
alternative measure of price efficiency. Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) suggest that more 
efficient markets tend to have more idiosyncratic risk and a lower R square of a market 
model regression because the ratio of firm-specific information to market-level 
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information is likely to be higher in a more efficient market that allows market 
participants to act quickly upon receipt of information. Examples of using this price 
efficiency measure are Bris, Goetzman, and Zhu (2006), Saffi and Sigurdsson (2007), and 
many others. More recently, using a variance decomposition of price changes based on 
vector auto-regression, Wu (2007) separates the variation of information unrelated to 
pricing errors from variation of information related efficient prices. The dispersion of the 
pricing error measures the temporary deviation between the actual transaction price and 
the efficient price, thus serving as a measure of relative price efficiency. Examining the 
daily shorting data during the pilot program, she finds that increased daily short selling 
activity due to suspension of the uptick rule for pilot stocks directly drives the 
improvement in price efficiency.  
          These studies, due to data frequency limitation, focus on various types of price 
efficiency measures and daily evidence on the shorting-efficiency relation, cannot 
directly reveal how actual shorting flow affects the informational efficiency of stock 
prices in an intra-day fashion. Instead of applying indirect measures of price efficiency as 
suggested by previous studies, the high frequency shorting flow data allows this study to 
adopt the magnitude and speed of price response to analyst downgrades as a 




3.2 Informativeness of Short Selling  
 
           The majority of prior empirical work that has examined the informativeness of 
short selling has been based on monthly short interest and provides evidence that short 
sellers are sophisticated and well-informed investors by establishing the link between 
short interest changes and subsequent stock returns. For example, Asquith and Meulbroek 
(1996) provide evidence that short sellers successfully identify securities that 
subsequently under-perform in the market. By examining private information about 
firms’ earnings announcements, Senchack and Starks (1993) test the stock price reaction 
to earnings announcements and find that the greater the change in unexpected short 
interest, the more negative is the market reaction to short interest. Availability of options 
mitigates short sale constraints because for firms with tradable options, the reaction is 
less negative. Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan (2001) examined the 
informativeness of short selling by linking the short interest with stock’s fundamental 
ratios, such as size and book to market ratio. They found that short sellers were able to 
identify over-valued stocks. More recently, Desai, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran (2002) 
examine the relationship between the level of short interest and stock returns on the 
NASDAQ from 1988 to 1994 and find that heavily shorted stocks experience significant 
negative abnormal annual return of up to -13.56% after controlling for market return, 
firm size, book to market, and momentum factors.  
           Using monthly short interest to examine the informativeness of short selling 
activities has several shortcomings. Firstly, monthly short interest is the total number of 
shares that are held short on a given day, which only provides a static shot of the short 
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selling activities during an entire month and is unable to capture the short-term pattern for 
short sellers’ behavior. Secondly, the speed of price adjustment is studied according to 
the arrival of private information, which may occur in an intra-day fashion. Both Wall 
Street convention and several studies have suggested the short-term trading pattern of 
short sellers. While Wall Street professionals claim that the average shorting period is 
roughly 7 days, Reed (2003) estimates the average short holding period is about 10 days, 
and Daske et al (2005) estimate the holding period for shorts to be 33 days and uses a 20 
day holding period to calculate the shorting returns. In any case, using long-term monthly 
returns to examine short-term short sellers’ behavior would be misleading. Finally, by 
using monthly short interest, one cannot distinguish short supply from short demand, 
which is most likely related to the motivation and the informativeness of short selling 
activities.  
           By using daily short sales data which has become available in recent years, 
researchers are able to take a closer look at short sellers’ behavior and conduct empirical 
tests that deliver more convincing evidence. For example, using intra-day short selling 
data from the Australia Stock Exchange, Aitken et al (1998) find that short sales are 
negatively associated with stock returns, and provide evidence that short sales around 
information events are associated with a larger stock price reaction. In the U.S., 
Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004) use a unique daily short selling dataset from 
NASDAQ’s automated confirmation transaction service (ACT) to investigate the short 
selling before earnings announcements. They find that abnormal short selling is 
significantly related to post announcement stock returns, and that the level of pre-
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announcement short selling mostly appears to reflect firm specific information rather than 
the fundamental characteristics.  
           Bohmer, Jones, and Zhang (2006) use NYSE SuperDot system data associated 
with short selling from 2000 to 2004, and find that short sellers are extremely well-
informed. They document that stocks with heavy shorting under-perform by 1.16% in the 
following 20 days, and that institutional non-program short sales and large short selling 
orders are most informative. Similarly, Daske, Richardson, and Tuna (2005) use NYSE 
SuperDot short selling data during the period from April 2004 to May 2005 to investigate 
whether short selling precedes bad news events. However, inconsistent with the generally 
accepted notion that short sale transaction are well-informed trades based on private 
information, they find no evidence that short sale transactions are concentrated prior to 
bad news events. Unfortunately, neither NSYE SuperDot data nor ACT daily short sale 
data cover all the trade that occurs on the NASDAQ. While the NYSE SuperDot system 
only captures 74% of total NYSE volume and misses most large orders, NASDAQ ACT 
system doesn’t contain orders that go through the Small Order Execution System 
directly.17 Thus, a sample selection bias may exist in those studies.  
          More recently, when REG SHO data, an intra-day short selling dataset that covers 
all listed companies in a given Exchange became available, many researchers used this 
comprehensive and high frequency data to re-examine the short sellers’ behavior during a 
short period, from 2005 to 2006. For example, using NASDAQ SHO data for the first 6 
months of 2005, Diether, Lee, and Werner (2005) find that increasing short sales predicts 
future negative return, and that small trades have high predictive power. In addition to its 
                                                 
17 See www.marketdata.nasdaq.com for more details. 
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unique features, such as high frequency and containing short sale orders data, the REG 
SHO dataset records all the tick-by-tick short sales orders during the bid price-test pilot 
program, an experimental program that lifts the price tick test constraints for so called 
pilot stocks. This enables testing of the impact of uptick rules on stock price efficiency in 
either an intra-day or daily manner. 
          To examine stock price efficiency with respect to the arrival of private information, 
recent literature takes earnings as a proxy for private information until they are publicly 
announced; examples are Reed (2007), Chistophe et al (2004), and Daske et al (2005). 
This treatment has several disadvantages. First, stock market regulations strictly prohibit 
insider trading that utilizes non-publicly available material information, especially the 
firms’ earnings information. Utilizing negative earnings information prior to the 
announcement imposes a great legal risk on short sellers, which has not been considered 
in prior research.18 Secondly, even if short sellers possess the same earnings private 
information, their evaluation on securities may well diverge. The negative earnings 
private information may or may not trigger short selling depending on short sellers’ 
valuation of current stock prices. In this paper, using financial analysts’ recommendations 
as private information overcomes those shortcomings. While utilizing analyst 
recommendations for short selling imposes no legal risk to the short seller, it allows 
different opinions given the same earnings information.  
 
                                                 
18 For example, Reed (2007) and Christophe et al (2004) 
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3.3 The Investment Value of Analyst Recommendations 
 
           Prior research generally suggests that sell-side analysts’ recommendations are 
informative and have incremental investment value. For example, Womack (1996) uses 
First Call data to examine the price and volume reactions to analyst’s recommendation 
changes and provides evidence that brokerage firm analysts appear to have market timing 
and stock-picking ability. He documents a size-adjusted return of –4.7% in the three-day 
event period window and a –9.1% post-recommendation drift over a six-month post-
event period for sell recommendations in contrast to a 3 % event window return and 2.4% 
short-lived post-event drift for buy recommendations. The author conjectures that the 
asymmetrical reaction of stock price to good news and bad news shows that bad news 
may be incorporated into stock price much more slowly than good news.  
          Consistent with Womack (1996)’s results, Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and 
Trueman (2001) use a different method from a more investor-oriented calendar time 
perspective and find that a portfolio comprised of the most (or least) highly 
recommended stocks provides an average annual abnormal return of 4.13 (-4.91)%. More 
recently, Brav and Lehavy (2003) examine market reaction to target price announcement 
and find that target prices, recommendations, and earnings forecasts are informative and 
contain information about six-month post-event abnormal returns.  
           If analysts possess the ability to gather a wide variety of information not available 
to investors and to efficiently process that information, then stock price reactions to 
analysts’ forecast and recommendation revisions should be stronger than to firms’ 
earnings announcements. Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004) provide evidence that the 
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informativeness of analysts’ recommendation revisions increase before the firm’s 
earnings announcement date, indicating that the investment value of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts and recommendations stems more from their independent collection of 
information than from the interpretation of public information, such as management 
earnings guidance. This result provides a strong motive for this study to use analyst 
recommendations as a proxy for private information. Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (2004) 
provide evidence of persistence in analyst stock picking ability and show that analysts 
who have issued more (or less) profitable recommendations in the past tend to issue more 
(or less) profitable recommendations in the future. More recently, Jegadeesh, Kim, 
Krische, and Lee (2004) have argued that, on average, stocks favorably recommended by 
analysts out-perform stocks unfavorably recommended by them. However, after 
controlling for firm-specific characteristics, such as book-to-market and momentum, the 
marginal predictive ability of the analyst recommendation is not significant. One may 
argue that after Regulation Fair Disclosure, the investment value of analyst 
recommendations has declined since the information on which they are based on 
disseminated to the public so quickly. Indeed, it is expected that private information 
possessed by an analyst would be incorporated into stock price faster than ever before 
after Regulation FD. Green (2006) shows that early access to stock recommendations 
provides investors with a significant investment value with 1.5% two day returns by 
shorting stocks with downgrade recommendation after controlling for transaction costs, 
and that short-term profit opportunities persist for only two hours following the pre-
market release of analyst recommendation changes. This result highlights the speed of 
which private information is incorporated into the stock price and motivates this paper to 
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use high frequency short selling data to directly examine the price adjustment speed with 
respect to the arrival of private information for stocks subject to lower short selling 
constraints. This paper contributes to the literature in this area by conducting a stock 
price response test based on normal trading-hour recommendations.   
 
4. Intra-Day Evidence of Improved Stock Price Efficiency 
 
        Prior literature has suggested that short sale constraints lower price efficiency. For 
example, Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2006) examined the shorting-efficiency relation in 
46 different countries by using delayed price response to market shocks as a proxy for 
price efficiency. They found that stock price in countries with constraints in place are less 
efficient than those where investors are allowed to short stocks. Similarly, Saffi and 
Sigurdsson (2007) compared short selling in 26 markets around the world, and found that 
short sale constraints are associated with lower price efficiency measured by the 
correlation between contemporaneous stock returns and lagged market returns as well as 
the R square of a market model regression. More recently, Wu (2007) used the dispersion 
of the pricing error as the measure of informational efficiency of stock prices and found 
that increased daily short selling activities due to suspension of the uptick rule for pilot 
stocks directly drove the improvement in price efficiency. These studies, due to the data 
frequency limitation, focus on various types of price efficiency measures and daily 
evidence on the shorting-efficiency relation, and so cannot directly reveal how actual 
shorting flow affects the informational efficiency of stock prices in an intra-day fashion.  
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         When short sales are subject to uptick rules, aggressive short sellers with more 
negative opinions would be prohibited from registering their private information into 
stock prices.19 This study hypothesizes that the suspension of the uptick rule would 
improve stock price efficiency. To directly examine whether relaxing uptick rules 
improves efficiency, I look at the magnitude and speed of the price response on a typical 
information event day - the day that analyst recommendation downgrades become 
publicly available. This method has several advantages. Firstly, it is a simple, direct, and 
straightforward way to measure the stock price efficiency. Secondly, it examines the 
informational efficiency of stock prices in the context of true information setting, namely, 
the analyst recommendation. Thirdly, it uses suspension of the uptick rule as the proxy 
for short sale constraint, which is least likely to be subject to endogeneity concerns. 
Finally, it provides closer and more magnified evidence on how price response delays 
actually occur for short sale constrained stocks (control stocks) and less short sale 
constrained stocks (pilot stocks). 
 
4.1 Data and Samples 
 
         The analyst recommendation data during the sample period from May to December 
of 2005 was obtained from First Call Historical Dataset. The recommendation value is 
defined as followings: one is “buy”; two is “overweight”; three is “neutral”; four is 
“underweight”; five is “sell”; and zero is the initiation of recommendation.  To examine 
                                                 
19 Diether, Lee, and Werner (2005) define a passive short selling order as the one that increases the quote-
to-quote volatility on the bid side, and a passive short selling order as the one dominated by limited orders. 
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the stock price response to an information event, it is important to ensure that investors 
have access to these analyst recommendations. In this section, I focus on 
recommendations that are released outside of regular trading hours, either before 9:30am 
or after 4:00pm, and examine the stock price response after the open at 9:30 am. Further, 
to ensure that the analyst recommendation represent significant information events that 
have material impact on stock value, this study focuses on stock recommendations issued 
by the 20 highest rated U.S. brokerage research departments, as designated by 
Institutional Investor, that  distribute their recommendations through First Call. 
         To measure the informational significance of downgrades, recommendation 
changes are defined here as the difference between the previous recommendation and the 
current recommendation for the same brokerage firm. For the initiation of 
recommendation, the recommendation change is specified as the deviation of the current 
recommendation from the neutral recommendation with the rating value of 3. For 
example, if brokerage firm X initiates a research on stock Y with a rating of 1 or buy, 
then the recommendation change is 3-1=2, representing an upgrade recommendation. For 
any given day, if there are multiple recommendation changes for one stock, a simple 
average of those changes is taken as the value of the recommendation change on that date 
for that stock. Finally, a recommendation change is classified as a downgrade if the value 
of a recommendation change is negative, as an upgrade if the value of the 
recommendation change is positive. 
        The short selling data is from the Regulation SHO dataset. The summary of short 
selling activities in 2005 is presented in Table 2. Panel A of Table 2 compares short 
selling activities for pilot and control stocks during pre- SHO period, from January to 
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April 2005. It shows that before the suspension of uptick rules for pilot stocks, the short 
selling activities measured in either total shorting selling volume or short selling ratio are 
not statistically different between the pilot and control samples. Panel B of Table 2 
compares short selling activities during the post-SHO period for pilot and control stocks 
and shows that short selling activities are greater in the pilot sample than in the control 
sample on both Exchanges, suggesting that removing uptick rules for pilot stocks 
stimulate short selling activities.  
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
 
         The SEC chosen pilot stocks from the Russell 3000 membership list. All securities 
in the Russell 3000 Index were ranked by average daily dollar trading volume for the 
previous year. Then, every third stock was chosen as the pilot stock, and the remaining 
stocks are “control stocks”. The Russell 3000 membership lists are obtained from the 
Russell Company.  To eliminate the potential effect of index inclusion or index exclusion 
on stock returns, this study requires that sample stocks are members of the Russell 3000 
index after the June 2004 reconstitution and remained in the Russell 3000 member list 
after the June 2005 reconstitution. Thus, stocks that were added to the index due to IPOs 
during the period June 2004 through 2005 are excluded, as well as stocks that were 
eliminated during the same period due to mergers, bankruptcies, and ticker changes. The 
control sample was obtained by excluding stocks on pilot stock list as of May 2, 2005, 
which is roughly twice as large as the pilot sample.  
        Previous literature reveals that the impacts of the suspension of the uptick rule on 
market quality is different for NYSE-listed stocks and for NASDAQ-listed stocks. 
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Diether, Lee, and Werner (2006) suggest that, while NYSE’s tick test is a more binding 
rule for short sellers, NASDAQ’s bid price test has a much more limited effect on the 
trading strategies of short sellers, because short sellers in NASDAQ-listed stocks can use 
a more natural mixture of aggressive marketable limited orders and passive limited orders 
to execute their short sales.20 Moreover, the Office of Economic Analysis of the SEC 
(2007) points out that the tick-test rule on the NYSE acts as a more binding constraint 
than the bid-test rule on the NASDAQ. To accommodate the different nature of price test 
rules on these 2 Exchanges, separate analyses of NYSE-listed and NASDAQ-listed stock 
were performed. 
         To examine the impact of the suspension of uptick rule on stock price efficiency, 
four samples were constructed during the sample period from May to December of 2005:  
a pilot sample in the NYSE, a control sample in the NYSE, a pilot sample in the 
NASDAQ, and a control sample in the NASDAQ. If the suspension of the uptick rule 
contributes to the different price response patterns for the pilot and control sample, then 
similar intra-day price response patterns before the Pilot Program will be seen, when pilot 
stocks and control stocks have the identical treatment on the short selling price test 
restrictions. Therefore, similar samples were also constructed in a sample period from 
January through the end of April of 2005, a period featured by the same uptick rule 
treatment for the pilot and control stocks. Finally, merging the recommendation data with 
the pilot list and control stock list on both the NASDAQ and the NYSE yields samples 
for subsequent analysis.  
                                                 
20 If the short seller submits a market order which cannot be executed at or below the bid due to the uptick 
rule, market dealers on the NASDAQ will treat this order as a limit order to sell at the price that is one 
penny above the bid. This is a typical marketable limited order. 
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        Tick-by-tick stock trade prices were obtained from the NYSE TAQ data set for 
NYSE-listed stocks, and from the NASTRAQ data set for NASDAQ-listed stocks. Stock 
returns, trading volume, and other firm specific characteristic variables are extracted from 
the Center for Research in Securities Price (CRSP) Daily Stocks Combined Files and 
COMPUSTAT. Table 1 shows the total number of recommendation changes and the 
number of recommendation changes for the eight samples. There are 6754 downgrades 
during the sample period for pilot and control stocks, split approximately equally 
between NASDAQ firms and NYSE firms. Restricting to the top 20 brokerage firms 
leaves 1365 downgrades, with roughly twice as many NYSE firms as NASDAQ. As 
there are twice as many control firms as pilot firms in the sample, there are roughly twice 
as many downgrades for control firms as for pilot firms. There are fewer downgrades 
during the pre-SHO period, with 5708 total downgrades. Restricting to the top 20 
brokerage firms leaves a total of 843 downgrades, also split about 2 to 1 for NYSE firms 
and 2 to 1 for control firms. 
 (Insert Table 1 about here) 
 
4.2 After-hour Downgrades 
 
        Next, I examine different intra-day patterns of price responses to analyst 
recommendation downgrades for the pilot and control samples. To examine the timing of 
those price responses, 5 minute intra-day stock cumulative returns are calculated, 
including the opening returns, for both pilot and control stocks listed on either the NYSE 
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or the NASDAQ, for each stock recommendation downgrade during the sample period 
from May to December of 2005.  Then I compare over time the sizes of the average 
cumulative price response for pilot and control stocks. If the suspension of the uptick rule 
helps to improve stock price efficiency, then it would be much faster for pilot stock to 
react to analyst recommendation downgrades and the magnitude of price response would 
be larger for pilot stocks than control stocks. Table 3 and Figures 1 and 3 compare the 
magnitude and speed of price responses to analyst recommendation downgrades on the 
NYSE for both pilot and control samples. Table 4 and Figures 2 and 4 show the results 
for NASDAQ-listed stocks.  
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
 
          The right four columns of Table 3 show that, when the uptick rule is suspended for 
pilot stocks, the intra-day 5-minute interval cumulative returns for pilot and control 
stocks are significantly distinct from each other until half an hour after the market 
opening. Specifically, for NYSE-listed pilot stocks, more than 80% of the event day price 
change, -1.66%, has been incorporated into prices before the opening bell, compared to 
50% of the event day price change before the market opening for control stocks. This 
suggests that the opening price for pilot stocks better reflects the downgrade information 
than that of control stocks. It also takes about half an hour after opening for control 
stocks to incorporate the majority of the downgrade information into the stock price, 
while such process has occurred even before the market opens for pilot stocks. There is 
strong evidence that informational price efficiency measured by the speed of price 
response to downgrades has been improved for pilot stocks. Figure 1 graphs the intra-day 
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5 minutes cumulative return for both pilot and control samples on the NYSE. It appears 
that the magnitude of price response is larger for pilot stocks than for control stocks, but 
the difference is not significantly distinguishable from zero as shown in Table 3. In sum, 
on the NYSE, the magnitude of price response to downgrades is similar for pilot and 
control stocks, the pilot stocks just experience the response faster. 
          To ensure that these results are not due to different short selling constraints, but 
rather are due to other systematic differences between control and pilot stocks, similar 
tests are conducted for pilot and control stocks before the SHO period begins, when both 
pilot and control stocks were subject to the same uptick rule restrictions. The left five 
columns of Table 3 show that, before the suspension of the uptick rule for pilot stocks, 
there is no significant difference between pilot and control stocks in terms of 5 minutes 
cumulative intra-day stock returns across all intervals, suggesting that price efficiency 
measured by the speed and magnitude of price response to downgrades were about the 
same for pilot and control stocks when they were subject to the same uptick rule 
restrictions. Figure 2 graphs these returns and shows that the market opening returns are 
essentially identical for both pilot and control samples. Again, it appears that that the 
magnitude of price response is greater for pilot stocks than control stocks, but the 
difference is not statistically significant as shown in Table 3. The results here confirm 
that the suspension of tick test rules increases the speed with which stocks respond to 
after-hour analyst downgrades on the NYSE. 
         Due to the different uptick rule natures and market structures on the NYSE and the 
NASDAQ, I perform tests separately on NASDAQ-listed stocks, and report the results in 
Table 4. The left five columns of Table 4 show that there is no price efficiency gain for 
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pilot stocks before the pilot program. The right four columns of Table 4 show that the 
speed of price response is faster for pilot stocks than for control stocks. For pilot stocks, 
about 95% of the event day return has been impounded into stock price before the market 
opening. In contrast, it takes about 35 minutes for control stocks to do so. Compared to 
the NYSE, which impounds about 85% of downgrade information into the opening price 
for pilot stocks as shown in Table 3, the NASDAQ seems to be more efficient than the 
NYSE in terms of the speed of price response. It also shows that the magnitude of price 
response is greater for pilot stocks than for control stocks on the NASDAQ. Compared to 
a -2.41% downgrade average event day return for control stocks, the market generates a  
-3.64% downgrade event day average return for pilot stocks.  
(Insert Figure 1 and 2 about here) 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
 (Insert Figure 3 and 4 about here) 
 
          Although the results show that suspension of uptick rules for pilot stocks helps to 
improve intra-day price efficiency both in terms of the magnitude and the speed of price 
response to the bad news, no direct link was found between increased short selling 
activities on the recommendation day and the improved price efficiency. Most of the 
downgrade information has been incorporated into stock prices by the market opening for 
pilot stocks.   
          The analysis is repeated for the full sample with all reported analyst 
recommendations in the First Call. The pre- and post-SHO results displayed in Figure 5 
show that while the magnitude of price response on the recommendation day is 
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essentially the same for pilot and control samples, pilot stocks react to the bad news much 
faster during the first half hour of trading and before the market opening.  
(Insert Figure 5) 
        Comparing the magnitude of opening return to downgrades during pre- and post-
SHO period, one may find that on average control stock prices decline by 1.5% before 
the market opening on the downgrade day during the pre-SHO period, and such decline 
has been reduced to 0.8% during the post-SHO period. For pilot stocks, however, the 
price decline before the market opening is about the same (1.5%) for the pre- and post-
SHO periods. It appears that it is the control stocks that changed their behavior when 
uptick rules were suspended, not the pilot stocks. However, this time series comparison 
suffers from following limitations. First, the market trends during pre- and post-SHO 
period may be different. The price response to downgrades during a bearish market is 
expected to be greater than that in a bullish market. In fact, the S&P 500 Index declined 
by about 1% during the pre-SHO period and increased by about 8% during the post-SHO 
period. Second, the greater downgrade magnitude may also contribute to greater price 
response. Panel A of Table 5 shows that while the average downgrade magnitude is 
approximately -1.5 for both pilot and control samples during the post-SHO period, this 
number is around -2.0 during the pre-SHO period. Panel B and Panel C of Table 4 further 
compare the downgrade structures during pre- and post-SHO periods. It shows that while 
only 5% downgrades have the values of recommendation change of -3 during the post-
SHO period, about 30% downgrades during the pre-SHO period have the similar 
recommendation change value. In sum, greater downgrade magnitudes combined with 
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weaker market condition during the pre-SHO period may lead to greater price response 
during the pre-SHO period than during the post-SHO period.  
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
 
4.3 Robustness Checks 
 
         There are several possible reasons other than uptick rule restrictions why pilot stock 
prices would respond more rapidly to downgrades than control stocks. Firstly, the 
samples are not perfectly matched.  The number of observations in the control sample is 
about twice as many as in the pilot sample. Also, these two samples are not matched on 
firm size and book-to-market ratio. These variables are important in numerous studies 
and may be important here. Secondly, recommendation initiations are included in the 
analysis and assume that analysts initially hold “neutral” opinions on the stock. The 
market may respond differently to initial recommendations than to downgrades of 
existing recommendations. Thirdly, all downgrades are treated equally without 
considering whether it is a downgrade from a relatively good recommendation to a 
neutral recommendation, or a downgrade from a bad one to a worse one. If the market 
responds differently to different types of downgrades, then differences in the samples of 
pilot and control downgrades will result in different price responses for pilot and control 
stocks. 
        To address these robustness issues, firstly, this study will examine the distribution of 
downgrade recommendation change values. Secondly, recommendation initiations are 
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excluded in the tests. Thirdly, pilot and control samples are matched on firm size and 
book-to-market ratio. Finally, a distinction is made between “not so good” downgrades 
and “really bad” downgrades, and the tests run for these two sub-samples. “Not so good” 
downgrades are defined as the recommendation changes from “buy” to “overweight” or 
from “overweight” to “neutral”. The “really bad” downgrades are recommendation 
changes from “neutral” to “underweight” or from “underweight” to “sell”.  
Table 4 shows that the mean and the distribution of downgrade magnitude in the pilot 
sample are not distinguishable from those in the control samples. Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9 
consistently show the improved stock price efficiency for the pilot sample after 
recommendation initiations are excluded, the pilot and control sample are matched on the 
firm size and book–to-market basis, and “not so good” downgrades have been 
distinguished from “really bad” downgrades. 
(Insert Figure 6, 7, 8, and 9 about here)  
 
Detailed intra-day five minute cumulative returns on the downgrade date for both pilot 
and control samples on the NYSE are reported in Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9.  
(Insert Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9 about here) 
 
In each of the samples the opening return for pilot stocks is significantly different from 
that of control stocks. It is clear that stocks with no uptick rule restrictions open at a price 




4.4 Downgrades during Normal Trading Hours 
 
        Wu (2007) has shown that increased short selling activity associated with the 
suspension of uptick rules for pilot stocks directly improves stock price efficiency. But 
when this study examined the stock price efficiency in a direct intra-day fashion, the 
results show that short selling activities on the downgrade recommendation day do not 
directly contribute to the quicker stock price response to bad news because virtually all 
downgrade information has been incorporated into stock price before the market opens. 
To determine whether short selling is responsible for this price improvement it is 
necessary to examine shorting immediately around the downgrade event. There are at 
least two ways to accomplish this task. The first is to investigate the intra-day price 
response and short selling around downgrade recommendations that occur during normal 
trading hours. The second is to examine the short selling prior to the recommendation 
downgrade date.         
          In this section, downgrade recommendations that occur during normal trading 
hours are analyzed. From the full sample of downgrade recommendations, I select those 
published during the normal trading hours from 11:30am to 2:00pm. To ensure that these 
recommendations constitute substantial negative surprises, I require that these 
downgrades follow a prior upgrade. The final sample includes 133 control stock 
downgrades and 78 pilot stock downgrades. Then I calculate the 5-minute cumulative 
returns for a four hour period beginning 2 hours before the release time of the 
recommendation and ending 2 hours after the release time. The returns between market 
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opening and 2 hours before the recommendations are also calculated for both samples to 
account for possible information leakage before the recommendation downgrades. 
         Figure 10 graphs the intra-day return paths around the normal trading-hour 
downgrades for both pilot and control samples. It shows that when the downgrade 
recommendation is released to the market at time 0, pilot stocks respond to bad news 
quicker and with greater magnitude. While Figure 1 could not provide much information 
on what happened before the market opening, Figure 10 shows a more complete intra-day 
picture, which reveals that the pre-recommendation short selling may contribute to the 
enhanced price efficiency for pilot stocks.  
         Pilot stocks begin to respond to the downgrade announcement approximately 85 
minutes before the announcement, while there is no significant price response before the 
announcement for control stocks. This suggests that the suspension of the uptick rule on 
pre-recommendation short selling appears to contribute to the enhanced price efficiency 
for pilot stocks. This is a reasonable outcome, because, while informed short sellers are 
prevented from submitting shorting orders due to the uptick rule restrictions in control 
stocks when the stock price is declining. Now they can do so in pilot stocks by freely 
submitting down-tick shorting orders to take advantage of their private information, 
pushing stock prices down before the recommendation announcement.  
(Insert Figure 10 about here) 
 
        Table 10 confirms this observation. It shows that pilot and control stock returns are 
significantly different beginning 85 minutes before the announcement, and continuing for 
75 minutes after the announcement.  
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(Insert Table 10 about here) 
 
        So far, I have only established that pilot stocks with no uptick rule restrictions 
respond to bad news more quickly than control stocks. It has not been established that 
any shorting activity actually accompanies this price response. To test if there is a direct 
link between the pre-recommendation pilot stock price decline and short selling, I 
examine the short selling activities around normal trading hour recommendations. 
         I calculate the short ratio in every five minute interval as the ratio of the short 
volume during that interval to the average daily trading volume. This short ratio is then 
cumulated, starting two hours before the announcement and ending two hours after the 
announcement. The results are reported in the six left hand columns of Table 11 for pilot 
and control stocks. Surprisingly, the results show that there is no significant difference in 
short selling between the pilot and the control sample. Pilot and control stocks are shorted 
about the same amount around a downgrade. However, pilot shorting activity is more 
effective at driving down the price. 
          It is possible that there is a difference in market maker activity between the pilot 
and control stocks that may account for the differential price response in Figure 9. The 
SHO dataset lists the short classification entered for each transaction. A short trade is 
classified as either “short,” indicating that it would ordinarily be subject to a tick test rule, 
or “exempt,” indicating that it is exempt from a tick test rule, typically because the trade 
is made on behalf of a market-maker or dealer. During the SHO test period all trades on 
pilot stocks are technically “exempt” but dealers for the most part continued to mark 
them “short” and “exempt” and relied on the processing center to exempt pilot stocks 
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from the tick test rule. This leaves us with a record of dealer (exempt) versus non-dealer 
(non-exempt) shorting activity for both pilot and control stocks. 
         To explore the possible short selling force that may explain the pattern observed in 
Figure 9, I proceed to separate short sale exempt orders submitted by market dealers who 
rely on the uptick rule exemption provisions in Rule 10a-1 from non-exempt orders. The 
six columns in the middle of Table 10 show that non-exempt short selling activities 
measured as a percentage of the average daily trading volume are smaller for pilot stocks 
than control stocks during the entire trading day, and the right six columns show that 
exempt short selling is greater for pilot stocks than for control stocks. This suggests that 
short selling around downgrades shifted from informed traders to dealers, with informed 
traders actually avoiding shorting pilot stocks.  
(Insert Table 11 about here) 
 
         The analysis in this section reveals two possible activities that help to explain the 
relation between short selling and improved price efficiency. The first is that informed 
short sellers are less likely to short pilot stocks before downgrades, possibly because of 
concerns that short selling on pilot stocks will be more highly scrutinized than on control 
stocks. However, the remaining downtick shorting orders are still quite effective in 
pushing the price down. The second is that, as market makers and dealers observe 
reduced shorting in pilot stocks, they fill the liquidity gap to facilitate trading. These 
shorting orders may actually push the stock price down and help to improve price 
efficiency. 
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          The analysis in this section reveal the fact that short seller may intentionally reduce 
their informed shorting during a two hour period prior to the recommendation due to the 
regulatory scrutiny during the Pilot Program. However, this conclusion is not strong due 
to the small sample size with only 89 observations for pilot stocks and 133 observations 
for control stocks. Also, identifying shorts marked as “non-exempt” as normal short 
sellers’ shorts might be problematic. Table 12 summarizes the percentage of exempt vs. 
non-exempt short orders during pre- and post- SHO period. It shows that about 0.5% of 
shorting orders are exempt from uptick rule tests during the pre-SHO period, while this 
percentage increased dramatically during the post-SHO period with 2.5% for control 
stocks and about 18% for pilot stocks. According to Regulation SHO, all shorting orders 
in pilot stocks should be marked as “exempt” during the post-SHO period. But shorting 
orders from market dealers submitted directly through the clearing house may be 
automatically marked as “non-exempt” orders. Considering this possibility, shorts 
marked as “exempt” may include shorts from both market dealers and normal short 
sellers. Therefore, using “exempt” and “non-exempt” shoring order status to identify 
shorts from either market dealers or normal short sellers may be problematic.  
 
5. Short Selling Activities Prior to the Analyst Recommendations 
 
         The intra-day transaction record shows no evidence of increased short-selling 
leading up to or immediately following a downgrade for pilot stocks. The surprising 
results based on the analysis of downgrades occurs during normal trading hours suggests 
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that short sellers (non-market-dealers) reduced their informed trading during a two hour 
period before the recommendation announcements. However, this conclusion is not 
strong due to the fact that the sample size is small with only 89 observations for pilot 
stocks and 133 observations for control stocks. Also, Table 12 shows that identifying 
shorts marked as “non-exempt” as non-market-dealers’ shorting might be problematic in 
the previous analysis.  In this section, I adopt a regression approach to further examine 
whether short sellers engage in informed trading prior to the release of analyst 
recommendations by testing the relationship between abnormal short selling in the days 
prior to analyst recommendations and the information content of such short selling.  
 
5.1 The OLS Regression 
 
        In the regression model, the dependent variable, abnormal short selling, is defined as 
the average daily shorting volume during the five days preceding the analyst 
recommendations divided by the average daily shorting volume during the sample period, 
all minus 1. I implicitly assume that the average daily short selling ratio in those 170 days 
is a fair representation of the firm’s typical daily level of short selling. More specifically, 
a stock’s average daily abnormal short selling during the five days prior to the release of 
analyst recommendation, ABSHO (-5,-1), is measured as  
 
                       ABSHO (-5,-1) = Average SHO (-5,-1)/ Average SHO -1,  
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Where the average SHO (-5,-1) is the average daily shorting volume during the five days 
prior to the analyst recommendation, and the average SHO is the average daily shorting 
volume during the sample period from May to December of 2005. Use of a five-day pre-
recommendation interval is a reasonable choice because it balances the general short term 
pattern of short selling and the limited market timing capability of informed short sellers.  
         On the one hand, short selling unrelated to the recommendations might be falsely 
incorporated into the analysis if a longer time period than five days is adopted. On the 
other hand, it is unlikely that short selling related to the recommendations occurs only on 
one or two days prior to it. In fact, informed short sellers have strong incentives to engage 
in a number of smaller trades over a relatively longer period instead of a single large 
trade concentrated at one time.  
         The following OLS regression model that is similar to the one used by Christophe, 
Ferri, and Angel (2004) is adopted to test whether abnormal short selling is associated 
with short sellers’ private information regarding the upcoming analyst recommendations. 
 
,)1,5(3)1,5()1,0()1,5( 210 εββββ +−−⋅+−−⋅++⋅+=−− ABVOLRETRETABSHO (1) 
 
where )1,0( +RET is the two-day stock return from the closing prices of day -1 to +1, 
)1,5( −−RET is the stock return from the closing price of day -5 to -1, and 
)1,5( −−ABVOl is the abnormal trading volume during the period from day -5 to day -1, 
measured as the average daily trading volume for 5 days prior to the analyst 
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recommendation divided by the average daily trading volume for the non-
recommendation period, all minus 1.  
         The independent variable )1,0( +RET is chosen as a proxy for the analyst 
recommendation information content because the market reaction to the recommendation 
reveals whether the recommendation contains a surprise. Hence, a negative 2 day return 
following the recommendations indicates that the market views the analyst 
recommendation as a negative surprise, and a positive one implies a positive surprise. A 
statistically significant and negative 1β  would reveal that the abnormal short selling 
increases prior to a downgrade recommendation, and that short sellers are capitalizing 
their private information associated with forthcoming analyst recommendation 
downgrades. And a non-negative and insignificant 1β  would reject the hypothesis that 
private information about the upcoming downgrade recommendation drives short selling 
prior to the release of the recommendation. 
         It is possible that upward or downward changes in the stock price might affect the 
level of short selling in the days leading up to the release of analyst recommendations. 
For instance, a pre-recommendation increase in stock price might induce “contrarians”21 
to short sell “over-valued” stocks.  To control for this effect,  )1,5( −−RET  is included as 
a control variable in the regression model.  
         To account for potential contemporaneous correlation between abnormal short 
selling and trading volume, )1,5( −−ABVOl  is included as the control variable to account 
for the possibility that increased short selling is caused by increased trading volume. 
                                                 
21 See description of contrarians short selling in Diether, Lee, and Werner (2005) 
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)1,5( −−ABVOl is measured as the percentage difference between the average daily 
volume in the 5 day interval and the average daily volume during the sample period.  
 
5.2. Results and Discussions 
 
          The OLS models for both pilot and control stocks listed in NYSE and NASDAQ 
are estimated. Results of the OLS regressions are presented in Table 13 with the control 
sample results in Panel A and the pilot sample results in Panel B. The correlation matrix 
and VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) are reported in Table 14. Table 14 shows that 
correlations between independent variables are either not significant or very small for 
both the pilot and control samples. VIF test results further confirm that it is unlikely that 
regressions will be subject to multicollinearity problem. 
 (Insert Table 13 and Table 14 about here) 
 
          The regression results in Panel A of Table 13 show a significant and negative 
relationship between the two-day post recommendation return, RET(0,+1), and abnormal 
short selling prior to the recommendations, ABSHO(-5,-1) for control stocks. The 
parameter estimate of – 0.2016 for NYSE-listed control stocks implies that if two stocks 
are similar except for a 1% difference in their post-recommendation returns, then the 
stock with the lower return has pre-recommendation abnormal short selling that is, on 
average, 0.2 percentage points larger. This effect is more profound for NASDAQ-listed 
control stocks, with a significant and negative β1 coefficient of -0.41. Both facts support 
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the assertion that, for control stocks, at least a meaningful portion of short selling is 
motivated by information about the content of the forthcoming analyst recommendations.  
        Also, the results suggest that abnormal short selling is affected by the 
contemporaneous return of stocks, because the coefficient of RET (-5,-1) is significant 
and positive for NYSE-listed stocks. Due to the binding nature of the uptick rules on the 
NYSE, informed short sellers can only passively submit shorting orders when stock 
prices increase prior to the arrival of bad news. This makes them look like “contrarians” 
although, in fact, they were information-driven traders. In contrast, the coefficient of RET 
(-5,-1) for control stocks on the NASDAQ is not significantly distinct from zero. This is 
consistent with Diether, Lee, and Werner (2006)’s assertion that the bid price test rules on 
the NASDAQ is a less binding restriction than the tick-test rule on the NYSE. Due to the 
less binding nature of bid-test rules on the NASDAQ, some aggressive informed short 
sellers on the NASDAQ can submit shorting orders less passively than passive informed 
short sellers. Shorting orders from both groups entangle with each other, producing a 
mixed relationship between the short selling and contemporaneous stock returns prior to 
the recommendations. In addition, the coefficients of ABVOL (-5,-1) are 0.76 and 0.96 
for NYSE-listed control stocks and NASDAQ-listed stocks, respectively. Both numbers 
are significant, suggesting that abnormal volume tends to support abnormal short selling.  
        Contrary to the expectation that the coefficient of β1 for pilot stocks would be a 
larger negative number than for control stocks, Table 13 shows that, for both NYSE and 
NASDAQ listed pilot stocks, the coefficient estimates on post-recommendation return, 
RET(0,1), are not statistically different from zero. This suggests that there is no reliable 
relationship between abnormal short selling and recommendation information for pilot 
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stocks during the sample period. Short sellers are no longer active in trading on their 
private information associated with the forthcoming analyst downgrades for pilot stocks.  
        This is a surprising finding, because when the uptick rule for pilot stocks is 
suspended, it would be easier for short sellers to trade on their private information, and a 
more significant negative relationship between short selling prior to analyst 
recommendations and subsequent stock returns on the information event day would be 
expected. An interesting story here is that, during the Pilot Program period, for certain 
reasons, short sellers bypassed the opportunities to take advantage of their private 
information on the forthcoming analyst recommendations.  
         One may argue that due to the suspension of the uptick rules, short sellers can now 
aggressively submit shorting orders prior to bad news and push stock prices down before 
the recommendations,  the bad news may have already been impounded into stock returns 
preceding the information event, making negative returns on the event days unobservable. 
If this is the case, then a significant and negative coefficient of β2 would be expected for 
pilot stocks. However, the significant and positive coefficients of contemporaneous 
returns shown in Panel B of Table 13 rule out this possibility and reveal that both pilot 
and control stock short sellers follow a similar “contrarians” trading strategy. In addition, 
due to the less binding nature of NASDAQ bid test rules, the coefficient of β2 is larger 
for NYSE-listed pilot stocks than NASDAQ-listed control stocks. Therefore, the joint 
examining of coefficients for both β1 and β2 confirms the fact that, for pilot stocks, short 
sellers do not adopt the aggressive information-driven trading strategy preceding the 
analyst recommendations for the pilot stocks as expected, and that they even crease to 
capitalizing their private information during the sample period. 
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         While it is difficult to explain this counter-intuitive finding, I conjecture that short 
sellers intentionally alter their behaviors in order to minimize the regulatory risk 
associated with the Regulation SHO. Although Regulation SHO suspends the uptick rules 
for pilot stocks and makes short selling relatively easier when short sellers need to take 
advantage of their private information, sophisticated short sellers, who were aware of the 
possible regulatory scrutiny from the SEC, were very cautious in their information-driven 
trading associated with stocks marked as pilot stocks. Indeed, as the Office of Economic 
Analysis of the SEC has mentioned, “it is possible that traders might behave differently if 
a rule were permanently and completely removed than if it is only temporarily or 
incompletely removed (during the pilot program)…”. Therefore, “it is possible that short 
sellers with private information might be on good behavior if they believe that heightened 
scrutiny during the Pilot increases their chances of getting caught.” 22 
         Whether or not short sellers actively avoided shorting pilot stocks, it is clear that 
pre-recommendation short selling is not a driving force that contributes to the improved 
stock price efficiency when the uptick rule is relaxed for pilot stocks, because the results 
show that pilot stocks experienced less private information driven shorting during the 
sample period. The additional implication of this finding reminds us that when 
Regulation SHO data is used to conduct short selling related research, it is necessary to 
be very cautious about the altered short sellers’ behaviors as discovered in this section. 
 
                                                 
22 The SEC (2007), Economic Analysis of the Short Sale Price Restriction Under the Regulation SHO Pilot 
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5.3 The Robustness Test: Pre-SHO Results 
 
          The results in Table 13 show that short sellers avoid trading on private information 
associated with forthcoming analyst downgrades for pilot stocks when the uptick rule is 
suspended. If such a behavior change in short selling is associated with the change of the 
uptick rule, then before the pilot program, there would be no difference between the pilot 
and the control samples in terms of the relationship between pre-recommendation 
abnormal short selling and post-recommendation returns. Table 15 reports the results of 
OLS regressions given in equation (1) for the period from January to April of 2005, 
featured with the same uptick rule restriction for pilot and control stocks. 
(Insert Table 15 about here) 
 
         The results in Table 15 show significantly negative coefficient estimates of β1 for 
both pilot and control stocks, suggesting that, for both pilot and control stock short sellers 
were capitalizing on their private information prior to analyst recommendation 
downgrades. Larger coefficient estimates of β2 for NYSE-listed stocks indicate that short 
sellers were more constrained on the NYSE than on the NASDAQ. In sum, the results in 
Table 15 confirm that changed short sellers’ behavior in pilot stocks are not an artificial 
coincidence, but the result of the change in the uptick rule due to regulation SHO.  
5.4 A Robustness Test: Controlling for Exchange Traded Options 
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        The regression has thus far ignored the possibility of alternative investment vehicles 
for an informed investor to trade on negative private information. Chen and Singal (2003) 
and Senchark and Starks(1993) suggest that the level of short interest is affected by the 
availability of exchange traded options. Options provide investors with a direct 
alternative to capitalizing their negative private information when short sales are 
restricted. The lack of a reliable relationship between abnormal short selling and 
recommendation downgrade may reflect a greater use of options by sophisticated 
investors for pilot stocks in the sample period. To account for the impact of exchange 
traded options on the analysis, I obtain option availability data from CBOE (Chicago 
Board of Option Exchange). I then broke down the initial four samples into eight sub-
samples, and re-estimate Equation (1) as in Table 13. The results are detailed in Table 16.  
(Insert Table 16 about here) 
 
          Table 16 shows that, for both pilot stocks with options and with no options, the 
coefficients of β1 are consistently not distinct from zero, suggesting that option 
availability is not a factor that induces short sellers to bypass the information-driven 
trading opportunities preceding analyst recommendations. 
 
5.5 Controlling for Firm Size and Book-to-Market Ratios  
 
         Previous studies addressing the relationship between short selling activities and the 
subsequent stock returns suggest the necessity of controlling for firm size and book-to-
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market ratio. For example, Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) find a small firm effect 
associated with short selling and stock return relationship. Moreover, Chirstophe et. al 
(2004) have highlighted the “torpedo” effect, which states that even slight negative 
information can lead growth stock to suffer a large drop in price.23 When the 
recommendation is negative, short sellers are more likely to target the growth stocks with 
low book-to-market ratios. It is possible that the different price response patterns in the 
pilot and control samples are driven by different compositions of value stocks and growth 
stocks in both samples. Therefore, the implication here is that the absence of a reliable 
relationship between short selling and subsequent stock returns following the information 
event may be biased by a value stock dominated pilot stock sample.  
(Insert Table 17 about here) 
 
         Table 17 reports the firm size and book-to-market ratio for the pilot and control 
samples in the NYSE. It shows that there is no significant difference between the pilot 
and control sample in terms of firm size and book-to-market ratios, and it is unlikely that 
the small firm effect or “torpedo” effect contribute to the absence of a relationship 
between abnormal short selling and subsequent stock returns on the information event 
day.  
         To conduct a more convincing robustness check than a simple snapshot of the 
sample statistics, it is estimated that the pilot sample OLS regressions for three sub-
samples characterized by the ranks of firm size and book- to-market ratio.  Table 18 
                                                 
23 Skinner and Sloan (2002)  
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shows the pilot sample OLS regression results, when firm size and book–to-market ratios 
pilot stocks listed in both the NYSE and the NASDAQ are controlled for. 
(Insert Table 18 about here) 
 
Panel A of Table 16 shows that the coefficients of β1 are far from being significant 
across different size categories in both NYSE and NASDAQ samples. Also, the estimated 
value of coefficients on β2 decline when the firm size decreases, indicating that passive 
short sellers are more likely to aim at larger firms than small firms. The short sale 
constraints difference between large firms and small firms may explain this result, 
because normally large firms have more shares available for shorting than small firms.  
         Panel B of Table 18 shows that, for NYSE-listed pilot stocks, the coefficients of β1 
are again consistently not different from zero across different book-to-market categories, 
confirming that there is no reliable relationship between abnormal short selling and 
private information about the forthcoming downgrade. Further, the results also show that 
the growth stock sample has a larger positive coefficient of β2 than the value stock 
sample for NYSE-listed pilot stocks. More specifically, for one percentage point increase 
of abnormal short selling before the recommendations, growth stocks experience a 2.39% 
price increase while value stocks experience a 1.73% price increase over a two-day 
period (0,+1), representing a reverse “torpedo” effect for NYSE-listed pilot stocks. For 
NASDAQ-listed pilot stocks, again, the coefficients of β1 are not distinguishable from 
zero across different book-to-market categories. The similar reverse torpedo effect in the 
NASDAQ pilot sample was not found.  
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          In sum, the results in Panel B of Table 18 reinforce the view that short sellers 
forego the opportunity to trade on their private information associated with pilot stocks. 
Also the results show that passive short sellers are more likely to target large stocks and 
growth stocks when stock prices are in an upward trend, a typical contrarians’ short 
selling strategy.    
 
5.6 Controlling for the Market Trend 
 
         During the sample period, the stock market index followed a generally upward 
trend, increasing an aggregate of 9.6% from the beginning of May through the end of 
December in 2005. Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether the results presented in 
Table 11 are biased in such an environment, because the upward market trend may deter 
short sellers from submitting shorting order. To address this issue, the following model 
was estimated which includes two-day market returns following the recommendations as 
the third control variable.  
 
,)1,0(4)1,5(3)1,5()1,0()1,5( 210 εβββββ ++⋅+−−⋅+−−⋅++⋅+=−− MKTABVOLRETRETABSHO (2) 
 
where MKT (0, +1) is measured by two-day value weighted average return following the 
recommendations. Table 19 reports the OLS regression results with the market trend as 
the control variable.  
(Insert Table 19 about here) 
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        Table 19 shows results that essentially resemble those found in Table 4. After 
controlling for market trend, measured as a 2 day market return over day (0,+1), 
estimates of coefficients β1 for both NYSE-listed and NASDAQ-listed stocks are not 
significantly distinct from zero, confirming that the market movement is not responsible 
for the test results in Table 13, and that the estimates for the pilot samples in Table 13 are 
robust.  
 
5.7 Shorter Periods prior to Recommendations 
 
          In the previous analyses, the five-day pre-downgrade period was chosen, somewhat 
arbitrarily, to be five-day before the downgrade. The potential shortcoming of choosing 
such a long period is that when the uptick rules are relaxed, informed short sellers may 
adopt a less risky strategy that concentrates on short selling in a shorter period prior to the 
downgrade. Thus a five-day period may dilute the significance of shorting activities prior 
to the downgrade. In this section, regressions are run with two alternative specifications 
for pilot stocks on the NYSE during the sample period from May to December 2005. The 
first one uses a three-day period prior to the recommendation in the regression, and the 
second one adopts a one-day period.  
 
,)1,3(3)1,3()1,0()1,3( 210 εββββ +−−⋅+−−⋅++⋅+=−− ABVOLRETRETABSHO  (3) 
,)1(3)1()1,0()1( 210 εββββ +−⋅+−⋅++⋅+=− ABVOLRETRETABSHO                  (4) 
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         The regression results are presented in Table 20. Panel A shows the results with a 
three-day period prior to the recommendation and provides no evidence that short sellers 
concentrate their shorting in a three-day period before the recommendations for pilot 
stocks. The results in Panel B of Table 20, again, rule out the possibility that short sellers 
focus their shorting just on the day before the recommendation. This additional 
robustness test confirms the results that informed short sellers tend not to trade on their 
private information in pilot stocks.  
 
5.8 Alternative Specification of Regression Model 
 
          The previous regression model is designed to capture the information contend of 
short selling prior to recommendations. The stock return following recommendations is a 
proxy for the information content. In this section, I adopt the following regression model 
to examine the impact of short selling prior to recommendation on the price response to 
downgrades.
,)1,5(3)1,5()1,5()1,0( 210 εββββ +−−⋅+−−⋅+−−⋅+=+ ABVOLRETABSHORET (5) 
          The difference between equation (5) and equation (1) is that RET(0,+1) is a proxy 
for information content of downgrades in equation (1), and it measures price response to 
downgrades during a two-day period following the recommendations in equation (5). The 
regression results are presented in Table 21 for the post-SHO period and in Table 22 for 
the pre-SHO period.  
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(Insert Tables 21 and 22 about here) 
 
          Table 21 shows that during the Post-SHO period, the value of the coefficient of 
ABSHO(-5,-1) is significantly negative for control stocks, indicating the stocks with 
more shorting prior to the recommendation experienced greater price decline following 
the recommendation announcements. For pilot stocks, however, this coefficient is not 
significantly different from zero, indicating that there is no reliable relationship between 
shorting prior to recommendations and stock returns following recommendations. Table 
22 presents the regression results for the pre-SHO period, from January to April 2005.  It 
shows that coefficients of ABSHO(-5,-1) for both pilot and control stocks are 
significantly negative numbers, suggesting that when uptick rules were binding for both 
pilot and control stocks before the Pilot Program, stocks with more shorting prior to 
recommendations tend to experience more price decline when information becomes 
publicly available.  
 
5.9 An Alternative Measure of Abnormal Short Selling Prior to Recommendations 
 
          Previously, I run OLS regression for Pre- and Post-SHO periods separately, and I 
assume that the average of both shorting volume and trading volume during these two 
sample periods are fair representatives of normal shorting and trading levels. Table 2 
shows that shorting activities has been increased for pilot stocks after the suspension of 
uptick rules. One may argue that average shorting and trading volume during the post-
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SHO period may not be considered as a perfect measure of normal shorting and trading 
volume. In this section, I adopt average shorting and trading volume in the pre-SHO 
period as an alternative measure of normal shorting and trading volume for the post-SHO 
period. Specifically, I run the following regression: 
,)1,5(13)1,5()1,0()1,5(1 210 εββββ +−−⋅+−−⋅++⋅+=−− ABVOLRETRETABSHO (6) 
where ABSHO1(-5,-1)=Shorting volume (-5,-1)/Average shorting volume during the pre-
SHO period, and ABVOL1(-5,-1)= Trading Volume (-5,-1)/ Average Trading Volume 
during the pre-SHO period.  Table 23 compares the regression results based on equation 
(6) and equation (1), and shows that the results are essentially the same.  (Insert Table 23 
about here) This additional test demonstrates that the major conclusion in Table 13 is 
robust when I adopt an alternative measure of abnormal shorting and abnormal volume in 
the regression. 
 
5.10 The Market Opening Auction 
 
          Thus far, neither normal-hour shorting on the recommendation day nor pre-
recommendation daily shorting flows could explain the improved pilot stock price 
efficiency measured by either larger magnitude or faster speed of price responses to 
analyst recommendation downgrades. It appears that short selling that occurs between 
day -1 and day 0 may contribute to the improved price efficiency when the uptick rule 
restrictions are suspended for pilot stocks. 
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          Before Regulation SHO, short selling is allowed at the opening auction as long as it 
follows the 10a-1 rule which only allows uptick short selling orders. In the NYSE, short 
selling with minus tick at the opening is only allowed for certain types of foreign 
securities. After regulation SHO, however, downtick or zero-tick short selling at the open 
became available for non-exempt traders of pilot stocks. These added short sales may 
contribute to the enhanced stock price efficiency. When the NYSE specialists build open 
book, they observe many downtick short selling orders from aggressive short sellers. The 
batch auction mechanism at the NYSE opening may induce more short selling orders 
from aggressive short sellers, because it provides an opportunity for price improvement at 
the opening price. Also, specialists in the NYSE have a legal responsibility to share the 
open book information with other brokers and dealers, who may further share such 
information with institutional investors. Consequently, aggressive short sellers who held 
the most pessimistic opinions will be encouraged to submit more short selling orders with 
the lowest price. Ultimately, the competition amongst the aggressive short sellers at the 
opening auction greatly facilitates the process of impounding negative information into 
stock price before the market open bell. A similar process with a stronger information 
impounding effect is likely to occur in the NASDAQ; because the dealer quotes are 
oriented to the opening auction there has a relatively higher information transparency 
than that in the NYSE. This is confirmed by comparing the results in Tables 2 and 3, 
which show that opening returns on the NASDAQ comprise 95% of the total return due 
to the downgrade, while the opening returns on the NYSE comprise about 85% of the 
total return. Note, however, that the opening return also includes any price change due to 
after hours trading before the open. Therefore, it is conjectured that both after-hour 
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shorting and the market opening shorting orders contribute to the enhanced stock price 
efficiency when the uptick rule restrictions are removed. One of the limitations of this 
paper is that the lack of data on after-hours shorting and short selling orders at the market 
opening limits my ability to further test this promising conjecture.  
 
6. Conclusions  
 
         In this paper, I examine the information content of short selling around the analyst 
recommendations and explore the possible forces that directly contribute to the improved 
informational stock price efficiency when uptick rules were suspended for pilot stocks. 
Analyzing the Regulation SHO data for 2005, I measure the intra-day price efficiency as 
the magnitude and speed of price responses to analyst recommendation downgrades, and 
find that suspension of the uptick rule helps improve stock price efficiency. In particular, 
for after-hours downgrades, pilot stocks respond quickly, with virtually all of the price 
response incorporated by the following open, while control stocks take an extra half an 
hour after opening to fully reflect the new information.  For downgrades that occur 
during normal trading hours, I find that downgrade information is partially incorporated 
into pilot stock prices up to two hours before the recommendation is released, while 
control stocks take up to an hour and a half after the release to impound the information 
into stock price. Both results show that removing tick- test restrictions increases the speed 
with which negative information is impounded into stock prices. Furthermore, the pre-
recommendation price decline in pilot stocks is associated with lower levels of non-
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exempt shorting and higher levels of exempt shorting, suggesting that at least a 
proportion of informed short sellers are avoiding shorting pilot stocks with forthcoming 
bad news. Despite lower levels of informed shorting, observed rapid price response 
occurs. This is consistent with the hypothesis that shorts without tick- test constraints can 
more efficiently impound information into prices.  
         Finally, short selling activities prior to the release of analyst recommendations 
indicate that, while short sellers were capitalizing their private information preceding the 
recommendations for control stocks, such behaviors have been altered in the pilot stock 
sample. These results suggest that short sellers intentionally altered their information-
driven trading strategies during the Pilot Program and avoided trading on forthcoming 
bad news. The results are robust when accommodating a number of potentially 
confounding factors. This is a surprising discovery because when the uptick rules were 
suspended for pilot stocks, it would be easier for short sellers to conduct such 
information-driven trading. While it is difficult to explain this surprising finding, I 
conjecture that, during the Pilot Program in 2005, short sellers were aware of the SEC’s 
regulatory scrutiny, and were very cautious in trading on their private information 
associated with forthcoming analyst recommendation downgrades.  
          The main findings of this paper lends credit to future research that utilizes data of 
after-hour shorting and shorting orders at the market opening auction to examine the 
importance of both after-hour trading and market opening in improving stock price 
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Table 2.1 Descriptive Summary for Analyst Recommendation Changes 
 
Table 1 presents the number of upgrades and downgrades for eight samples specified in section 4.1. 
Recommendations from top 20 brokerage firms and from the full sample are listed. Post-SHO represents a 
period from May to December of 2005 and Pre-SHO represents a period from January to April of 2005.  
 
Panel A Top 20 Brokerage Firms Full Sample 
Post-SHO No. of Upgrades 
No. of 
Downgrades No. of Upgrades 
No. of 
Downgrades 
NYSE Pilot 382 277 1801 1467 
NYSE Control 911 605 2765 1779 
Total 1293 882 4566 3246 
     
NASDAQ Pilot 209 153 1408 1156 
NASDAQ Control 414 330 2906 2352 
Total 623 483 4314 3508 
    
Panel B Top 20 Brokerage Firms Full Sample 
Pre-SHO No. of Upgrades 
No. of 
Downgrades No. of Upgrades 
No. of 
Downgrades 
NYSE Pilot 331 143 1125 898 
NYSE Control 603 373 3803 2910 
Total 934 516 4928 3808 
     
NASDAQ Pilot 147 97 979 636 
NASDAQ Control 383 221 1913 1264 























Table 2.2 Descriptive Summary of Short Selling Activities in 2005 
 
Table 2 summarizes short selling activities during the pre-sho period and the post-sho period. The pre-sho 
period is from January to April 2005 and the post-sho period is from May to December 2005. The average 
daily numbers of shorting shares for the pilot and control samples are reported. The differences between the 
pilot and control samples are calculated. The standard errors of mean estimation are in parentheses.  
 
Panel A. The Pre-SHO Period (January to April 2005) 
  NYSE         NASDAQ       
  Pilot Control 
Pilot-




volume 207812 197998 9814   198385 218826 -20441  
 (15380) (10148) (18426) 0.53  (14719) (11143) (18461) -1.11 
Shorting 
 Ratio 0.21620 0.2148 0.00140   0.17 0.171 -0.001  
  (0.0025) (0.0018) (0.0023) 0.08   (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.002) -0.46 
 
 
Panel B. The Post-SHO Period (May to December 2005) 
  NYSE         NASDAQ     
  Pilot Control 
Pilot-




volume 250000 202000 48000**   186800 146000 40800**  
 (14000) (10014) (17212) 2.79  (13700) (10080) (17009) 2.40 
Shorting 
Ratio 0.23 0.21 0.02***   0.2 0.186 0.014***  
  (0.0025) (0.0017) (0.003) 6.62   (0.0015) (0.001) (0.0018) 7.77 
























Figure 11 Cumulative Intra-Day Returns for NYSE Pilot and Control Stocks in Response to 
Post-and Pre-SHO Top 20 Brokerage Firms’ Analyst Recommendation 
 
Five-minute cumulative average returns following after-hours downgrade announcements by top 20 brokerage firms 
are calculated. Pilot and control stocks are graphed separately. During post-SHO period from May to December 2005, 
pilot stocks face no uptick rule restrictions while control stocks are tick-test restricted.  
 
Post-SHO NYSE Pilot Vs. Control Samples




























Figure 12 Cumulative Intra-Day Returns for NYSE Pilot and Control Stocks in Response to 
Pre-SHO Top 20 Brokerage Firms’ Analyst Recommendation 
 
Five-minute cumulative average returns following after-hours downgrade announcements by top 20 brokerage firms 
are calculated. Pilot and control stocks are graphed separately. During pre-SHO period from January to April 2005, 
pilot stocks faced the same uptick rule restrictions control stocks did. 
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Figure 13 and 2.4 Cumulative Intra-Day Returns for NASDAQ Pilot and Control Stocks in 
Response to Post- and Pre-SHO Top 20 Brokerage Firms’ Analyst Recommendation 
Downgrades 
 
Five-minute cumulative average returns following after-hours downgrade announcements by top 20 brokerage firms 
are calculated. Pilot and control stocks are graphed separately. During the post-SHO period pilot stocks face no uptick 
rule restrictions while control stocks are tick-test restricted. During this pre-SHO period pilot and control stocks face 
the same uptick restrictions. 
Post-SHO NASDAQ Pilot Vs. Control Sample Intra-day Price Response 
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Figure 2.5 Cumulative Intra-Day Returns for NYSE Pilot and Control Stocks in Response 
to Pre- and Post-SHO Analyst Recommendation Downgrades 
 
Five-minute cumulative average returns following after-hours downgrade announcements are calculated. Pilot and 
control stocks are graphed separately. During the pre-SHO period pilot stocks face an uptick rule restriction while 
during the post-SHO period they face no uptick rule restrictions. Control stocks are tick-test restricted the entire time. 























































Table 2.3 NYSE Intra-day cumulative returns following After-hour 
Recommendation Downgrades for the Pilot and Control Samples 
 
This table presents the 5 minutes interval cumulative stock returns, including opening returns, on the event date when 
top 20 brokerage firms released downgrade recommendations for both pilot and control samples in the NYSE. The pre-
SHO regulation period is from January to April of 2005 and the post –SHO regulation period is from May through 
December of 2005. The standard errors are presented in parentheses below the means. Diff is the difference of 5 
minutes interval cumulative returns between pilot and control samples. T-statistics is presented as T-stat.  
 
NYSE   Pre SHO           
Post 
SHO       
Time Pilot Control Diff T-stat   Pilot Control Diff T-stat 
16:00-9:30am -1.44% -1.22% -0.22% -0.65  -1.66% -0.82% -0.84%*** -4.05 
 (0.0027) (0.0020)    (0.0016) (0.0014)   
9:35am -1.66% -1.36% -0.30% -0.87  -1.82% -1.14% -0.67%*** -2.65 
 (0.0028) (0.0020)    (0.0021) (0.0014)   
9:40am -1.75% -1.40% -0.34% -0.98  -1.90% -1.29% -0.61%*** -2.39 
 (0.0029) (0.0020)    (0.0021) (0.0015)   
9:45am -1.82% -1.55% -0.27% -0.74  -1.91% -1.36% -0.55%** -2.11 
 (0.0030) (0.0021)    (0.0021) (0.0015)   
9:50am -1.88% -1.57% -0.31% -0.85  -1.96% -1.46% -0.50%** -1.90 
 (0.0030) (0.0021)    (0.0022) (0.0015)   
9:55am -1.91% -1.58% -0.34% -0.92  -1.94% -1.38% -0.56%** -2.10 
 (0.0030) (0.0022)    (0.0022) (0.0015)   
10:00am -1.94% -1.58% -0.36% -0.96  -1.92% -1.50% -0.42% -1.61 
 (0.0030) (0.0022)    (0.0021) (0.0015)   
10:05am -1.97% -1.63% -0.34% -0.90  -1.90% -1.50% -0.41% -1.54 
 (0.0031) (0.0022)    (0.0022) (0.0015)   
10:10am -1.97% -1.64% -0.33% -0.88  -1.90% -1.52% -0.39% -1.46 
 (0.0030) (0.0023)    (0.0022) (0.0015)   
10:15am -1.98% -1.64% -0.34% -0.88  -1.89% -1.54% -0.35% -1.33 
 (0.0031) (0.0023)    (0.0022) (0.0015)   
10:20am -1.94% -1.65% -0.30% -0.77  -1.89% -1.57% -0.31% -1.17 
 (0.0031) (0.0023)    (0.0022) (0.0015)   
10:25am -1.98% -1.67% -0.31% -0.78  -1.87% -1.57% -0.30% -1.13 
 (0.0032) (0.0023)    (0.0022) (0.0015)   
10:30am -2.01% -1.67% -0.34% -0.87  -1.86% -1.57% -0.30% -1.12 
 (0.0032) (0.0023)    (0.0022) (0.0015)   
12:00am -2.05% -1.74% -0.31% -0.78  -2.00% -1.69% -0.31% -1.14 
 (0.0032) (0.0024)    (0.0023) (0.0015)   
3:00pm -2.15% -1.68% -0.47% -1.14  -2.03% -1.73% -0.30% -1.04 
 (0.0034) (0.0023)    (0.0024) (0.0015)   
4:00pm  -2.24% -1.78% -0.46% -1.06  -1.90% -1.69% -0.20% -0.71 
 (0.0036) (0.0024)    (0.0024) (0.0016)   






Table 2.4 NASDAQ Intra-day cumulative returns following After-hour Recommendation 
Downgrades for the Pilot and Control samples 
 
This table presents the 5 minutes interval cumulative stock returns, including opening returns, on the event date when 
top 20 brokerage firms released downgrade recommendations for both pilot and control samples on the NASDAQ. The 
pre-SHO regulation period is from January to April of 2005 and the post –SHO regulation period is from May through 
December of 2005. The standard errors are presented in parentheses below the means. Diff is the difference of 5 
minutes interval cumulative returns between pilot and control samples. T-statistics is presented as T-stat.  
 
NASDAQ    
Pre-
SHO         
Post-
SHO       
Time Pilot Control Diff T-stat   Pilot Control Diff T-stat 
 (1) (2) 
(3)=(1)-
(2)   (4) (5) (6)=(4)-(5)  
16:00-9:30am -3.06% -3.28% 0.21% 0.005  -3.44% -2.06% -1.38%*** -2.19 
 (0.85%) (0.47%)    (0.62%) (0.13%)   
9:35am -3.79% -3.48% -0.31% -0.008  -3.59% -2.30% -1.29%*** -2.02 
 (0.84%) (0.46%)    (0.62%) (0.14%)   
9:40am -3.52% -3.42% -0.09% -0.002  -3.41% -2.23% -1.17%** -1.84 
 (0.82%) (0.47%)    (0.62%) (0.14%)   
9:45am -3.43% -3.55% 0.12% 0.003  -3.38% -2.20% -1.18%** -1.87 
 (0.81%) (0.48%)    (0.62%) (0.14%)   
9:50am -3.53% -3.59% 0.06% 0.002  -3.49% -2.25% -1.24%** -1.96 
 (0.81%) (0.47%)    (0.62%) (0.14%)   
9:55am -3.56% -3.62% 0.06% 0.002  -3.49% -2.25% -1.24%** -1.94 
 (0.80%) (0.47%)    (0.63%) (0.14%)   
10:00am -3.60% -3.54% -0.06% -0.001  -3.49% -2.27% -1.22%** -1.87 
 (0.82%) (0.48%)    (0.63%) (0.14%)   
10:05am -3.81% -3.68% -0.13% -0.003  -3.50% -2.29% -1.21%** -1.83 
 (0.82%) (0.48%)    (0.64%) (0.14%)   
10:10am -3.87% -3.72% -0.15% -0.004  -3.52% -2.30% -1.22%** -1.83 
 (0.82%) (0.49%)    (0.65%) (0.14%)   
10:15am -3.87% -3.76% -0.11% -0.003  -3.62% -2.34% -1.28%** -1.89 
 (0.83%) (0.49%)    (0.66%) (0.14%)   
10:20am -3.93% -3.75% -0.18% -0.004  -3.68% -2.36% -1.32%** -1.95 
 (0.84%) (0.49%)    (0.66%) (0.15%)   
10:25am -4.05% -3.77% -0.28% -0.007  -3.64% -2.38% -1.27%** -1.86 
 (0.84%) (0.50%)    (0.67%) (0.15%)   
10:30am -4.05% -3.81% -0.23% -0.006  -3.66% -2.37% -1.28%** -1.87 
 (0.84%) (0.50%)    (0.67%) (0.15%)   
12:00 -4.52% -3.87% -0.65% -0.016  -3.72% -2.49% -1.24%** -1.77 
 (0.90%) (0.53%)    (0.68%) (0.15%)   
3:00pm -4.80% -4.21% -0.58% -0.014  -3.76% -2.51% -1.25%** -1.74 
 (0.92%) (0.55%)    (0.70%) (0.16%)   
4:00pm  -4.73% -4.22% -0.50% -0.012  -3.64% -2.41% -1.24%** -1.70 
 (0.90%) (0.56%)    (0.71%) (0.16%)   




Table 2.5 Sample Statistics for Downgrades  
 
Recommendations are assigned point values of 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 for “buy,”, “overweight,” “neutral,” “underweight,” and 
“sell,” respectively. The recommendation change is calculated as the change in the downgrade point value, and ranges 
from -1 for a 1-step downgrade to -4 for a downgrade from “buy” to “sell.” 
 
Panel A: Sample means of downgrade recommendation changes 
Pre-SHO Mean  Stderr Post-SHO Mean Stderr 
Pilot -1.97 0.0214 Pilot  -1.45 0.0154 
Control -2.02 0.0152 Control  -1.46 0.0109 




Panel B: Downgrade recommendation change structure for the pilot and control samples 













-4 89 5.05% 176 5.02% 
-3 510 28.96% 1126 31.12% 
-2 1108 62.92% 2294 65.43% 
-1 1761 100% 3506 100% 




Panel C: Downgrades recommendation change structure for the pilot and control sample 













-4 10 0.64% 22 0.71% 
-3 77 4.90% 157 5.03% 
-2 620 39.47% 1252 40.14% 
-1 1571 100% 3119 100% 













Figure 2.6 Stock Price Response to Downgrades during the Pilot Program on the NYSE: 
Excluding Recommendation Initiations 
 
This figure graphs 5 minute cumulative returns for pilot and control stocks on the NYSE for all downgrades except 
initiations announced after hours the previous day. Pilot and control stocks are graphed separately. 
 
Price Response to Downgrades 
( Excluding Recommendation Initiations)








































































Figure 2.7 Stock Price Response to Downgrades on the NYSE during the Pilot Program: 
Using Size and Book to Market Matched Samples 
 
This figure plots 5 minute cumulative returns for pilot and control stocks on the NYSE for all after-hour downgrades 
except initiations. Pilot and control stocks are graphed separately. 
 
 
Price Response to Downgrades 
(Firm size and book to market matched Samples) 






































































Figure 2.8 Stock Price Response to “Not So Good” Downgrades on the NYSE during the 
Pilot Program 
 
This figure plots 5 minute cumulative returns for pilot and control stocks on the NYSE experiencing “Not so good” 
after-hour downgrades. Pilot and control stocks are graphed separately. 
 
Price Response to Downgrades (not so good) 























































Figure 2.9 Stock Price Response to “Really Bad” Downgrades on the NYSE during the Pilot 
Program 
 
This figure plots 5 minute cumulative returns for pilot and control stocks on the NYSE experiencing “really bad” after-
hour downgrades. Pilot and control stocks are graphed separately. 
Price Response to Really Bad Downgrades



































































Table 2.6 Stock Price Response to After-hour Downgrades on the NYSE during the Pilot 
Program: Excluding Recommendation Initiations 
 
Five minute cumulative returns for pilot and control stocks on the NYSE for all downgrades except initiations 




N=740 stderr t 
Control 
N=1356 stderr t Diff t 
 (1)   (2)   (3)=(1)-(2)  
9:30 -1.22% 0.00110 -11.11 -0.61% 0.00077 -7.93 -0.61%*** -4.56 
9:35 -1.25% 0.00114 -10.96 -0.94% 0.00080 -11.72 -0.31%*** -2.21 
9:40 -1.24% 0.00114 -10.90 -1.11% 0.00084 -13.14 -0.13% -0.95 
9:45 -1.25% 0.00113 -11.07 -1.16% 0.00086 -13.53 -0.10% -0.67 
9:50 -1.26% 0.00115 -10.97 -1.23% 0.00089 -13.82 -0.03% -0.20 
9:55 -1.27% 0.00115 -11.06 -1.20% 0.00095 -12.66 -0.07% -0.47 
10:00 -1.25% 0.00114 -11.01 -1.26% 0.00091 -13.87 0.01% 0.07 
10:05 -1.28% 0.00115 -11.10 -1.28% 0.00091 -14.10 0.00% 0.01 
10:10 -1.30% 0.00116 -11.23 -1.30% 0.00091 -14.19 0.00% -0.03 
10:15 -1.31% 0.00116 -11.27 -1.31% 0.00092 -14.30 0.00% 0.01 
10:20 -1.33% 0.00117 -11.36 -1.33% 0.00092 -14.42 -0.01% -0.04 
10:25 -1.32% 0.00118 -11.20 -1.33% 0.00092 -14.42 0.01% 0.06 
10:30 -1.32% 0.00117 -11.23 -1.32% 0.00092 -14.31 0.01% 0.05 
         
11:00 -1.28% 0.00117 -10.94 -1.32% 0.00094 -14.02 0.04% 0.25 
12:00 -1.36% 0.00123 -11.09 -1.43% 0.00097 -14.78 0.06% 0.41 
13:00 -1.36% 0.00123 -11.01 -1.43% 0.00097 -14.65 0.07% 0.42 
14:00 -1.39% 0.00124 -11.21 -1.43% 0.00098 -14.54 0.04% 0.22 
15:00 -1.43% 0.00128 -11.17 -1.46% 0.00100 -14.58 0.03% 0.17 






















Table 2.7 Stock Price Response to After-hour Downgrades on the NYSE during the Pilot 
Program: Using Size and Book to Market Matched Samples 
 
Cumulative five minute returns are reported for after-hour downgrades for stocks on the NYSE. Control stocks are 




n=777 stderr t 
Control  
n= 748 stderr t Diff t 
 (1)   (2)   (3)=(1)-(2)  
9:30 -1.19% 0.0010 -11.57 -0.57% 0.0008 -7.16 -0.62%*** -4.75 
9:35 -1.21% 0.0011 -11.27 -0.90% 0.0009 -10.07 -0.30%*** -2.19 
9:40 -1.21% 0.0011 -11.36 -0.98% 0.0009 -11.04 -0.23% -1.69 
9:45 -1.23% 0.0011 -11.55 -1.08% 0.0009 -11.73 -0.15% -1.03 
9:50 -1.23% 0.0011 -11.39 -1.14% 0.0009 -12.09 -0.09% -0.65 
9:55 -1.24% 0.0011 -11.45 -1.07% 0.0011 -9.44 -0.16% -1.05 
10:00 -1.22% 0.0011 -11.41 -1.17% 0.0010 -11.39 -0.06% -0.38 
10:05 -1.25% 0.0011 -11.47 -1.17% 0.0010 -11.37 -0.07% -0.50 
10:10 -1.27% 0.0011 -11.58 -1.18% 0.0010 -11.41 -0.09% -0.57 
10:15 -1.28% 0.0011 -11.67 -1.20% 0.0010 -11.59 -0.08% -0.50 
10:20 -1.30% 0.0011 -11.75 -1.21% 0.0010 -11.69 -0.09% -0.57 
10:25 -1.29% 0.0011 -11.60 -1.21% 0.0010 -11.66 -0.08% -0.53 
10:30 -1.28% 0.0011 -11.54 -1.20% 0.0010 -11.66 -0.07% -0.50 
         
11:00 -1.25% 0.0011 -11.20 -1.19% 0.0010 -11.41 -0.05% -0.34 
12:00 -1.34% 0.0012 -11.44 -1.26% 0.0011 -11.40 -0.08% -0.47 
13:00 -1.34% 0.0012 -11.39 -1.26% 0.0011 -11.42 -0.08% -0.47 
14:00 -1.36% 0.0012 -11.41 -1.28% 0.0011 -11.38 -0.07% -0.44 
15:00 -1.39% 0.0012 -11.25 -1.31% 0.0011 -11.47 -0.08% -0.46 






















Table 2.8 Stock Price Response to “Not So Good” After-hour Downgrades on the NYSE 
during the Pilot Program 
 




n=558 stderr t 
Control 
 n=998 stderr t Diff t 
 (1)   (2)   (3)=(1)-(2)  
9:30 -1.30% 0.0014 -9.58 -0.58% 0.0010 -6.05 -0.72% *** -4.34 
9:35 -1.36% 0.0014 -9.63 -0.94% 0.0010 -9.72 -0.42% *** -2.47 
9:40 -1.33% 0.0014 -9.42 -1.09% 0.0010 -10.94 -0.24% -1.38 
9:45 -1.35% 0.0014 -9.64 -1.15% 0.0010 -11.35 -0.20% -1.16 
9:50 -1.36% 0.0014 -9.55 -1.22% 0.0011 -11.62 -0.14% -0.77 
9:55 -1.36% 0.0014 -9.58 -1.23% 0.0010 -11.78 -0.13% -0.72 
10:00 -1.34% 0.0014 -9.62 -1.27% 0.0011 -11.83 -0.07% -0.41 
10:05 -1.38% 0.0014 -9.74 -1.27% 0.0011 -11.93 -0.10% -0.58 
10:10 -1.39% 0.0014 -9.81 -1.30% 0.0011 -12.15 -0.09% -0.52 
10:15 -1.40% 0.0014 -9.82 -1.31% 0.0011 -12.15 -0.09% -0.50 
10:20 -1.42% 0.0014 -9.85 -1.33% 0.0011 -12.33 -0.09% -0.50 
10:25 -1.42% 0.0015 -9.75 -1.33% 0.0011 -12.24 -0.09% -0.48 
10:30 -1.41% 0.0014 -9.74 -1.33% 0.0011 -12.14 -0.08% -0.46 
         
11:00 -1.39% 0.0014 -9.59 -1.34% 0.0011 -11.99 -0.05% -0.26 
12:00 -1.49% 0.0015 -9.71 -1.47% 0.0011 -12.92 -0.02% -0.10 
13:00 -1.48% 0.0015 -9.61 -1.46% 0.0011 -12.70 -0.02% -0.10 
14:00 -1.51% 0.0015 -9.81 -1.44% 0.0012 -12.39 -0.07% -0.38 
15:00 -1.54% 0.0016 -9.74 -1.47% 0.0012 -12.49 -0.07% -0.37 






















Table 2.9 Stock Price Response to “Really Bad” After Hours Downgrades on the NYSE 
during the Pilot Program 
 
Cumulative five minute returns are reported for pilot and control stocks that experience after-hour downgrades in the 




n=332 stderr t 
Control 
n=663 stderr t Diff t 
 (1)   (2)   (3)=(1)-(2)  
9:30 -1.16% 0.0017 -6.85 -0.78% 0.0009 -8.22 -0.38% *** -1.97 
9:35 -1.13% 0.0017 -6.58 -0.98% 0.0010 -9.58 -0.15% -0.75 
9:40 -1.17% 0.0017 -6.88 -1.12% 0.0011 -10.19 -0.05% -0.24 
9:45 -1.18% 0.0017 -6.96 -1.20% 0.0011 -10.64 0.02% 0.10 
9:50 -1.20% 0.0017 -6.89 -1.27% 0.0012 -11.00 0.07% 0.36 
9:55 -1.22% 0.0018 -6.89 -1.22% 0.0014 -8.93 -0.01% -0.03 
10:00 -1.21% 0.0017 -6.91 -1.31% 0.0012 -11.06 0.11% 0.50 
         
11:00 -1.22% 0.0018 -6.73 -1.41% 0.0012 -11.52 0.20% 0.90 
12:00 -1.32% 0.0018 -7.11 -1.43% 0.0013 -11.24 0.12% 0.52 
13:00 -1.36% 0.0019 -7.34 -1.44% 0.0013 -11.13 0.07% 0.32 
14:00 -1.36% 0.0019 -7.19 -1.49% 0.0013 -11.32 0.13% 0.57 
15:00 -1.38% 0.0020 -7.01 -1.53% 0.0013 -11.40 0.15% 0.64 


























Figure 2.10 Stock Price Response to Downgrades during Normal Trading Hours on the 
NYSE during the Pilot Program 
 
Five minute cumulative returns beginning two hours before the posting time of a downgrade and ending two hours after 
the posting time are calculated for pilot and control stocks. Only downgrades that follow a prior upgrade are included in 
the sample. Time zero is the time the downgrade was announced. 
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Table 2.10 Stock Price Response to Downgrades during Normal Trading Hours on the 
NYSE during the Pilot Program 
 
Five minute cumulative returns beginning two hours before a trading day downgrade and ending two hours after a 
trading day downgrade are shown for pilot and control stocks. Diff is the difference between the pilot cumulative return 





n=79 Stderr t 
Control 
n=133 Stderr t Diff t 
 (1)   (2)   (3)=(1)-(2)  
-115 0.00% 0.000226 -0.12 0.03% 0.000319 0.81 -0.03% -0.73 
-110 -0.03% 0.000345 -0.99 -0.01% 0.000399 -0.23 -0.03% -0.47 
-105 -0.06% 0.000445 -1.30 0.00% 0.00046 0.03 -0.06% -0.92 
-100 -0.07% 0.000585 -1.22 -0.01% 0.000551 -0.15 -0.06% -0.79 
-95 -0.11% 0.000781 -1.38 * 0.00% 0.000627 -0.03 -0.11% -1.06 
-90 -0.14% 0.000867 -1.59 * -0.01% 0.000633 -0.18 -0.13% -1.18 
-85 -0.20% 0.000996 -1.97 ** -0.02% 0.000698 -0.36 -0.17% -1.41 * 
-80 -0.24% 0.001086 -2.25 ** -0.03% 0.000765 -0.40 -0.21% -1.61 * 
-75 -0.25% 0.001129 -2.17 ** 0.00% 0.000816 0.00 -0.24% -1.76 ** 
-70 -0.22% 0.001094 -2.02 ** -0.02% 0.00087 -0.20 -0.20% -1.46 * 
-65 -0.19% 0.001089 -1.74 ** 0.00% 0.000951 0.03 -0.19% -1.33 * 
-60 -0.19% 0.001118 -1.71 ** -0.03% 0.001092 -0.27 -0.16% -1.03 
-55 -0.18% 0.001172 -1.57 * -0.06% 0.001281 -0.46 -0.13% -0.72 
-50 -0.20% 0.001224 -1.67** -0.04% 0.001291 -0.32 -0.16% -0.92 
-45 -0.23% 0.001258 -1.84** -0.02% 0.00137 -0.15 -0.21% -1.14 
-40 -0.25% 0.001175 -2.13** -0.01% 0.001298 -0.07 -0.24% -1.38 * 
-35 -0.23% 0.001253 -1.85** -0.01% 0.001291 -0.10 -0.22% -1.21 
-30 -0.23% 0.001199 -1.89** -0.01% 0.001388 -0.08 -0.22% -1.18 
-25 -0.26% 0.001226 -2.14** -0.01% 0.001344 -0.06 -0.25% -1.40 * 
-20 -0.28% 0.001229 -2.26** -0.01% 0.001351 -0.09 -0.27% -1.45 * 
-15 -0.29% 0.00125 -2.31** 0.00% 0.001351 -0.01 -0.29% -1.56 * 
-10 -0.29% 0.001337 -2.14 ** -0.05% 0.001371 -0.34 -0.24% -1.25 
-5 -0.32% 0.001386 -2.31** -0.08% 0.001343 -0.60 -0.24% -1.24 
0 -0.38% 0.001397 -2.70 *** -0.09% 0.001384 -0.67 -0.28% -1.45 * 
5 -0.41% 0.001374 -2.98 *** -0.14% 0.001449 -0.95 -0.27% -1.37 * 
10 -0.40% 0.001301 -3.07 *** -0.14% 0.001455 -0.94 -0.26% -1.35 * 
15 -0.46% 0.00141 -3.25 *** -0.14% 0.001502 -0.95 -0.32% -1.53 * 
20 -0.46% 0.001412 -3.23 *** -0.15% 0.001493 -1.02 -0.30% -1.48 * 
25 -0.53% 0.001528 -3.47 *** -0.17% 0.001485 -1.15 -0.36% -1.69 * 
30 -0.54% 0.001536 -3.50 *** -0.16% 0.001523 -1.08 -0.37% -1.73 * 
35 -0.52% 0.001557 -3.37 *** -0.17% 0.001626 -1.06 -0.35% -1.56 * 
40 -0.53% 0.001584 -3.37 *** -0.17% 0.001626 -1.07 -0.36% -1.58 * 
45 -0.53% 0.001559 -3.39 *** -0.17% 0.001615 -1.03 -0.36% -1.61 * 
50 -0.52% 0.001504 -3.43 *** -0.14% 0.003564 0.39 -0.38% -0.98 
55 -0.53% 0.001494 -3.57 *** -0.19% 0.001691 -1.13 -0.34% -1.52 * 
60 -0.58% 0.001624 -3.56 *** -0.21% 0.001761 -1.21 -0.37% -1.53 * 
65 -0.52% 0.001534 -3.40 *** -0.20% 0.001722 -1.15 -0.32% -1.41 * 
70 -0.50% 0.001474 -3.42 *** -0.21% 0.001646 -1.27 -0.29% -1.33 * 
75 -0.51% 0.001491 -3.45 *** -0.21% 0.001626 -1.31 -0.30% -1.37 * 
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80 -0.52% 0.00148 -3.50 *** -0.24% 0.001626 -1.47 * -0.28% -1.27 
85 -0.50% 0.001552 -3.21 *** -0.26% 0.00172 -1.49 * -0.24% -1.04 
90 -0.51% 0.001547 -3.27 *** -0.28% 0.001773 -1.59 * -0.22% -0.95 
95 -0.51% 0.001551 -3.28 *** -0.28% 0.001797 -1.58 * -0.22% -0.95 
100 -0.53% 0.001541 -3.41 *** -0.27% 0.001806 -1.48 * -0.26% -1.09 
105 -0.51% 0.001593 -3.18 *** -0.24% 0.001849 -1.32 * -0.26% -1.07 
110 -0.53% 0.001626 -3.26 *** -0.30% 0.001901 -1.60 * -0.23% -0.91 
115 -0.59% 0.001559 -3.75 *** -0.36% 0.001968 -1.82 ** -0.23% -0.90 
120 -0.17% 0.003806 -0.44 -0.14% 0.00227 -0.61 -0.03% -0.07 






































Table 2.11 Short Selling around Normal Trading-hour Downgrade Recommendations 
during the Pilot Program 
Table 10 compares intra-day cumulative shorting ratios for the pilot and the control samples on downgrade 
recommendation dates. The cumulative shorting ratio is defined as the ratio of five minutes cumulative shorting volume 
to the daily trading volume. Time 0 is the time when analysts publish the recommendations. The first row is from the 
market opening to 2 hours before the recommendation, and the last row is from 2 hours after the recommendations to 
the market closing. 
 
Cummulative Intra-day Shorting Ratio Non-exampt Short Selling Exampt Short Selling
Time Pilot Stderr Control Stderr Diff t Pilot Stderr Control Stderr Diff t Pilot Stderr Control Stderr Diff t
4.56% 0.005 3.87% 0.003 0.69% 1.24 3.75% 0.004 3.79% 0.003 -0.04% -0.08 0.89% 0.001 0.17% 0.000 0.71% 5.27
-115 4.43% 0.005 4.43% 0.003 0.00% 0.00 3.72% 0.004 4.33% 0.003 -0.61% -1.18 0.92% 0.002 0.31% 0.001 0.61% 3.17
-110 4.65% 0.005 4.52% 0.003 0.13% 0.24 3.85% 0.004 4.42% 0.003 -0.56% -1.08 0.79% 0.001 0.44% 0.001 0.35% 2.19
-105 4.96% 0.005 4.85% 0.004 0.11% 0.19 4.12% 0.004 4.75% 0.004 -0.63% -1.14 1.08% 0.002 0.46% 0.002 0.62% 2.56
-100 5.28% 0.005 5.15% 0.004 0.13% 0.21 4.39% 0.004 5.02% 0.004 -0.63% -1.10 0.94% 0.001 0.25% 0.001 0.69% 4.35
-95 5.42% 0.005 5.42% 0.004 0.00% 0.00 4.56% 0.004 5.31% 0.004 -0.75% -1.29 1.05% 0.001 0.24% 0.001 0.81% 4.80
-90 5.90% 0.005 5.80% 0.005 0.10% 0.15 4.89% 0.004 5.69% 0.005 -0.80% -1.23 1.18% 0.001 0.30% 0.001 0.88% 4.63
-85 5.93% 0.005 6.20% 0.005 -0.27% -0.38 4.80% 0.004 6.18% 0.005 -1.37% -2.08 1.34% 0.002 0.33% 0.001 1.01% 5.29
-80 6.08% 0.005 6.45% 0.005 -0.38% -0.54 5.10% 0.004 6.42% 0.005 -1.32% -1.98 1.19% 0.001 0.51% 0.001 0.69% 3.34
-75 6.54% 0.005 6.67% 0.005 -0.13% -0.19 5.54% 0.005 6.56% 0.005 -1.03% -1.46 1.47% 0.002 0.42% 0.002 1.05% 4.05
-70 6.46% 0.005 6.87% 0.006 -0.41% -0.54 5.52% 0.004 6.74% 0.006 -1.22% -1.69 1.33% 0.002 0.39% 0.001 0.94% 4.00
-65 6.59% 0.005 7.42% 0.006 -0.83% -1.03 5.43% 0.005 7.41% 0.006 -1.97% -2.54 1.39% 0.002 0.44% 0.001 0.95% 4.08
-60 7.22% 0.005 7.75% 0.007 -0.53% -0.60 5.98% 0.005 7.27% 0.006 -1.29% -1.74 1.47% 0.002 4.96% 0.046 -3.49% -0.76
-55 7.29% 0.005 7.95% 0.007 -0.66% -0.73 6.29% 0.005 7.46% 0.006 -1.17% -1.55 1.36% 0.002 0.66% 0.003 0.70% 2.26
-50 7.49% 0.005 7.88% 0.007 -0.39% -0.44 6.19% 0.005 7.47% 0.006 -1.28% -1.69 1.61% 0.002 0.50% 0.002 1.11% 4.33
-45 7.79% 0.005 8.29% 0.008 -0.49% -0.51 6.54% 0.005 7.79% 0.007 -1.25% -1.54 1.53% 0.002 0.54% 0.002 0.99% 4.03
-40 7.51% 0.005 8.23% 0.007 -0.72% -0.86 6.26% 0.004 8.11% 0.007 -1.85% -2.28 1.55% 0.002 0.56% 0.003 0.99% 3.11
-35 8.13% 0.005 8.69% 0.007 -0.56% -0.64 6.87% 0.005 8.56% 0.007 -1.69% -1.98 1.71% 0.002 0.54% 0.002 1.16% 4.57
-30 8.84% 0.005 9.26% 0.009 -0.43% -0.41 7.38% 0.005 8.76% 0.008 -1.38% -1.56 1.73% 0.002 0.51% 0.002 1.22% 4.09
-25 9.07% 0.006 9.48% 0.009 -0.41% -0.38 7.25% 0.005 8.96% 0.008 -1.71% -1.91 1.69% 0.002 0.40% 0.002 1.29% 4.53
-20 8.93% 0.006 9.44% 0.009 -0.50% -0.45 7.48% 0.005 8.95% 0.008 -1.47% -1.53 1.63% 0.002 0.57% 0.002 1.06% 3.41
-15 9.87% 0.006 9.60% 0.010 0.26% 0.23 8.22% 0.005 9.08% 0.008 -0.86% -0.88 1.82% 0.003 0.48% 0.001 1.34% 4.40
-10 9.40% 0.006 10.26% 0.010 -0.86% -0.72 7.90% 0.005 9.71% 0.009 -1.81% -1.81 1.79% 0.002 0.28% 0.001 1.51% 7.06
-5 9.55% 0.006 10.80% 0.011 -1.25% -1.01 8.10% 0.006 10.23% 0.009 -2.12% -2.02 1.82% 0.002 0.53% 0.003 1.29% 3.52
0 9.72% 0.006 10.76% 0.010 -1.04% -0.86 8.16% 0.005 10.27% 0.009 -2.11% -2.06 1.76% 0.002 0.42% 0.002 1.34% 5.25
5 10.29% 0.007 11.32% 0.012 -1.02% -0.75 8.64% 0.006 10.74% 0.010 -2.09% -1.79 2.16% 0.002 0.38% 0.002 1.78% 6.64
10 10.71% 0.007 11.47% 0.012 -0.77% -0.56 8.97% 0.006 10.93% 0.010 -1.96% -1.64 2.18% 0.002 0.37% 0.002 1.80% 6.52
15 11.24% 0.007 11.85% 0.012 -0.61% -0.43 9.41% 0.006 11.30% 0.011 -1.89% -1.55 2.15% 0.002 0.48% 0.002 1.67% 5.45
20 10.83% 0.007 12.30% 0.013 -1.46% -1.03 9.38% 0.006 11.76% 0.011 -2.38% -1.93 2.03% 0.002 0.43% 1.60% 7.36
25 11.70% 0.007 12.51% 0.014 -0.81% -0.51 9.81% 0.007 11.94% 0.012 -2.13% -1.54 2.33% 0.002 0.76% 0.004 1.56% 3.25
30 11.91% 0.007 13.01% 0.016 -1.10% -0.64 9.97% 0.007 12.44% 0.013 -2.47% -1.66 2.13% 0.002 0.56% 0.004 1.57% 3.64
35 12.33% 0.008 13.40% 0.017 -1.08% -0.58 10.39% 0.007 12.86% 0.014 -2.47% -1.55 2.04% 0.002 0.60% 0.003 1.44% 3.50
40 11.87% 0.007 13.88% 0.019 -2.01% -0.99 10.11% 0.007 13.32% 0.016 -3.21% -1.80 2.14% 0.002 1.05% 0.006 1.09% 1.81
45 12.23% 0.007 14.48% 0.020 -2.25% -1.06 10.21% 0.007 13.90% 0.017 -3.70% -1.99 2.30% 0.002 0.20% 0.000 2.10% 8.82
50 12.23% 0.007 14.37% 0.020 -2.14% -1.00 10.50% 0.007 13.79% 0.017 -3.29% -1.76 2.17% 0.002 0.73% 0.003 1.44% 4.38
55 12.53% 0.008 13.29% 0.013 -0.77% -0.51 10.63% 0.007 13.12% 0.013 -2.48% -1.66 2.40% 0.002 0.53% 0.003 1.86% 4.87
60 13.27% 0.008 15.16% 0.021 -1.88% -0.84 11.20% 0.007 14.58% 0.018 -3.38% -1.73 2.46% 0.002 0.88% 0.003 1.59% 4.63
65 12.99% 0.008 15.31% 0.024 -2.32% -0.92 11.26% 0.007 14.72% 0.021 -3.47% -1.56 2.45% 0.002 0.69% 0.005 1.76% 3.03
70 13.14% 0.008 15.77% 0.023 -2.63% -1.11 11.12% 0.007 15.24% 0.020 -4.12% -1.96 2.65% 0.002 0.61% 0.003 2.04% 5.80
75 13.73% 0.008 16.09% 0.023 -2.36% -0.96 11.54% 0.007 15.64% 0.021 -4.10% -1.87 2.71% 0.003 0.61% 0.002 2.10% 6.80
80 13.66% 0.009 12.96% 0.012 0.70% 0.48 11.42% 0.008 12.84% 0.012 -1.42% -1.00 2.65% 0.002 0.78% 0.003 1.88% 5.09
85 13.63% 0.008 15.55% 0.023 -1.92% -0.80 11.69% 0.008 14.98% 0.020 -3.30% -1.56 2.68% 0.002 0.97% 0.005 1.71% 3.11
90 14.14% 0.008 16.42% 0.024 -2.28% -0.89 11.91% 0.008 16.06% 0.022 -4.15% -1.78 2.71% 0.003 0.53% 0.002 2.17% 6.16
95 14.52% 0.008 16.77% 0.025 -2.25% -0.86 12.26% 0.008 16.24% 0.022 -3.98% -1.68 2.77% 0.003 0.64% 0.002 2.13% 5.83
100 14.34% 0.008 15.09% 0.016 -0.75% -0.42 12.22% 0.008 14.88% 0.016 -2.66% -1.47 2.68% 0.003 0.77% 0.003 1.90% 4.99
105 14.93% 0.008 17.09% 0.025 -2.16% -0.81 12.72% 0.008 16.52% 0.023 -3.80% -1.58 2.75% 0.003 0.49% 0.003 2.26% 6.23
110 15.57% 0.010 17.96% 0.025 -2.39% -0.89 13.15% 0.009 17.38% 0.022 -4.24% -1.76 2.92% 0.003 0.60% 0.004 2.32% 5.05
115 15.72% 0.010 17.66% 0.025 -1.94% -0.73 13.58% 0.009 17.24% 0.023 -3.66% -1.49 2.99% 0.003 0.87% 0.003 2.12% 5.05
120 15.84% 0.009 18.18% 0.026 -2.34% -0.86 13.39% 0.008 17.71% 0.023 -4.32% -1.74 3.09% 0.003 0.81% 0.002 2.27% 6.47
23.67% 0.013 26.02% 0.037 -2.35% -0.60 19.90% 0.012 25.39% 0.035 -5.49% -1.49 3.73% 0.003 1.47% 0.008 2.25% 2.52  
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Table 2.12 Summary of Exempt and Non-Exempt Short Selling Activities 
 
This table summarizes short sales marked as “exempt” and “non-exempt” in the Regulation SHO dataset. 
The Pre-SHO period is from January to April 2005 and the Post-SHO period is from May to December 
2005. The percentages of these short sales are presented below the numbers.  
 
Panel A. Total Number of Shorting Orders 
  Pre-SHO   Post-SHO   
  Exempt Non-Exempt Exempt Non-Exempt 
Pilot 58115 12706254 8068884 29337032 
 0.46% 99.54% 21.57% 78.43% 
Control 106388 24511673 1115699 54496741 
  0.43% 99.57% 2.01% 97.99% 
 
Panel B. Total Number of Shorting Shares 
  Pre-SHO   Post-SHO   
  Exempt Non-Exempt Exempt Non-Exempt 
Pilot 52166700 7487377600 3088342650 13455994100 
 0.69% 99.31% 18.67% 81.33% 
Control 92726100 14722505250 821505700 29873432300 
  0.63% 99.37% 2.68% 97.32% 
 
Panel C  
 Samples Exempt Non-Exempt 
Pilot Sample 18.67% 81.33% 
Downgrades during normal 
trading hours for pilot stocks 15.76% 84.24% 
Control Sample 2.68% 97.32% 
 Downgrades during normal 


















Table 2.13 OLS Regression: Abnormal Short Selling Prior to Analyst Recommendations for 
Pilot and Control Stocks during the Pilot Program 
 
,)1,5(3)1,5()1,0()1,5( 210 εββββ +−−⋅+−−⋅++⋅+=−− ABVOLRETRETABSHO (1) 
 
This table presents the OLS regression based on the above equation. The sample period is from May to December of 
2005. The variable ABSHO(-5,-1) is the average daily abnormal short selling prior to the analyst recommendations, 
measured as the average daily short selling in the pre-recommendation period divided by the average daily short selling 
in the non-recommendation period, all minus 1. The dependent variable RET(0,1) is the stock’s 2-day percentage return 
following the recommendations. The control variable RET(-5,-1) represents the stock’s percentage return measured 
form the closing price on day -6 through then end of day -1. The control variable ABVOL(-5,-1) is the stock’s 
abnormal volume in the pre-recommendation period, measured as the average daily volume in the pre-recommendation 
period divided by the average daily volume in the non-recommendation period, all minus 1. White’s (1980) robust 
standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficients.  
 
 Panel A: Control Samples        
  Intercept RET(0,+1) RET(-5,-1) ABVOL(-5,-1) 
Adjusted 
R square 
NYSE      
Control Sample (n=1964) 0.01419** -0.2016** 1.0507*** 0.7576*** 0.580 
Robust Standard Errors (0.0082) (0.1078) (0.3094) (0.0338)  
      
NASDAQ Intercept RET(0,+1) RET(-5,-1) ABVOL(-5,-1)  
Control Sample (n=956) 0.01143 -0.4104** -0.3692 0.96429*** 0.733 
Robust Standard Errors (0.0148) (0.2004) (0.3652) (0.0630)  
      
 Panel B: Pilot Samples      
  Intercept RET(0,+1) RET(-5,-1) ABVOL(-5,-1) 
Adjusted 
R square 
NYSE      
Pilot Sample (n=804) -0.0024 0.1055 1.8611*** 0.6599*** 0.531 
Robust Standard Errors (0.0139) (0.3476) (0.2803) (0.0223)  
      
NASDAQ Intercept RET(0,+1) RET(-5,-1) ABVOL(-5,-1)  
Pilot Sample (n= 473) -1.05 *** 0.2098 0.706 *** 1.038 *** 0.889 
Robust Standard Errors (0.0246) (0.2068) (0.2371) (0.0169)  
            













Table 2.14 Correlation Matrix  
 
NYSE  Pilot   
  RET(0,1) RET(-5,-1) ABVOL(-5,-1) 
RET(0,1) 1.000 0.008 -0.037 
RET(-5,-1)  1.000 -0.023 
ABVOL(-5,-1)     1.000 
VIF 1.00 1.00 1.00 
NYSE  Control   
  RET(0,1) RET(-5,-1) ABVOL(-5,-1) 
RET(0,1) 1.000 0.076 0.042 
RET(-5,-1)  1.000 0.167 
ABVOL(-5,-1)     1.000 
VIF 1.01 1.01 1.00 
NASDAQ  Pilot   
  RET(0,1) RET(-5,-1) ABVOL(-5,-1) 
RET(0,1) 1.000 0.003 0.029 
RET(-5,-1)  1.000 -0.085 
ABVOL(-5,-1)     1.000 
VIF 1.03 1.03 1.01 
NASDAQ  Control   
  RET(0,1) RET(-5,-1) ABVOL(-5,-1) 
RET(0,1) 1.000 0.024 -0.034 
RET(-5,-1)  1.000 0.149 
ABVOL(-5,-1)     1.000 
VIF 1.03 1.03 1.00 
Correlations different from zero at p=0.05 are given in bold 
























Table 2.15 OLS Regression: Abnormal Short Selling Prior to Analyst Recommendations for 
Pilot and Control Stocks before the Pilot Program 
 
This table presents the OLS regression based on the above equation. The sample period is from January to April of 
2005. The variable ABSHO(-5,-1) is the average daily abnormal short selling prior to the analyst recommendations, 
measured as the average daily short selling in the pre-recommendation period divided by the average daily short selling 
in the non-recommendation period, all minus 1. The dependent variable RET(0,1) is the stock’s 2-day percentage return 
following the recommendations. The control variable RET(-5,-1) represents the stock’s percentage return measured 
form the closing price on day -6 through then end of day -1. The control variable ABVOL(-5,-1) is the stock’s 
abnormal volume in the pre-recommendation period, measured as the average daily volume in the pre-recommendation 
period divided by the average daily volume in the non-recommendation period, all minus 1. White’s (1980) robust 
standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficients.  
 
 Pre-SHO   Panel A: Control Samples     
  Intercept RET(0,+1) RET(-5,-1) ABVOL(-5,-1) 
Adjusted 
R square 
NYSE      
Control Sample (n=947) 0.01357 -0.4879** 2.1740*** 0.8816*** 0.688 
Robust Standard Errors (0.0102) (0.2487) (0.2938) (0.0330)  
NASDAQ      
Control Sample (n=504) -0.0106 -0.2302* 0.4607** 0.9892*** 0.721 
Robust Standard Errors (0.0067) (0.12015) (0.2057) (0.037)  
      
 Pre-SHO  Panel B: Pilot Samples    
  Intercept RET(0,+1) RET(-5,-1) ABVOL(-5,-1) 
Adjusted 
R square 
NYSE      
Pilot Sample (n=451) 0.0002 -0.8222*** 1.9193*** 0.8255*** 0.561 
Robust Standard Errors (0.0126) (0.3654) (0.3827) (0.0590)  
NASDAQ      
Pilot Sample (n= 275) 0.0103 -0.4020** 0.5233*** 1.0324*** 0.745 
Robust Standard Errors (0.0182) (0.2322) (0.2641) (0.0492)  
            
















Table 2.16 OLS Regression: Abnormal Short Selling for Pilot and Control Stocks Prior to 
Analyst Recommendations for Pilot and Control Stocks during the Pilot Program, for 
Stocks with and without Exchange Traded Options during the Pilot Program 
 
The sample period is from May to December of 2005. This table details the results of OLS regression, which was 
specified in table 4 and was fitted to subsamples determined by availability of exchange traded option at the time of 
analyst recommendations.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficients.  
 
 Option    Panel A: NYSE     
 Intercept RET(0,+1) RET(-5,-1) ABVOL(-5,-1) 
Adjusted  
R square 
Pilot Sample (n=511) 0.0018 -0.1011 -0.2106 0.7642*** 0.613 
Robust Standard Error (0.0124) (0.7567) (0.9167) (0.0476)  
Control Sample (n=1421) 0.0139 -0.1820 0.2423 0.7635*** 0.579 
Robust Standard Error (0.0089) (0.1228) (0.3694) (0.0442)  
 No-Option Intercept RET(0,+1) RET(-5,-1) ABVOL(-5,-1) 
Adjusted  
R square 
Pilot Sample (n=293) 0.0113 -2.277 3.9520* 0.5628*** 0.416 
Robust Standard Error (0.0224) (2.2006) (2.4290) (0.0911)  
Control Sample (n=541) 0.0383** -0.5441** 0.2703 0.8067*** 0.558 
Robust Standard Error (0.0179) (0.2872) (0.6393) (0.0480)  
      
 Option  Panel B: NASDAQ   
  Intercept RET(0,+1) RET(-5,-1) ABVOL(-5,-1) 
Adjusted  
R square 
Pilot Sample (n=337 ) -0.0184 0.1813 0.8358* 1.0118*** 0.891 
Robust Standard Error (0.0130) (0.1843) (0.4259) (0.0378)  
Control Sample (n=696) 0.0093 -0.2611* -0.22083 0.9820*** 0.850 
Robust Standard Error (0.0106) (0.1351) (0.3591) (0.0532)  
 No-Option Intercept RET(0,+1) RET(-5,-1) ABVOL(-5,-1) 
Adjusted  
R square 
Pilot Sample (n=136) 0.0020 0.3504 0.58121 1.0624*** 0.889 
Robust Standard Error (0.0283) (0.5119) (0.5259) (0.1018)  
Control Sample (n=260) 0.0104 -0.8979 -0.8291 0.9362*** 0.567 
Robust Standard Error (0.0276) (0.7014) (0.9762) (0.1466)  














Table 2.17  Firm Level Characteristics for the Pilot and Control Samples in the NYSE 
 
This table presents firm level characteristics for the pilot and control samples during the sample period 
from May to December, 2005.  Size is the market capitalization of individual stocks, which equals to the 
product of shares outstanding and the daily closing price. Book value= shareholders’ equity+ deferred 
taxes+ investment tax credit- book value of preferred stock. Mean standard errors are reported in 





Sample Pilot Sample (Pilot-Control) 
  n Mean  n Mean  Diff T-stat 
Market 
Capitalization 926 7973772  463 7668024  -305748 -0.24 
( in thousands )  (914776)   (914776)    
         
Book to Market 
Ratio 875 0.5992  443 0.5584  -0.0408 -1.43 




























Table 2.18 Pilot Sample OLS Regressions: Controlling for Firm Size and Book to Market 
Ratios 
 
The sample period is from May to December of 2005. This table details the results of OLS regression, which was 
specified in table 4 and was fitted to subsamples determined by firm size and book to market ratios at the time of 
analyst recommendations. The Highlighted full sample results from Table 4 are reported for comparison purpose.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficients.  
 
 Panel A  Controlling for Size   
 NYSE Pilot Stocks Intercept RET(0,+1) RET(-5,-1) ABVOL(-5,-1) 
Adjusted R 
square 
Large Firms(n=268) -0.004 0.171 2.340*** 0.7188*** 0.708 
 (0.016) (0.679) (0.593) (0.070)  
Median Firms (n=270) -0.031 0.049 2.310*** 0.574*** 0.463 
 (0.019) (1.027) (0.638) (0.105)  
Small Firms(n=266) 0.028 0.245 0.929 0.653*** 0.447 
 (0.025) (0.658) (0.731) (0.115)  
Full Sample (n=804) -0.0024 0.1055 1.8611*** 0.6599*** 0.531 
 (0.0139) (0.3476) (0.2803) (0.0223)  
NASDAQ Pilot Stocks Intercept RET(0,+1) RET(-5,-1) ABVOL(-5,-1)  
Large Firms(n=277) -0.038 0.181 1.392** 1.042*** 0.898 
 (0.016) (0.318) (0.564) (0.089)  
Median Firms (n=131) 0.0004 0.528 1.119* 0.966*** 0.728 
 (0.027) (0.405) (0.586) (0.079)  
Small Firms(n=65) 0.009 0.031 -0.173 1.011*** 0.946 
 (0.045) (0.255) (0.430) (0.037)  
Full Sample (n=473) -1.05 *** 0.2098 0.706 *** 1.038 *** 0.889 
 (0.0246) (0.2068) (0.2371) (0.0169)  
Panel B  
Controlling for Book to 
Market Ratios   
NYSE Pilot Stocks Intercept RET(0,+1) RET(-5,-1) ABVOL(-5,-1)  
Growth Stocks (n=260) 0.0002 0.253 2.394*** 0.623*** 0.486 
 (0.020) (0.843) (0.817) (0.117)  
Median Stocks (n=258) -0.026 -0.481 1.972*** 0.810*** 0.712 
 (0.017) (0.617) (0.484) (0.059)  
Value Stocks (n=262) 0.016 0.315 1.703** 0.629*** 0.461 
 (0.023) (0.759) (0.957) (0.110)  
Full Sample (n=804) -0.0024 0.1055 1.8611*** 0.6599*** 0.531 
 (0.0139) (0.3476) (0.2803) (0.0223)  
NASDAQ Pilot Stocks Intercept RET(0,+1) RET(-5,-1) ABVOL(-5,-1)  
Growth Stocks (n=203) -0.0004 0.162 0.242 1.033*** 0.931 
 (0.016) (0.203) (0.475) (0.039)  
Median Stocks(n=124) -0.044* 0.743 1.066 1.089*** 0.888 
 (0.026) (0.838) (0.882) (0.135)  
Value Stocks(n=131) 0.030 0.288 0.852* 0.929*** 0.704 
 (0.026) (0.344) (0.477) (0.084)  
Full Sample (n=473) -1.05 *** 0.2098 0.706 *** 1.038 *** 0.889 
 (0.0246) (0.2068) (0.2371) (0.0169)  
*,**, and *** are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 177
Table 2.19  OLS Regressions for Pilot Samples: Controlling for the Market Trend 
 
,)1,0(4)1,5(3)1,5()1,0()1,5( 210 εβββββ ++⋅+−−⋅+−−⋅++⋅+=−− MKTABVOLRETRETABSHO (2) 
This table presents the OLS regression based on the above equation. The sample period is from May to December of 
2005. The control variable MKT(0,+1) is measured as the two-day value weighted average market return following the 
analyst recommendations. White’s (1980) robust standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficients.  
 





Pilot Sample  0.005 0.205 1.909*** 0.661*** -4.095** 0.537 
(n=804) (0.012) (0.474) (0.493) (0.058) (1.746)  
Control Sample 0.014 -0.202** 1.050*** 0.758*** 0.034 0.580 
(n=1965) (0.008) (0.107) (0.311) (0.034) (1.010)  





Pilot Sample -0.016 0.185 0.667** 1.035*** 2.460 0.889 
(n=473) (0.013) (0.180) (0.317) (0.055) (1.703)  
Control Sample  0.013 -0.417** -0.362 0.964*** -1.028 0.734 
(n=956) (0.011) (0.203) (0.365) (0.063) (1.477)  




























Table 2.20 OLS Regression with a shorter period prior to the recommendations: Abnormal 
Short Selling Prior to Analyst Recommendations for Pilot and Control Stocks during the 
Pilot Program 
 
,)1,3(3)1,3()1,0()1,3( 210 εββββ +−−⋅+−−⋅++⋅+=−− ABVOLRETRETABSHO  (3) 
,)1(3)1()1,0()1( 210 εββββ +−⋅+−⋅++⋅+=− ABVOLRETRETABSHO                  (4) 
 
Panel A presents the OLS regression based on the first equation and Panel B presents the OLS regression based on the 
second equation. The sample period is from May to December of 2005. The variable ABSHO(-5,-1) is the average 
daily abnormal short selling prior to the analyst recommendations, measured as the average daily short selling in the 
pre-recommendation period divided by the average daily short selling in the non-recommendation period, all minus 1. 
The dependent variable RET(0,1) is the stock’s 2-day percentage return following the recommendations. The control 
variable RET(-5,-1) represents the stock’s percentage return measured form the closing price on day -6 through then 
end of day -1. The control variable ABVOL(-5,-1) is the stock’s abnormal volume in the pre-recommendation period, 
measured as the average daily volume in the pre-recommendation period divided by the average daily volume in the 
non-recommendation period, all minus 1. White’s (1980) robust standard errors are in parentheses below the 
coefficients.  
 
Panel A: Using a 3-days period prior to the recommendations 
 Pilot Samples Intercept RET(0,+1) RET(-3,-1) ABVOL(-3,-1) 
Adjusted 
R square 
NYSE      
Pilot Sample (n=804) 0.016 0.065 2.303** 0.549*** 45.04% 
Robust Standard Errors 0.015 0.603 0.917 0.075  
      
NASDAQ      
Pilot Sample (n= 473) 0.005 0.236 0.942** 1.034*** 89.46% 
Robust Standard Errors 0.015 0.234 0.573 0.064  
            
*,**, and *** are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
Panel B: Using an one-day period prior to the recommendations  
 Pilot Samples Intercept RET(0,+1) RET(-1) ABVOL(-1) 
Adjusted 
R square 
NYSE      
Pilot Sample (n=804) 0.114 0.369 3.592 0.433*** 38.09% 
Robust Standard Errors 0.034 1.080 4.463 0.099  
      
NASDAQ      
Pilot Sample (n= 463) 0.011 0.285 1.281 1.023*** 93.67% 
Robust Standard Errors 0.027 0.370 1.921 0.046  
            







Table 2.21 OLS Regression: RET(0,+1) as Dependent Variable and ABSHO(-5,-1) as 
Explanatory Variable during the Post-SHO Period 
 
,)1,5(3)1,5()1,5()1,0( 210 εββββ +−−⋅+−−⋅+−−⋅+=+ ABVOLRETABSHORET  
 
This table presents the OLS regression based on the above equation. The sample period is from May to December of 
2005. The variable ABSHO(-5,-1) is the average daily abnormal short selling prior to the analyst recommendations, 
measured as the average daily short selling in the pre-recommendation period divided by the average daily short selling 
in the non-recommendation period, all minus 1. The dependent variable RET(0,1) is the stock’s 2-day percentage return 
following the recommendations. The control variable RET(-5,-1) represents the stock’s percentage return measured 
form the closing price on day -6 through then end of day -1. The control variable ABVOL(-5,-1) is the stock’s 
abnormal volume in the pre-recommendation period, measured as the average daily volume in the pre-recommendation 
period divided by the average daily volume in the non-recommendation period, all minus 1. White’s (1980) robust 
standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficients.  
 
 Panel A: Control Samples        
  Intercept ABSHO(-5,-1) RET(-5,-1) ABVOL(-5,-1) 
Adjusted 
R square 
NYSE      
Control Sample (n=1964) 0.0009 -0.0070** 0.0531** 0.0016 0.93% 
Robust Standard Errors 0.0010 0.0033 0.0260 0.0016  
      
NASDAQ      
Control Sample (n=956) 0.000 -0.022** 0.036 0.004** 1.05% 
Robust Standard Errors 0.0002 0.0089 0.0306 0.0019  
      
 Panel B: Pilot Samples      
  Intercept ABSHO(-5,-1) RET(-5,-1) ABVOL(-5,-1) 
Adjusted  
R square 
NYSE      
Pilot Sample (n=804) 0.0001 0.0004 0.0057 -0.0023 0.14% 
Robust Standard Errors 0.0014 0.0058 0.0308 0.0026  
      
NASDAQ      
Pilot Sample (n= 473) -0.0037 0.0099 0.0006 0.0020 0.2% 
Robust Standard Errors 0.0034 0.0133 0.0509 0.0030  
            














Table 2.22 OLS Regression: RET(0,+1) as Dependent Variable and ABSHO(-5,-1) as 
Explanatory Variable during the Pre-SHO Period 
 
,)1,5(3)1,5()1,5()1,0( 210 εββββ +−−⋅+−−⋅+−−⋅+=+ ABVOLRETABSHORET  
 
This table presents the OLS regression based on the above equation. The sample period is from May to December of 
2005. The variable ABSHO(-5,-1) is the average daily abnormal short selling prior to the analyst recommendations, 
measured as the average daily short selling in the pre-recommendation period divided by the average daily short selling 
in the non-recommendation period, all minus 1. The dependent variable RET(0,1) is the stock’s 2-day percentage return 
following the recommendations. The control variable RET(-5,-1) represents the stock’s percentage return measured 
form the closing price on day -6 through then end of day -1. The control variable ABVOL(-5,-1) is the stock’s 
abnormal volume in the pre-recommendation period, measured as the average daily volume in the pre-recommendation 
period divided by the average daily volume in the non-recommendation period, all minus 1. White’s (1980) robust 
standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficients.  
 
 Panel A: Control Samples        
  Intercept ABSHO(-5,-1) RET(-5,-1) ABVOL(-5,-1) 
Adjusted 
R square 
NYSE      
Control Sample (n=1964) 0.0021 -0.008** 0.0288 0.0074* 0.0394 
Robust Standard Errors (0.0014) (0.0040) (0.0414) (0.0046)  
      
NASDAQ      
Control Sample (n=956) -0.0027 -0.0058** -0.0228 -0.0065** 0.0620 
Robust Standard Errors (0.0029) (0.0036) (0.0543) (0.0038)  
      
 Panel B: Pilot Samples      
  Intercept ABSHO(-5,-1) RET(-5,-1) ABVOL(-5,-1) 
Adjusted 
R square 
NYSE      
Pilot Sample (n=804) 0.0004 -0.0152** 0.0452 0.0194*** 0.0174 
Robust Standard Errors (0.0020) (0.0067) (0.0387)  (0.0062)  
      
NASDAQ      
Pilot Sample (n= 473) -0.0014 -0.0161** 0.0287 0.0238** 0.0589 
Robust Standard Errors (0.0037) (0.0080) (0.0530) (0.0120)  
       













Table 2.23 OLS Regression: Abnormal Short Selling Prior to Analyst Recommendations for 
Pilot and Control Stocks during the Pilot Program 
 
,)1,5(13)1,5()1,0()1,5(1 210 εββββ +−−⋅+−−⋅++⋅+=−− ABVOLRETRETABSHO (6) 
 
 where ABSHO1(-5,-1)=Shorting volume (-5,-1)/Average shorting volume during the pre-SHO period, and 
ABVOL1(-5,-1)= Trading Volume (-5,-1)/ Average Volume during the pre-SHO period.  This table presents 
the OLS regression based on the above equation. The sample period is from May to December of 2005. The pre-SHO 
period is from January to April 2005. The variable ABSHO(-5,-1) is the average daily abnormal short selling prior to 
the analyst recommendations, measured as the average daily short selling in the pre-recommendation period divided by 
the average daily short selling in the non-recommendation period, all minus 1. The dependent variable RET(0,1) is the 
stock’s 2-day percentage return following the recommendations. The control variable RET(-5,-1) represents the stock’s 
percentage return measured form the closing price on day -6 through then end of day -1. White’s (1980) robust standard 
errors are in parentheses below the coefficients.  
 
 
 ABSHO1(-5,-1) Intercept RET(0,+1) RET(-5,-1) ABVOL1(-5,-1) 
Adjusted 
R square 
      
Control Sample (n=1445) 0.0841 -0.6821** 1.3842*** 0.8026*** 0.297 
Robust Standard Errors (0.0154) (0.3854) 0.3582 (0.2517)  
      
Pilot Sample (n=608) 0.0240 -0.3406 0.8026*** 0.4470*** 0.379 
Robust Standard Errors (0.0103) (0.3251) (0.2048) (0.11317)  
      
 ABSHO(-5,-1) Intercept RET(0,+1) RET(-5,-1) ABVOL (-5,-1) 
Adjusted 
R square 
      
Control Sample (n=1964) 0.01419** -0.2016** 1.0507*** 0.7576*** 0.580 
Robust Standard Errors (0.0082) (0.1078) (0.3094) (0.0338)  
      
Pilot Sample (n=804) -0.0024 0.1055 1.8611*** 0.6599*** 0.531 
Robust Standard Errors (0.0139) (0.3476) (0.2803) (0.0223)  
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